(中英文对照)Abolish Singapore’s Internal Security Act 废除新加坡内部安全法令

justice now         新书:1963年冷藏箱的50周年


Abolish Singapore’s Internal Security Act

We welcome Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s announcement that his government would repeal the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Emergency Ordinance.  He said the changes are aimed at “having a modern, mature and functioning democracy which will continue to preserve public order, ensure greater civil liberties and maintain racial harmony.” We look forward to the Malaysian Prime Minister fulfilling his promise to his people.

Singapore inherited the ISA from Malaysia. This law has been in existence for more than half a century and its impact on society is both crippling and pernicious. Its life began soon after the Second World War as the Emergency Regulations in 1948 when the British used it to put down strong anti-colonial movements. In 1955, the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance incorporating the Emergency Regulations was passed. When Singapore joined Malaysia in 1963, the Federation of Malaya’s Internal Security Act 1960 became part of our law。

The Ministry of Home Affairs claims that: 

    “ … A person arrested under the ISA in Singapore may be held in custody for 30 days after which an Order of Detention or Restriction Order must be issued or else the up to person must be released unconditionally.

In Malaysia, the period of custody is up to 60 days…” (ST 17.9.2011).


 This comparison is irrelevant because political detainees in Singapore have been imprisoned for periods which far exceed those in Malaysia.  Dr Chia Thye Poh was imprisoned for 26 years. Dr Lim Hock Siew was imprisoned for 20 years.  Mr Lee Tee Tong was imprisoned for 18 years and Dr Poh Soo Kai and Inche Said Zahari for 17 years.

The Ministry further claims that the Advisory Board is a safeguard against abuse under the ISA. The protection accorded by the Advisory Board is spurious, if not a farce. Several of us have appeared before such a board and can confirm that the board did not examine witnesses and evidence against the detainee.  In 1987, appearances before the board lasted not more than a few minutes each. Furthermore, detainees were discouraged from appearing before the board by ISD officers. Many were advised that appearing before the board would jeopardise their chances of early release.

Singapore has many existing laws that will deal with acts of terrorism. We have the Penal Code, the Sedition Act, Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act, Vandalism Act and after 9/11, the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act and the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act. These laws provide severe punishments which include death,  life imprisonment and caning.

In 1991, then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said, “Singapore will seriously consider abolishing the Internal Security Act if Malaysia were to do so”. He made this response to seven Malaysian journalists in his office when asked why the ISA was still needed in Singapore even though the Communist Party of Malaya no longer posed a threat. (ST 3.2.1991.) Now that Malaysia is repealing the ISA, we call upon PM Lee Hsien Loong to translate  his 1991 statement into reality and keep in step with the aspirations of our people for a mature and functioning democracy. Indefinite detention without trial is an affront to the human rights of citizens and an assault on our justice system.


Dated this 19th day of September 2011.

  1. Dr Lim Hock Siew 林福寿医生

  2. Dr Poh Soo Kai 傅树楷医生

  3. Said Zahari 赛扎哈里

  4. Lee Tee Tong  李思东

  5. Loh Miaw Gong  卢妙萍

  6. Chng Min Oh @ Chuang Men-Hu 莊明湖

  7. Tan Sin alias Tan Seng Hin 陈辛

  8. Toh Ching Kee 卓清枝

  9. Koh Kay Yew 许庚犹

  10. Vincent Cheng Kim Chuan 钟金全

  11. Teo Soh Lung 張素兰

  12. Yap Hon Ngian 叶汉源

  13. Tan Tee Seng  陈智成

  14. Low Yit Leng  刘月玲

  15. Wong Souk Yee 黄淑仪

  16. Tang Fong Har 陈凤霞




justice now冷藏行动中英文版



新加坡是从马来(西)亚继承它的内部安全法令。这项法令已经存在了超过半个世纪,而对社会所造成的是残废和致命伤害的严重后果。这项法令源于二战之后1948年实施的紧急法令,英国人(殖民主义者)用它来镇压强大的反殖民主义运动。保存着紧急法令内容的公共安全法令,是在1955年通过的。在 1963年当新加坡加入马来西亚时,马来亚联合邦的1960年内部安全法令,就成为我们(新加坡)的法律的组成部分。


    “在新加坡,一个在内部安全法令下被逮捕的人士可被拘留最多30天,此后 必须发出拘留令或限制令,或其他如无条件释放。



内政部进一步声称,咨询委员会(即所谓上诉委员会)是一项在内内安法令下防止滥用权力的保障。咨询委员会所给予被拘留者的保护是欺骗性的,只不过是一场 闹剧。我们之中的一些人,曾经向这个咨询委员会上诉过,但是,可以确认这个委员会并不会去盘问证人及审查指控的证据。在1987年,每个上诉过程费时不过 几分钟,而且内安局官员往往阻碍或打击被扣者进行上诉,许多被扣者都告知,若上诉必将危害他们早日获得释放的机会。





Dr Lim Hock Siew  林福寿医生

Dr Poh Soo Kai  傅树楷医生

Said Zahari  赛扎哈里

Lee Tee Tong   李思东

Loh Miaw Gong   卢妙萍

Chng Min Oh @ Chuang Men-Hu  莊明湖

Tan Sin alias Tan Seng Hin  陈辛

Toh Ching Kee  卓清枝

Koh Kay Yew  许庚犹

Vincent Cheng Kim Chuan 钟金全

Teo Soh Lung  張素兰

Yap Hon Ngian  叶汉源

Tan Tee Seng   陈智成

Low Yit Leng   刘月玲

Wong Souk Yee  黄淑仪

Tang Fong Har  陈凤霞



中英文对照:Does it matter if Lim Chin Siong was a communist? 林清祥即便是一个共产党员又咋啦?

作者:张素兰  Teo Soh Lung

林清祥 2-page-001               justice now

PM Lee Hsien Loong’s observation of the Battle for Merger exhibition (https://www.facebook.com/leehsienloong) is just an attempt to defend his father’s wrong doing.

For more than half a century, Singaporeans have been told that communists were dangerous people and that they indulged in violence. The government conveniently omit to tell us that it was the communists who fought and died for Malaya (which included Singapore) during World War II and that Chin Peng was honoured by our colonial master soon after the war.

The CPM was the first anti-colonial organisation and not the PAP. If Lim Chin Siong and his friends were communists, they were also the founding members of the PAP. They fought alongside the PAP and helped it win the general election in 1959. Without them, where will the PAP be today?

Lee Kuan Yew had worked with Lim Chin Siong and other alleged communists who he later expelled from the PAP. Lee should know and not just allege that Lim Chin Siong and his friends were communists who advocated violence and instigated riots. He should have charged them in open court and produce evidence to secure their convictions. The PAP should not be cowards by simply claiming immunity from prosecution by using the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance and later, the Internal Security Act.

In my conversations with the late Dr Lim Hock Siew, Dr Lim repeatedly said that his party, the Barisan Sosialis believed and took the constitutional path in challenging the PAP. They were confident of winning the 1963 general election and had taken steps to avoid giving any opportunity for the PAP to accuse them of creating trouble. They even cancelled a National Day rally in 1962. Dr Lim in answering a question from the audience in 2011 said:

“… on 3 June 1962, we wanted to celebrate National Day, PAP came into power on 3 June 1959. We were given permission with lots of conditions. You could not speak on this or that or they would come and interfere. We knew if we held that rally, there would be provocation from the PAP and there would be trouble. Then they would use that to suppress us. So we had a last-minute cancellation of that rally.


To that extent, we were very restrained. We wanted to preserve our strength for the general election.”

Such restraint was deliberately not appreciated by the PAP and the British because they knew the Barisan would win the election if the leaders were not put behind bars.

Operation Coldstore took place on 2 Feb 1963. One hundred and thirty three law abiding members of opposition parties, including Lim Chin Siong who were looking forward to the general election that year, were arrested and imprisoned without trial, many for decades. This surely is the most shameful part of the PAP history. That operation wiped out a credible opposition for which Singapore is still suffering today. Incidentally, Operation Coldstore is not listed in the “Timeline of Events” at the Battle for Merger exhibition.

The general election was held on 21 Sept 1963, seven months after Operation Coldstore. The PAP need not brag about its victory for we all know what they did.

 “What we need to know is whether Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues committed any acts of violence and acted against the interest of Singapore.”

But honestly, I don’t care if Lim Chin Siong was a communist or a CPM member. After all, the PAP does lots of business with communist Russia and China.

What we need to know is whether Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues committed any acts of violence and acted against the interest of Singapore. The PAP government has never disclosed any evidence proving that Lim Chin Siong instigated any violence. The PAP repeatedly blamed the communists for causing riots, even for those racial riots that took place during the time when Singapore was part of Malaysia and after separation, when all the opposition leaders were still in prison. Why does the PAP refuse to admit that the riots had nothing to do with the so called communists? Their intention is clear, to cast blame on the communists and instil fear on the people of Singapore.

Lim Chin Siong was incarcerated without trial both by the British and the Lim Yew Hock government (26 Oct 1956 – 4 Jun 1959) and the PAP government (2 Feb 1963 – Sept  1969). I understand he suffered severe depression in prison and was exiled to Britain in 1969. His career as a promising political leader (many think that he was better than Lee Kuan Yew) was terminated by the ruthless and violent acts of the British and the PAP. And Lim Chin Siong was not the only victim of the PAP. Many others – Dr Chia Thye Poh, Dr Lim Hock Siew, Ho Piao, Lee Tee Tong, Said Zahari, Dr Poh Soo Kai and many more were imprisoned without trial for decades by the PAP.

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong should follow the example of President Obama who investigated the CIA and made public the report of unlawful imprisonment and torture committed on captured prisoners at Guantanamo. Open up the archives of the ISD and search for the truth instead of simply believing what the ISD and his father tell him.

Convene an independent Commission of Inquiry while his father is alive, produce all documents justifying the imprisonment without trial of thousands of Singaporeans and exiles and let his father’s victims tell their side of history. We do not have much time, for the number of victims of Operation Coldstore is fast dwindling. Dr Poh Soo Kai is already in his 80s. I strongly urge the prime minister to act speedily and fairly, and not simply rely on the ISD to tell the history of Singapore.

 林清祥 2-page-001              justice now


















Teo Soh Lung

* Ms Teo Soh Lung graduated from the Univ of Singapore with a Bachelor of Laws (LLB Hons) in 1973 and served her pupillage under the late David Marshall. In 1981, she set up her own law firm in Aljunied and in 1985, she co-founded the Law Society Criminal Legal Aid Scheme which offers free legal assistance for criminal cases to the poor and needy members of the public.

Ms Teo also chaired a sub-committee under the Law Society which reviewed the Legal Profession Amendment Bill. One of the amendments to the bill had sought to take away the duty of the Law Society to comment on legislation. She called an EGM of the Society which overwhelmingly passed a motion calling on the government to withdraw the bill. Shortly after, she was subpoenaed to appear before a Parliamentary Select Committee and was vigorously questioned by then PM Lee Kuan Yew. She steadfastly defended her stand and the Law Society. She was subsequently elected as a member of the Council of the Law Society.

Some months later, in May 1987, she was arrested and detained without trial under the ISA together with the others for purported involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow the Govt by force and replace it with a Marxist state. She was released after 4 months but was imprisoned again in 1988 for refuting the government’s allegations against her. She was finally released in June 1990.

Soh Lung published her memoir Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner in 2010 and was one of the editors of Our Thoughts Are Free: Poems and Prose on Imprisonment and Exile in 2009.

She is also a founding member of Function 8 (https://fn8org.wordpress.com), an initiative by a group of citizens who believe that there is a need to facilitate the sharing of social, political and economic experiences of those who had, or are eager to contribute to society through reflection and civic discussion. Function 8 hopes to restart the process of critical thinking, rejuvenate the staleness of a society based on economic expediency and reclaim the human dignity and freedom which is the basis of our humanity.

Editor’s note: Ms Teo is right. Being a member of a group does not necessary mean the person endorses the actions of the group.

For example, Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong revealed in his interviews for the SPH publication “Men in White: The Untold Stories of the PAP” that former National Development Minister S. Dhanabalan left the Cabinet in 1992 because he was not comfortable with the way the PAP had dealt with the “Marxist Conspiracy” in 1987.

 “At that time, given the information, he was not fully comfortable with the action we took… he felt uncomfortable and thought there could be more of such episodes in the future… he’d better leave the Cabinet. I respected him for his view,” Mr Goh said.

Mr Dhanabalan said his reason for quitting some 12 years later, was one of conviction. “My philosophy is one where I need to have complete conviction about some key policies and if I have differences, it doesn’t mean I am against the group……but I have to try and live with myself if I have some disagreements on some things,” he said.

So, who to say that Mr Lim Chin Siong did not fall out with the CPM later over the ways to bring Singapore forward。


张素兰小姐毕1973 年业于新加坡国立大学法学硕士(LLB),并在1981年在已故马绍尔律下完成实习。在1981年,她在阿裕尼设立了自己的律师事务所。她是律师公会刑事法律援助计划的的共同创立者。这个援助计划是为那些在刑事法律下的贫穷者和需要援助的人士提供免费的法律援助。


几个月后,在9875月。她和其他人在内部安全法令下不经审讯被拘留了。他们被据说是涉及一项要通过武力推翻(行动党)政府和以马克思主义建立新政府的阴谋。4 个月后她被释放.。由于她拒绝了政府的指控,在1988年她又再一次被捕。她在1990年终于被释放了。

张素兰小姐在2010年出版了她的回忆录;《跨越蓝色大门:一名政治被拘留者的回忆》the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner)。她也是《我们的思想是自由的:2009年在监牢和被放逐的诗歌和散文》(Our Thoughts Are Free: Poems and Prose on Imprisonment and Exile in 2009.)的编辑之一。

她同时也是‘功能八’组织的发起人之一。这个组织上由一群公民所发起组织的。组织的成员相信,有必要让那些有社会、政治和经济经验的人与大家一同分享。或者期望通过沉思和公民讨论为社会做出贡献。(Function 8 (https://fn8org.wordpress.com)‘功能八’希望能够重新开始进行批判性的思维,把一个基于经济私利的腐败社会恢复过来和在人道主义的基础上恢复认可度尊严和自由的人性。







冷藏行动中文版              新书:1963年冷藏箱的50周年








Lim Chin Siong’s letter in “Straits Times” of 31st July 1961

Your editorial comments and news reports in the last week have focused attacked on me. By repeating the fiction that I am a Communist front-man I suppose my political antagonists hope that it would stick in the minds of some.

While Mr. Lee and his men keep crying Communism to cover up a multitude of sins, let me, for my part try to get the record straight.

Let me make of clear once and for all that I am not a Communist or a communist front-man, or for that matter, anybody’s front-man.    

My political association with Mr. Lee began in 1954 when together we conceived and brought into existence the PAP. I was at one time its assistant secretary general and a PAP assembly man.

Since 1956, and particularly since my release from jail in 1959, Mr. Lee has sought to isolate me from the rest of my colleagues and the party by smearing me as a Communist front-man. Despite this sustained smear in private, he found it fit to persuade me to accept the post of political secretary.

Not only was I reluctant to accept the post, but I had offered to withdraw from politics if he so desired it. He did not desire it. Instead he wished to show the people that I was identified with the government.    

For my part I was prepared to do what he urged of me, because I felt I should do everything in my power to support the PAP Government so that there could be stability in Singapore and we could get down to solving some of the problems that face our people.

Having denied me any participation in the party and Government, I was still to be used as political secretary to give the impression that the workers and the Government were one.  

But this position could not go on for ever. During the Hong Lim by-election I gave my categorical support to the PAP though the election sub-committee was instructed by Lee not to allow me to appear at any party mass rallies.  

After the defeat at Hong Lim the campaign against me was intensified. At the party conference some Ministers tried to attribute the causes of defeat to me and my associates in the trade unions.  

Every protest or criticism from the party branches against the absence of the internal party democracy or the policies of the Government was considered to be engineered by me. By trying to turn me into a whipping-boy it was hoped to cover the failings and sins of the leadership.  

However, I and my colleagues had felt it our responsibility to remind the leadership of its every deviation from party policies in respect of civil liberties, trade unions and the release of detainees in the hope of getting it to rectify.

In spite of the blatant disregard of our advice, we continued to emphasise the important of the left-wing unity. This was taken to mean that we add no alternative but to support the Government.  

On the question of our constitutional future we had proposed, what we considered, certain minimum and realistic demands so as to help point the way ahead. Instead of considering these proposals the party leadership had committed the entire people and party to Malaysia proposals without letting anyone know the details.  

Even when they acted in this callous manner, we sought for the details in the hope that proper consideration could be given to the matter.  

The leadership, on the other hand, was more interested in playing politics. They said they were going further than we – who are now branded as the Communist left- by demanding ‘the total eradication of colonialism’ .

Quite obviously, it was their intention to impress the people by this apparent militant stand, but when we asked for certain concrete steps to be taken to strength the anti-colonial stand we saw how nervous and jittery the leadership became.

In their nervousness they began the shout about Communism and chaos, ex-pecting to frighten some people into believing them. The Communist left who are supposed to be arch-conspirators have now, we are told, been taken for a ride by the British. How funny can people get?

My meeting with Lord Selkirk have been few and far between. If meeting Lord Selkirk makes one a plotter then Mr. Lee is the greatest of all plotters for he has dealings with Lord Selkirk more  than anyone else in Singapore.   By crying Communist on the one hand and British Imperialism on other Mr. Lee must have hoped to win sympathy from both the Chinese-educated and the English educated.

Unfortunately, he treats the people as simple on-lookers who could be impressed by his political acrobatics. This time of course he has learnt that the people are not all that simple.

Amid all his song and dance, Mr. Lee has been forced to make three important admissions:

1.He has agreed to consult the people on the question of merger, and this what we have asked for all the time.          

2.He now declares that he will not start a wave of arrests of political opponents, in contrast to his threats of earlier days, though he still  hopes that the British will do it for him.

3.He now openly promises to release the detainees. Sometime ago Mr. Lee stated that so long as the Federation Government remains anti- Communist and there are British bases in Singapore it would be impossible for Singapore to become Communist. He now raises the alarming prospect of a Communist Singapore.

Mr. Lee contradicts himself this time without his usual sophistry. We may look forward to such further contradiction.


SINGAPORE           i m not communist-page-001













但是没这样的情况已经一去不复返了。在芳林补选时,我给予人民行动党全力的支持。可是,补选委员会却接受李(李光耀)的指示,不让我在任何党举行的群众大会上出现。 (行动党)在芳林(补选)运动失败后,反对我的声音更加尖锐了。在党的会议上一些部长企图把(芳林补选)失利的原因归咎于我和我有关的工会。


















i m not communist-page-001  



林清祥英文01-page-001                  林清祥英文02-page-001

林清祥英文03-page-001                      林清祥英文04-page-001

Statement as required under Section 11(2)(b)of the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960

Detainee’s Name:   LIM CHIN SIONG

Grounds on which a Detention Order is made:

That you since 1948 has consistently acted in a manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore in that you have been actively, knowingly and willingly assisting the illegal Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) by pro­moting subversive activities initially amongst youths during your school days and later amongst the masses in the labour and political fields.

Allegations of Facts

1. That you in 1948 were a member of the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL) a Communist satellite organisation banned by the Government in 1948 for Communist United Front activities. You then became leader of the Little Devils Corps, an ancilliary organisation of the CPM using young children for intelligence and courier purposes to assist the Communist Terrorist Organisation. You were also active in CPM underground work amongst students in Pontian.

2. That you in 1949 whilst studying in Chinese High School, Singapore, maintained contact with the CPM by becoming a member of the Anti-British League, another CPM satellite organisation.

3. That you on 13.8.51 were arrested on suspicion of being a member of the Anti-British League.

4. That you in October 51 undeterred by your arrest, next became involved as one of the organisers of the Communist-inspired examination boycott as part of the CPM supported agitation against the Government and that you were subsequently expelled from the Chinese High School for your Communist activities.

5. That you in 1952 through your zeal and efficiency in Communist indoctrination work, were promoted to leader of a cell consisting of Seet Chay Tuan and Koh Thong Eng both of whom have been arrested for Communist activities. You conducted Hsueh Hsih (Communist indoctrination) cell activities using Marxist, Leninist and CPM publications for study.

6. That you in 1954 were one of the leaders of the Communist­inspired agitation against National Service Registration and that you passed on CPM directives to the student leaders who organised illegal assemblies and “stay in” strikes.

7. That you in 1955 were transferred from underground activities within the Singapore People’s Anti-British League to open front work in political parties and trade unions in furtherance of CPM United Front policy.

8. That you in 1955 became Paid Secretary of the Communist-controlled Singapore Spinning Works’ Union and later together with other CUF workers, you penetrated the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers Union (SFSWU). Secured in the post of Secretary-General, you succeeded in aligning 27 other Unions under SFSWU leadership and used this mass body as the principal vehicle for CUF activities in Singapore. The SFSWU was banned by Government following the Communist inspired October 1956 riots.

9. That you by September 1955 became the undisputed leader and spokesman of the trade union movement under your guidance, Communist in­doctrination through Hsueh Hsih discussion groups and pro-Communist cultural activities e.g. Communist songs and dances were introduced into the Unions. You made numerous inflamatory speeches and press statements attacking the :..colonial government, the emergency regulations and the national service.

10. That you in November 1955 solicited international support for CPM. on the eve of the Baling Peace Talks in a congratulatory message to the Communist movement for colonial freedom in London. In the message you propounded the CPM view that independence in Malaya could not be achieved • without the repeal of the Emergency Regulations and the Public Security Bill and legal recognition of the CPM.

11. That you in September 1956 played a leading part in stirring up agitation amongst the workers and students over the proposed introduction of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (PPS0). At the instigation of the CUF cadres under your leadership, widespread rioting by workers and students broke out in October 1956 and that you were arrested in late October 1956 together with other CUF workers for Communist activities and released in June 1959.

12. That you after your release in June 1959 and on your appointment as Political Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, returned to the CUF scene, and were appointed advisor to several pro-communist trade unions the most important being the Communist trade unions the most important being the Communist-controlled Singapore General Employees’ Union. Under your guidance the SGEU grew in influence and assumed a position similar to that occupied by the SFSWU in 1956.

13. That you in 1960 were selected to the Secretariat of the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC and that in May 1961 when the Malaysia Plan was enunciated, you and 5 other pro-communist secretaries of the STUC Secretariat came out in June 1961 to oppose Malaysia in support of the CUF policy. Your plans were foiled when the STUC was dissolved.

14. That you and your pro-Communist associates then set up the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU). Since August 61 the SATU of which you were the advisor, had won over the support of firstly 43 and later 37 other pro-Communist trade unions and has become an important and integral part of the CUF movement in Singapore.

15. That in May 61 when the Malaysia plan was enunciated, the Communist saw that a strong Central Government capable of dealing more strongly with the Communists would be created when the PAP came out in support of the Malaysia Plan, the Communist saw that their hopes of capturing the PAP was foiled. Led by you, the pro-Communist broke away and form a new party, the Barisan Sosialis where you held the vital poet of Secretary-General.

16. That you were personally responsible for winning over many PAP supporters for the Barisan Sosialis. Realising that the CPM failed in the Federation because it had failed to win the Malays over to its cause, you set out to win over Malay support for the Barisan Sosialis. You started off in this direction in August 61 by :-

             a. Advocating strong support for the Utusan Melayu Strike;

             b. Visiting a Malay fishing village at Tuas;

            c. Inviting two foremost Malays involved in the Utusan Melayu Strike (Said Zahari and Hussein Jahiddin, both now under detention) to attend Barisan Sosialis inaugural meeting.

17. That you in March 61 were responsible for publication of the Party’s newspapers in Malay – the “RAKYAT” when told that “RAKYAT” would never sell to the Malay public you replied that you were determined to see that “RAKYAT” came out in print even if it had two or three issues as what you wanted most was to see that the party’s aims and policies were put across to the Malays in their language.

18. That you were mainly responsible for formulating and implementing CUF policies of the Barisan Sosialis which was from its start the vehicle of CUF line on these issues.

19. That you were quoted in a December 61 article in the “Bintang Timur” a left—wing Indonesian paper as preferring a merger between S’pore and Indonesia rather than with the Federation of Malaya. Well in anticipation of Indonesia’s confrontation towards Malaysia, you had in September 61 warned that the “Mighty Malaysia Plan” inspired by the British colonial Power so that when Indonesia claims back the Borneo territories it will have to tangle with Malaya. That this is to create an artificial struggle 5etween the Asian People so that British influence would remain in the area to protect and defend Malaya.

20. That a CPM propaganda document in Malay entitled: “Utusan Warta Berita” published in South Thailand in October 61 by the Central Department of Malay works carried long extracts of your speech at the inaugural of the Barisan Sosialis on 17.9.61. Your speech which dealt with the problems of Merger and Malaysia was described by the CPM as of “great significance” and a “counter blast which crushed all the intimidating charges from Abdul Rahman”. This favourable comment in a CPM publication implies complete endorsement of your views by the CPM.

21. That you in January 62 exploited the Malaysian Socialist Conference in Kuala Lumpur, and through your pressure and influence, successfully used it as a means of furthering CUF activities and that you successfully persuaded the conference to adopt the following pro—communist deliberations.

(a) That the conference would pass a resolution opposing Malaysia and expressing no confidence in the PAP policy on Malaysia.

(b) That the PAP delegates would be allowed little opportunity to speak during the conference and if possible, to force them out of the Conference.

(c)  That no anti—Communist resolution would be passed at this conference.

(d) That the Barisan Sosialis would be fully consulted on all developments concerning the conference before, during and after the proceedings.

22. That you had a decisive say in matters pertaining to the Permanent Liaison Secretariat formed at the 2nd Malaysian Socialist Conference. The CPM has announced its approval of the Malaysian Socialist Conference on several occasions in propaganda documents. Clearly the CPS’ sees in the conference especially the Permanent Liaison Secretariat, a valuable asset for the CUF workers which all the left—wing parties in Malaysia can be united under Communist Leadership.

23. That you throughout 1961 and early 1962, you warned of violence in the event of Merger and Malaysia being forced through. That you at an SGEU 2nd District Branch Meeting on 29.12.61 warned that more conspiracy with the British could be expected if merger comes through and that they (the pro—Communist) would have no choice but to counter with force.

24. That you in the latter half of 62 in conformity with CPM policy and in reappraisal of the political situation discarded any talk of violence. In its stead, you advocated peaceful constitutional struggle S7eaking at a SGEU 2nd District Branch meeting on 15.6.62 on violence and peace “you said that victory in the anti—colonial movement must depend on the people’s feeling being roused and this could only be done by organization and education and that the difficulties which faced the CUF today should not dishearten them and they should seek to achieve their aims thro peaceful and legal means. You added that violence could only be justified against violence.

25. That you on 12 September 1962 made a policy speech at a comfort Party for Referendum Workers at the Hokkien Association. You analysed the trend of the future struggle after defeat of the CUP at the Referendum. You said that the struggle would continue on the present constitutional basis as long as peaceful constitutional means were open to them. Your main objective was to strike down the PAP and win the next general election and that you could do this by winning over the petty bourgeoisie. The Referendum, you said showed that you had to win over the entire people which could only be done by uniting the middle class around the workers and farmers. This is in line with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategy of a “Worker-Peasant Alliance” as a base on which the Government should operate.

26. That you repeated the policy you laid down at the Sept. 12 speech on at least two other occasions – at Barisan Sosialis 62 Annual Conference and in his 62 New Year message.

27.That you on 14 October 62 at the annual conference, laid down the stages of future struggle as follows:

     a. extend activities outside Singapore and get the cooperation of all leftwing anti-colonial forces in Malaysian and Afro-Asian countries;

      b. try their best to form the Government and through constitutional means, establish a Central Government of Malaysia;

         c. consolidate and strengthen the Party by perfecting its organisation and by intensifying political education. This was to be done by holding more cadre-training classes to “educate” all the party members so that they may not be politically mature, but also well-trained ideologically.

28. That you on 1 January 1963, as Secretary-General of Barisan Sosialis, issued a New Year message which reiterated the stand taken at the September 12 speech and at the Annual Conference in October 62. In addition you warned that “reactionary forces are massing their strength to end democracy in this country. “By this you meant the emergence of neo-colonialism in the form of the Malaysian Federation and the exclusion of the leftwing- from participation in constitutional politics by repression and police terror under cover of anti-Communist propaganda. You added that if this continued, the country would end up as a facist and military dictatorship and “the leftwing forces must then make the necessary judgement on the matter” possibly a hint of possible adoption of more militant CUF tactics.

29. That you and the Barisan Sosialis advocated support for Indonesian claim over West Irian and the Brunei Revolt of 8th December 62. This was conformity with the Communist policy of supporting any uprising against colonial powers for self-determination. 

30. That you provided guidance to a mass rally held on 19 December to declare support for. the Brunei rebels and especially to arouse Malay support for the revolt.


在1951年至1969年期间 ,林清祥被扣留了三次。1951年8月13日起被扣留一个星期,据说是涉嫌卷入‘抗英同盟’及罢考活动。第二次是1956年10月10月26日凌晨之1959年6月4日,‘理由’是虽经第一次被扣留,仍继续进行参透活动。第三次于1963年2月2日被扣至1969年9月。这‘控状’是在被监禁超过2个月后,扣留令才发出的。其译文如下:





(一) 1948年你是马共卫星组织‘新民主主义青年’成员;该组织因展开共产党统一战活动于1948年被政府封禁。之后,你成为马共属下为利用儿童替马共暴徒刺探军情而设立之‘小鬼队’之组织之领袖。你同时活跃于马共小笨珍学生中之地下工作。

 (二) 1949年在华侨中学念书时。你保持与马共联络,成为马共属下卫星组织‘星洲抗英同盟’成员。

(三) 1951年8月15日,因受嫌成为‘抗英同盟’成员而被捕。

(四) 尽管如此,被释放后1951年10月,你又卷入马共支持用来反政府之罢考行动,成为其组织者之一,结果你被开除出学校。

(五) 1952年由于你在宣传共产主义工作中之热忱与效力,你被升为一包括薛济团,与许统英在内之小组之领袖。薛与许曾因涉嫌共产党活动而被捕。你用马列主义组织学习小组进行共产主义宣传。

(六) 1954年内是共产党煽动之反国民服役之领袖之一,你将马共指示转达予非法集会与集中之学生领袖。

(七) 1954年内从地下‘抗英同盟’活动转移到政党与工会的公开活动以促进马共统一战线工作。

(八) 1955年你成为共产党控制之‘新加坡纺织工友联合会’受薪秘书,随着与其他共产党统一战线工作人员渗入‘新加坡各业工厂、商店职工会’。成为它的总务后,你联合了其他37工团,在‘各业工厂、商店职工联合会’领导下以它为主要工具在新加坡进行统战工作。1956年10月,在共产党煽动的暴动后,‘新加坡各业工厂、商店职工会’被封闭。

(九) 1955年9月你成为你指导下工运不可争辩的领袖与发言人,通过‘学习’与讨论小组,亲共文化活动如共产党歌曲与舞蹈被介绍到工会以进行共产主义宣传,你发表了无数煽动性演讲及声明以攻击殖民地政府,紧急法令及国民服役法令。

(十) 1955年11月华玲会谈前夕,为了替马共争取国际支援,你写信予‘伦敦殖民地自由运动’,信中你表达了马共的看法,认为除非马共获得合法地位。紧急法令与公安法令被取消,否则马来亚不能获得真正独立。

(十一) 1956年9月在工人统一学生中煽起反对拟议通过之公安法令活动中你起了主导作用。在您领导下之共产党统一战线干部之煽动下,工人与学生于56年10月进行暴动,随着你与其他马共统战干部被捕,59年6月你获得释放。

(十二) 56年6月释放后,你受委为财政部政治秘书,你照旧回到马共统战阵线,被委为多间亲共工会顾问,其中最主要的为共产党控制之‘泛星工友联合会’。在你指导下,‘泛星工友联合会’增长了影响力并具有了像1956年新加坡‘各业工厂、商店工友联合会’似的位置。

(十三) 1960年你被‘新加坡职工总会’选为秘书团秘书之一。1961年5月当马来西亚计划公布,你与职总声明反对马来西亚计划以支持共产党统一战线之政策,新加坡职总接着解散了而你的计划受挫。

(十四) 你与你的亲共同僚也成立了‘新加坡工团了会总会’(SATU)。从1961年8月起你 当顾问之SATU先取43工团而接着37亲共工团之支持成为马共在新加坡统战工作重要组成部门。

(十五) 61年5月当马来西亚计划公布了,马共见到行动党支持它意味将出现一强大中央政府能更强硬对付共产党,而他们希望夺取行动党已失败。在你领导下,亲共分子退党组织了‘社会主义阵线’,你担任了秘书长要职。

(十六) 是你个人争取了许多行动党的支持者投向社阵,发现到马共在联邦失败是因为无法取得马来人支持,你致力争取马来人支持社阵。61年你朝这个方向努力。

               a.  全力支持马来前锋报之工潮;


               c.邀请两名著名涉及马来前锋报之马来人士出席社阵成立典礼,他们是赛.查哈  利和胡森.查依仃。

 (十七) 1961年3月你负责你负责出版社阵马来文(RAKYAT)版,当你被告知它不可能在马来人中销售,你指示即使仅能售出一两份还是要出版,因为你决心见到党的目标与政策能通过马来族自己的语文转达给他们。

(十八) 社阵的共产党统一阵线政策主要是由你策划与执行的,它一开始计时共产党统战对各项问题推行其路线的工具。

(十九) 1961年2月印尼左翼‘东星日报’曾引用你谈话‘宁可让新加坡与印尼合并而不要与马来西亚合并’。预料到印尼将对抗马来西亚,你于1961年9月警告说:英国殖民当局提出的马来西亚计划是为了使一旦印尼要求收回北婆三邦时只好面对马来亚。这是人为制造亚洲人互相斗争以保留英国的影响力。

(二十) 1961年10月,一份由泰南马来工作中央部门出版的马共马来文之文件,长篇摘引你于1961年9月17日社阵成立时之演讲。你的演讲谈及合并与马来西亚,该马来文件形容你演讲内容具‘深重意义’并‘粉粹了东姑鸭都拉曼的各项职责’。这项好评说明马共完全支持你的看法。

  (二十一) 1962年正月,你利用了在吉隆坡召开的五邦社会主义大会,通过你的压力与影响,成功用它来进行共产党统一战线活动,成功地促成它讨论以下亲共课题:

       a. 促使大会通过及反对马来西亚计划并表明对行动党对马来西亚之政策的不信任。




(二十二) 对第二次五邦社会主义者大会成立的永久联络秘书处,在讨论事项中你保有决定性发言权。马共在其宣传文件中,几项表明赞许马来西亚五邦社会主义者大会——特别是它设立的永久秘书处,将是一有价值的资产以通过它团结马来西亚所有左翼政党在其领导下。

(二十三) 1961年底及62年初,你警告若硬行通过合并与大马将会导致暴乱。1961年12月29日在泛星工联第二分会你发言警告硬行通过合并,将会出现更多右派与英殖的阴谋,到时亲共份子只好被迫以暴力反抗。

(二十四) 1962年下半年,在对局势重新评价时,为吻合马共政策,你摒弃有关暴力的谈吐。相反,一再强调和平宪制斗争。62年6月15日,在泛星工会第二分会演讲时,‘你说反殖斗争的成败决定如何通过组织和教育去提高人民觉悟,今天面对的困难不应使大家颓丧,应继续通过和平与合法途径去达到目标。’你说暴力之应用只能在暴力镇压下才能说得过去。

(二十五) 1962年9月在一项于福建会馆举行的慰劳党全民投票工作人员会上,你分析了共产党统一阵线在全民投票失败后局势。指出只要和平宪制斗争环境还存在,应继续在当前和平宪制斗争基础上进行未来的斗争。你说今后目标是击垮行动党,取得小资产阶级支持以争取来届大选胜利。全民投票结果显示我们需要争取全民支持,这可通过团结中小资产阶层,及工农群众,这与中共以‘工农联盟’的战略作为基础进行政府操作的路线一样。

(二十六) 你至少在两次集会上重覆你于9月12日演讲拟订下之政策:一次在社阵62年常年大会,另一次在你发表的63你新年献词。

(二十七) 1962年10月14日于社阵常年大会上你订下来年斗争阶段:



           c. 通过健全党组织与政治教育以巩固及加强党。这可通过开办更多干部训练班以教育他们, 使他们不但政治上更加成熟,思想上也提高。

(二十八) 1963年正月作为社阵秘书长,在新年献词中你重申9月12日及党常年代表大会上讲话之立场,并补充说‘反动势力准备用合并的强大力量以终止本国之民主’。你指的是新殖民主义以马来西亚形式出现,左翼在他们的反共藉口下被排挤出宪制斗争途径,受到警方白色恐怖镇压。你指出若这倾向继续下去,本国将出现法西斯与军人等专政,‘左翼到时只好作必须的判断’,暗示可能采取更左的共产党统一阵线策略。

(二十九) 你及社阵主张支持印尼收回西伊里安及62年12月8日汶莱之革命。之主张吻合共产党支持任何反对殖民地国家及要求自治的起义之政策。

(三十) 1962年12月19日,你指导一项为支持汶莱叛乱者的群众大会,特别为了鼓起拿来群众支持该叛乱。

林金山 签


林清祥英文01-page-001                                       林清祥英文02-page-001 林清祥英文03-page-001                                        林清祥英文04-page-001







大家已经看到网上对他发表在党报的那篇笨拙的文章被围剿和讨伐了。这里不再重覆。   我要问的是:

  • 既然在20115月全国大选结束的一年扳不倒工人党赢得的阿裕尼集选区和后港单选区,那现在这些小猫小狗的玩意儿行吗?

  • 既然在2011年的7月份后港区补选无法攻破工人党的堡垒,那现在还扮演这些小猫小狗玩意儿行吗?

  • 既然在20131月失去了榜鹅东区的补选,那现在还扮演这些小猫小狗玩意儿行吗?

20115月全国选结束后,行动党对工人党管理的市镇会从来就没有停止过进行‘围剿’!哦!不对。应该叫‘骚扰’从来就没有停止过!   这里我可以给他们算一笔细账证明我没有骚扰行动党。   我一共发表了23篇文章(不包括后港区补选和榜鹅东区补选事件)。全部如下:

1.  2014年5月28日《李显龙的‘诚信政治’和李光耀的‘起诉破产’异曲同工!——破坏和削弱反对党在群众中的形象!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/05/28/

2.  2014年3月24日《行动党霸权主义统治下的工人党市镇会不是解放区!——AHPE杂费上调是行动党一手造成的!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/03/24/


4. 2014年2月15日:《行动党对工人党的‘围剿’绝对无法摆脱走下神台的命运!反击行动党围剿工人党!——让行动党成为无头苍蝇!!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/02/15/

5. 2014年2月5日:《敢走到测谎器证明自己不是PAP的党棍、走狗和爪牙目前还没出世!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/02/05/

6. 2014年2月5日:《癞天发就是:婊子上街卖风骚!-——再摆弄还是婊子!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/02/05/

7. 2014年2月1日:《找工人党的茬!——雕虫小技!——既毁不了工人党的形象、行动党也无法形成反攻态势、完成不了收复失土夙愿、更改变不了走下神坛的必然厄运!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/02/01/

8. 2014年3月5日:《行动党的爷们!秋天的柿子吃多了会得肾结石!——全国大选啥时候举行都行!——形成百团大战态势、集中火力攻陷行动党‘一亩三分地’——引进外来移民政策!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/03/05/

9. 2013年7月13日:《工人党不是行动党或是新加坡政府的附属组织》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/07/13/

10. 2013年7月11日:《给维文的一句忠言逆耳:兔子急了也踹鹰!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/07/11/

11. 2013年7月11日:《胡搅蛮缠也无法让行动党摆脱万民臭骂的困境!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/07/11/

12.  2013年7月5日:《维文同志,您忙完了吗!走,找刘程强先生喝咖啡去!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/07/05/

13. 2013年7月2日:《今年6月是一个不平凡的6月!老百姓在斗争取得话语权和知情权!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/07/02/

14. 2013年6月25日:《张禾宾,你囔什么囔?吵什么吵?——你的政治寿命已经不会太久了!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/06/25/

15. 2013年6月25日:《维文同志,工人党不道歉咋办?——行动党的议员说狂话,让行动党成为胡扯蛋的执政党!》(网址:


16. 2013年7月2日:《今年6月是一个不平凡的6月!老百姓在斗争取得话语权和知情权!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/07/02/

17. 2013年6月25日:(重新发表)《洪奕婷小姐,“争锋相对之后”,人民取得知情权和话语权、行动党霸气削弱!》(网址:


18. 2013年6月25日;(重新发表)《许文远在为了老祖宗‘开棺验尸’! 李显龙在移动老祖宗的龙位》(网址:


19.  2013年6月25日:(重新发表)《行动党的‘围魏救赵’策略告破!咱们的‘围城打援’成功! ‘围魏’ –工人党围不成、‘救赵’ — AIM也救不成了!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/06/25/

20. 2013年6月25日:(重新发表)《傅海燕,何许人也? — 小娘子也。– 既看不懂四书五经、也学不会孙子兵法》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/06/25/

21. 2013年6月25日:(重新发表)《丑媳妇总要见家翁——李显龙还是必须走到台前来致‘闭幕词’!》(网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/06/25/

22. 2013年6月25日:(重新发表)《不管姓啥都挽救和解决不了行动党与AIM之间的‘愚昧’关系—李显龙必须走到台前来致‘闭幕词’!清楚说明和解决行动党控制的市镇理事会与AIM的关系!网址https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/06/25/

 23. 2013年7月15日:《狗吠火车——成不了大器》(网址https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2013/07/15/


  • 工人党已经在群众中站住脚跟了!不管行动党应说明下三滥的招数也无法扭转人民对工人党的支持和信心!
  • 行动党只有老老实实的解决老百姓面对的问题,才有可能从工人党手中夺回阿裕尼集选区。任何企图动用国家机器来迫使工人党就范,绝对无法合奏工人党的支持者对工人党坚定不移的支持!



  • 行动党中央委员会在2011年大选过后、2012年党代表大会、2013年党特别大会和2014年召开党大会上念念不忘党耻!——一定要把阿裕尼集选区夺回来!(至于后港和榜鹅东区单选区他们就没敢胡说八道。)
  • 紧抓阿裕尼——后港——榜鹅东区市镇会的常年会计审计报告说事;
  • 在利用国家的法律幌子下对阿裕尼——后港——榜鹅东区市镇会在区内举办的一些居民活动进行干扰;


  • 张和宾——行动党管理下的16个市镇会的总管家;
  • 詹达斯——前国会议员、‘AIM’的‘股东’——负责行动党市镇会形象工程的党营事业单位;
  • 许文远——国家发展部长兼行动党主席;
  • 傅海燕——行动党总理公署部长;
  • 黄国庆和赖添发——行动党在勿洛小贩中心的地下党员和他们是披着‘小贩商联会主席’和‘基层领袖’的外衣成员;
  • 维文——环境发展部长;
  • 李显龙——总理兼行动党秘书长;
  • 张俪霖——总理私人秘书;
  • 李智陞——国家发展部政务部长
  • 黄循才——文化部长。


  • 国家发展部;
  • 环境部;
  • 总理公署;
  • 总理新闻秘书;
  • 主流媒体——《海峡时报》和《联合早报》;
  • 行动党在勿洛区的‘小贩商联会’和‘基层组织’等等。



  • 工人党中央委员会;

  • 阿裕尼——后港——榜鹅东区市镇会;

  • 刘程强——工人党秘书长、阿裕尼集选区国会议员;

  • 林瑞莲——工人党主席、阿裕尼集选区国会议员;

  • 毕单星——工人党中委、阿裕尼集选区国会议员;








但是,我关心的是:行动党真的能够实现党代表大会制定的目标? 答案是:够呛。

为什么? 因为新加坡人有一句口头禅:   如果能够倒?早就倒了。






这是过去三年的事。行动党就是不信邪。三年后的今天,他们又让 党内的小鬼子拿着这片破旗帜来说事。   行动党说,工人党管理的市镇会 老百姓的欠费比例太高了。 现在,让我们先来自20115月至今全国大选过后的如下一些数据。














  • 行动党管理的市镇会选民是731,268,这个数字是已经包括了他们在全国各个选区的反对票;

  • 工人党管理的市镇会选民是160,812,这个数字是没有包括全国各个选区的反对票;





行动党不必为此操心坐立不安!   如果工人党管理的市镇会因为流动资金出现问题而无法正常运作,那是工人党自己必须在来届大选必须面对选民的事!——鞠躬下台!






您认为来届大选会把票投给行动党吗?不知道。     不过,可以让行动党那两个傻屄学习学习一点中华文化!(这两个傻屄肯定不懂得中国的诗词)。这里就把毛泽东在1928年8月写得诗词《西江月·井冈山》让这两个傻逼学习学习: 






JINGGANGSHAN ——to the tune of  Xi Jiang Yue, August,1928

Below the hills fly our flags and banners, Above the hilltops sound our bugles and drums, Steadfastly we stand our ground. Already our defence is iron-clad, Now our will unit like a fortress. From Huangyangjie roars the thunder of guns, Words comes the enemy has fled into the night.





(中英文对照)The Judiciary and Us 司法与我们的关系





请您阅读这篇文章,谈谈您 看法。

作者: Teo Soh Lung  张素兰。


她是一名退休律师,是《跨越蓝色的大门:一个政治犯的回忆》(BEYOND THE BLUE GATE : RECOLLECTION OF A POLITICAL PRISONE)本书的作者身为退休人士,在闲暇时与友人聚谈、阅读,偶尔也在博客上点评时事,此外,也负责“功能8”(FUNCTION 8)的事务;“功能8”(FUNCTION 8)是个非营利组织,其宗旨事实促进社会经验、政治经验和经济经验的传播和共享。

                      张素兰 1        张素兰 2

On 8 Dec 1988, four ISA prisoners namely Kevin de Souza, Chng Suan Tze, Wong Souk Yee and I were jubilant for we had finally won our appeal. The Court of Appeal comprising Wee Chong Jin CJ, Chan Sek Keong and L P Thean JJ had ruled that we should be freed from detention. We thought we were going home, freed by our courts!




That freedom however turned out to be short lived. Like the 1960s, when Dr Lim Hock Siew and his friends were released on a similar technical error by Wee Chong Jin CJ and promptly rearrested and thrown into deplorable filthy prison cells in Queenstown, we too were rearrested outside the gate of Whitley Prison. The government’s justification for our rearrests was that the Court of Appeal did not rule on the merits of our case but merely on a technical irregularity found in the detention orders. That of course was true even though I felt much aggrieved because my lawyers did not raise any technical issues and I was prepared to fail in the appeal and proceed to the Privy Council, the highest court of appeal at that time. Since 1988, I have not cease wondering why the Court of Appeal had, to put it bluntly, “done me in” with that Dec 8 judgement. It prevented me from proceeding to the Privy Council and compelled me to start my litigation all over again. It gave the opportunity to parliament to pass new laws and amend the Constitution, which abolished judicial review for ISA cases and appeals to the Privy Council.




Recently, I attended a seminar on “The Role of the Judiciary in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.” It was organised by the European Union. The opening address of H.E. Dr Michael Pulch, EU Ambassador to Singapore who spoke about the judiciary’s role set me thinking about the Dec 8 judgement. Dr Pulch touched briefly on the independence of the judiciary and the institutions that support its independence.




In the speeches and discussions that followed, judgements of our Supreme Court were touched upon. Our judges tend to take a legalistic approach. Strictly, they administer the laws, something I learnt from law school.

Professor Dr Thio Li-ann of the National University spoke of how our judges interpreted the law leaving the necessity to make any amendments or repeal laws to the legislature. No activism for judges! Dr Jack Tsen-Ta of the Singapore Management University commented that our judges tend to give deference to the executive in their judgements.

Before 8 Dec 1988, I was aware that in autocratic countries, the judiciary often tend to take the side of the government. Judges are practical and fully aware of the consequences should they rule against the government.


Cases where governments in such countries pass laws hurriedly in order remedy a loophole in the law were well known. But in December 1988, I didn’t expect the Singapore government to join this group of autocratic governments. It did. Indeed, the Singapore government went one step further.


It amended the laws to ensure that no ISA prisoner would ever be freed by our courts! It took away the power of our judges by removing judicial review in ISA cases. The laws were to have retrospective effect.




 A constitution may not ensure the independence of the judiciary. A strong legal profession and parliament which respect and treasure the independence of judges are equally important. And lastly, the citizens too have an important role to play if we want to ensure an independent judiciary. Was there any protest by the Law Society against the new laws in 1988? Did the public object to the new laws? Was there any sensible debate in parliament over the new laws?




While the PAP government went about its business of amending the laws and criticising the judgement of the Court of Appeal in unkind terms, no one uttered a word in protest. The Law Society kept a stony silence. In the absence of support from the Law Society, parliament and the people, is it reasonable for us to expect judges to promote and protect human rights? Are we demanding too much from the judiciary? I don’t know.



Today, many people still live in fear. Parliament remains overwhelmingly one party. The Law Society has since 1986 never commented on legislation which are not referred to it. It has remained ineffective though I am told, has been working hard in many areas of pro bono work and working closely with the government. It may be another symbiotic venture in progress like our trade union.



I am not optimistic and I doubt we will see any change in the administration of justice. Judgements may be very well written containing brilliant arguments and research. But that is about all, I think. Until the attitude of people and the composition of parliament change, I doubt there will be any change. Prove me wrong.


 justice now   人民力量




作者:张素兰。 她是一名退休律师,是《跨越蓝色的大门:一个政治犯的回忆》本书的作者身为退休人士,在闲暇时与友人聚谈、阅读,偶尔也在博客上点评时事,此外,也负责“功能8”(FUNCTION 8)的事务;“功能8”(FUNCTION 8)是个非营利组织,其宗旨事实促进社会经验、政治经验和经济经验的传播和共享。

 张素兰 1    张素兰 2

 1988年12月8日,四位在内部安全法令下被拘留的政治犯, 凯尔文·德苏沙, 庄瑄芝, 黄淑绍和我,为自己赢得了上诉而欢呼。上诉庭是由黄宗仁, 陈锡强和邓立平的三位高等法院法官组成。他们裁决,我们应该获得释放。我们以为在法院的判决下,我们可以回家了!



吊诡的是, 这样的自由之身是曇花一现 的。就像1960年林福寿医生(已故)和他的朋友一样,由于大法官 黄宗仁 在技术上犯了类似的错误而获得释放,紧接着迅速的被再次逮捕,他们再次回到那凄惨和肮脏的女皇镇监牢里。我们也是一样。我们在卫特里路拘留所的铁门外被捕。再次被逮捕的理由是上诉庭并没有根据我们的案件特点做出裁决,只是在技术上发现一些不符合拘留令的规定吧了。我感到非常的委屈,因为我的律师并没有提出任何属于技术性的问题,但是那是事实。心理上我已经准备失败,然后准备到枢密院进行上诉。在当时,枢密院是新加坡最高的上诉法院。自1988年起,我没有停止过疑惑,上诉庭会在12月8日的判决采取这么直接了当的陷进(“done me in”)。它阻止我向枢密院上诉,同时,迫使我从头开始进行诉讼。这是要让国会有机会通过新的法令和修改宪法。那就是,废除内部安全法令的司法审核后到枢密院进行上诉。



最近,我出席了 “司法制度在保障及主张人权方面所扮演的角色”的研讨会。这个研讨会是由欧盟主办的。由 欧洲共同体驻新加坡大使, Dr Michael Pulch, 致开幕词。 当他谈到有关司法扮演的角色时让我想起了1988年12月8日的判决。 Dr Pulch 简明 的谈及有关司法独立性和支持司法独立的机构、组织。






国立大学的张黎衍教授在研讨会上提到我们的法官如何詮釋法律,他们有意撇开需要修改或废除的法律,让国会去处理。我们的法官不属于知识的活跃分子。新加坡管理大学的李振达 (Dr Jack Tsen-Ta Lee) 教授在评论时说,我们的法官往往持着恭敬不如从命的心态去执行他们的判决。







修改法律是确保在内部安全法令下不让任何政治犯有机会在法院的判决下获得自由!它废除在内安部个案中法官的复审权力。 有关修订并有追溯效力。





当行动党政府为了自身的利益进行修改法律条款,他们恶言批评上诉法院的判决,却没有人提出任何的抗议。律师公会像石块般的沉默。在没有得到律师公会、国会和人民的支持下,我们是否能够期盼合理的判决得到发扬和人权得到保护?我们是否对司法提出过分苛求? 我没有答案。









justice now       人民力量



(中英文对照)Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版

By Poh Soo Kai, Guest Contributor

傅树介/文 中文译者:伍德南

3 December 2014 Posted in: Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore  http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/12/03/singapores-battle-for-merger-revisited/

按:澳大利亚国立大学的网站《新曼达拉》(New Mandala)邀约傅树介医生撰写一篇有关新加坡的文章,傅医生写了本文,于2014123日贴上该网站。


The merger issue

2015 is the fiftieth anniversary of Singapore’s separation after almost two years of being part of the Federation of Malaysia (16 September 1963 – 9 August 1965). The event is marked as the day when the island gained independence. The British colonial rulers formally relinquished its residual power over Singapore’s defence, foreign affairs and internal security to the newly-formed Federation of Malaysia when merger came into effect. Reunification was the aspiration of its people as the island was severed in 1946 by the British after being part of the Straits Settlements for 120 years, save for the Japanese Occupation (1942-45).

However the merger scheme which Lee Kuan Yew’s PAP government concluded with the Federation of Malaya government’s Tunku Abdul Rahman was an outright failure. It is thus curious that for the official celebration of SG 50, the PAP government should choose to highlight the 12 radio broadcasts that Lee Kuan Yew as prime minister made between 13 September and 9 October 1961 which was published as The Battle for Merger (1962). The book was reprinted in 2014, with much official hype but no new insights. The deputy prime minister and concurrently coordinating minister for national security and minister for home affairs who launched the reprint, stressed the importance of the PAP’s push for the 1963 merger thus:

It was a time when momentous decisions had to be made for Singapore. A wrong decision then would have been calamitous and Singapore might still be trying to shake off the dire effects today.

[Ministry of Home Affairs, Speech by Mr Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, at the launch of the reprint of “The Battle for Merger”.]

12讲再版封面 12讲

The 1963 merger was a wrong decision. The disastrous outcome was foreseen by the opposition Barisan Sosialis.  We wanted reunification with Malaya, but NOT on the terms that Lee obtained. Those simply could not work. They did not address the fundamental ethnic issue which was handled differently in Malaya and Singapore. The Alliance, the ruling party which dominated Malaysian politics, was an alliance of ethnic-based political parties. It had control of Singapore’s internal security through the internal Security Act (ISA) which provided for detention without trial. The PAP had accepted that Singapore would have fewer seats than its population size warranted, weakening its representation in the Federal government.

Lee insisted that we ‘opposed merger’ fearing that we would be arrested and detained without trial by the Tunku as Malaysia’s prime minister. We countered with the declaration that Barisan leaders were willing to be arrested and imprisoned before merger took place. Contrary to the PAP’s proposals, we insisted that the people of Singapore should have the same rights and responsibilities as any other Malaysian citizen. The ‘autonomy’ in labour and education for Singapore which the PAP obtained was meaningless if the ISA was not abolished.

After Malaysia was formed on these faulty terms, the PAP found itself in the margins of Federal politics when the Tunku rejected its attempts to replace the MCA as his Chinese coalition partner.  The PAP then, in a volte-face, resorted to so-called championing of equal political rights for the Chinese.  Ethnic tensions were stoked in response by UMNO extremists championing Malay rights. Riots broke out in Singapore in 1964, and Separation came to be seen as the only way to avoid further outbreaks of ethnic-based violence.

The merger of Singapore into the larger Federation of Malaya with an entrenched rightwing government was introduced by the British, and rushed through to save Lee Kuan Yew’s political skin. The British were not prepared to give Singapore independence outside of merger with the Federation, fearing that its military bases on the island would be jeopardised if our genuine leftwing party won the 1963 election. Lee was keen on such a merger, expecting that the Tunku would act against the leftwing of his party. There was no vision of democracy or equality for the new society that was enunciated.

Lee had made clear to the British that should there be no role for him, he would not go into Malaysia. As prime minister since 1959, he threw everything he had to push for merger and to discredit his opposition as communists. Based on this charge, the PAP expelled its leftwing members, who then formed the Barisan Sosialis party led by Lim Chin Siong. The Internal Security Council, comprising of the Singapore, British and Federation of Malay governments, duly carried out Operation Coldstore on 2 February 1963 and subsequent weeks, with a total of 133 arrested.

Building up a reading list

Among those imprisoned in 1963, were individuals who refused to sign statements ‘renouncing’ or condemning communism – the only way to gain release. Dr Lim Hock Siew, imprisoned for almost twenty years, refused to sign a statement renouncing violence in 1975. He retorted that it was like asking him to announce that he would stop beating his wife, giving the impression that he was imprisoned for wife-beating. He would never lift a finger to justify his detention.

For more than twenty years following the release in 1982 of the last of the political prisoners then (save for Chia Thye Poh) we maintained silence about our wrongful imprisonment.  The political climate was stifling; we were warned of re-arrest should we ‘cause trouble’, which included maintaining contact with one another. There was also the need to focus on making a living. Only gradually were attempts made among ex-political prisoners to meet up socially.

Following The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (1998) , Said Zahari, who certainly did not have any communist links but was imprisoned for 17 years, published his autobiographical account Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir, and Tan Jing Quee co-edited (with Jomo KS) Comet in our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History; both accounts came out in 2001. They were spurred on by Lee’s narrative of his heroic deeds and flawless judgment, and demonising of his leftwing opponents as subversive communists at every turn.

赛查理回忆录     林清祥 2-page-001

The momentum grew with Tan Jing Quee and Michael Fernandez speaking about their imprisonment at an arts forum on Detention-Healing- Writing in 2006. Tan then come up with The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore, (2010) and The May 13 Generation: The Chinese Middle Schools Student Movement and Singapore Politics in the 1950s. The two books, available in both English and Chinese, challenge the state bifurcation of English-speaking students as apolitical and Chinese-speaking as manipulated by the Malayan Communist Party. The book launches drew a capacity audience. The latter in particular was attended by about 300 elderly Chinese-speaking former political activists who for decades had hidden their past, even from their children and grandchildren, who accompanied them to the event.

华惹一代   513事件

The detainees of the 1950s and 1960s were not the only ones who began to find a voice.  A younger group of  lawyers, dramatists, political activists, and social and church workers arrested in Operation Spectrum in 1987 as ‘marxist conspirators’ had also started to stir. They connected with the 1963 and 1970s detainees to produce Our Thoughts Are Free: Poems and Prose on Imprisonment and Exile (2009). The next year, Teo Soh Lung (imprisoned without trial 21 May 1987-26 Sept 1987; 19 April 1988-1 June 1990) published Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner. At the book launch, Teo stated,

‘I call for the ISA to be abolished. The ISA and its predecessors have destroyed many lives from the time of the British to today.’

张素兰 1   张素兰 2

Since then, her comrades have put out collections of essays by Catholic church workers who were Operation Spectrum survivors,[i] and on Singapore’s political exiles from the 1970s[ii].

The growth of the social media, resulting in the proliferation of publishing outlets, made its impact during the campaign for the hotly-contested election of the president in August 2011. Citizen journalists,  invited to the debates, asked the candidates to state their position on the ISA. Former cabinet minister Tony Tan justified the legislation on grounds that terrorism is a real threat, which led Dr Lim Hock Siew to challenge him to repeat his statement so that they could meet in a court of law, and to call for an independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the allegations against all ISA prisoners. His challenge is still on YouTube.

Operation Coldstore documents: Demanding accountability

Except for the 1990s, the ISA has been used in every decade in postwar Singapore. Operation Coldstore remains the most controversial, as it paved the way for the PAP’s unbroken rule and constitutes its founding myth of ‘riding the communist tiger’. What it did, in effect, was to eliminate Lim Chin Siong and the Barisan Sosialis from the 1963 general election. Lim had won the confidence not only of the Chinese-speaking labour unionists, but also the English-speaking left, mostly coming out from the University Socialist Club. I was one of them.

Documentary evidence from the colonial archives, analysed by historians such as TN Harper, Geoff Wade[iii] and PJ Thum[iv],  has shown that

the British and the Federation governments were not going to accept a leftwing government in Singapore; they came to Lee’s rescue by abetting in Operation Coldstore. I too made a trip to the Kew Archives in the early 1990s.  There is insufficient evidence that Lim Chin Siong, the key target to be destroyed politically, was a member of the MCP—which did not stop the demonising of him as such in the 2014 Battle for Merger. Choice quotations from the Colonial Office include:

While we accept that Lim Chin Siong is a Communist, there is no evidence he is receiving orders from the CPM, Peking or Moscow. Our impression is that Lim is working very much on his own and that his primary objective is not the Communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional government of Singapore. It is far from certain that having obtained this objective Lim would necessarily prove a compliant tool of Peking or Moscow.[v]

Also, Lee was,

quite clearly attracted by the prospect of wiping out his main political opposition before the next Singapore elections…advocating a policy of provocation of Lim Chin Siong and his associates with a view to forcing them into unconstitutional action justifying their arrest. [vi]

The specific reason given for our arrests was that the Barisan was supplying arms and logistical support for the popular uprising led by Azahari in Brunei on 8 December 1962. The British had minuted how this charge was formulated:

Lee had in mind a statement calling for the crushing of the revolt pointing out that organisation, training and arms could not have been provided within the Borneo territories and drawing the conclusion that there must have been foreign intervention. As to arrests, Lee said that information about the recent contacts between Azahari and Lim Chin Siong coupled with Barisan Socialis’ statement giving open support for the revolutionaries provided a heaven-sent opportunity of justifying action against them.[vii]

Lim Chin Siong as Barisan leader had a meal in a restaurant with Azahari, leader of the socialist Partai Rakyat Brunei, who was stopping by Singapore, in full view of the head of Special Branch. Our statement of moral support for the Brunei popular uprising was no different from those that the Barisan had issued for other anti-colonial uprisings. Strangely for the danger we were alleged to pose in our fraternal relations with Azahari, our arrests were postponed for two months after the Brunei uprising as the Tunku and Lee could not agree on the list of detainees!

The authorities had indicated that they would produce evidence of our clandestine involvement in the Brunei uprising, but never did. I am still waiting.

Operation Coldstore was a set-up against Lee’s political opponents. On its fiftieth anniversary, I declared in the blurb of The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore: Commemorating 50 Years:

I maintain that I was imprisoned for being part of a slate of left-wing anti-colonialists who were going to pose a challenge to Lee Kuan Yew in the election of 1963. The charges of communism and subversion, used to frame people like me, have simply been chanted repeatedly to this day. Our rejection of the charge has been ignored outright, without any attempt to supply evidence or specific details which we could answer.


To date, we have received only a non-reply, in the form of the re-printing of the Battle for Merger, the Cold War diatribe of the day. The government has to content itself with targeting school children and blitzing the mainstream media, using the same language and materials from half a century ago, and resurrecting the failed ‘merger’, implicitly to justify Coldstore, though the event itself is not ever mentioned. The impression given is that with the radio talks the PAP won the hearts and minds of the people. If that had been the case, Coldstore would have been unnecessary.

Even more impossible to justify than our arrests is the length of the imprisonments. Detention orders were renewed every two years, without any limit at the minister’s pleasure. Lim Hock Siew would have received at least 8 extensions of such orders under section 8A of the ISA, 1960, a printed form with the name of the detainee and date typed in. How many such orders would Chia Thye Poh, – imprisoned on 29 October 1996, restricted to Sentosa island from 17 May 1989, then to Singapore from 28 November 1992 and freed of restrictions on 27 November 1998, – have received?

The present PAP leaders have chosen to identify themselves with the gross injustices using the ISA inflicted by their party elders, and to cling to a narrative of history that has been seriously questioned.

Dr Poh Soo Kai was Assistant Secretary-General of Barisan Sosialis. He was imprisoned twice under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) which allows for detention without trial for a total of 17 years by Singapore’s PAP government.

[i] Fong Hoe Fang, ed. That We May Dream Again (2009)

[ii] Teo Soh Lung and Low Yit Keng, eds. Escape from the lion’s paw : reflections of Singapore’s political exiles (2009)

[iii] Geoff Wade, ‘Operation Coldstore: A Key Event in the Creation of Modern Singapore’, in The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore: Commemorating Fifty years, eds. Poh Soo Kai, Tan Kok Fang, Hong Lysa (2013).

[iv] Thum Pingtjin, “‘The Fundamental Issue is Anti-colonialism, not Merger’: Singapore’s ‘Progressive Left’ , Operation Coldstore and the Creation of Malaysia”,  Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore Working Paper series no. 211, November 2013.

[v] High Commissioner, Singapore to Secretary of State, 8 September 1962, CO 1030/1159 in TN Harper, ‘ Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”’ in Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, eds. Tan Jing Quee and Jomo KS (2001), p. 41.

[vi]  High Commissioner Singapore to Secretary of State, CO 1030/998, 28 April 1962, cited in Tan Jing Quee, ‘Merger and the Decimation of the Left-Wing in Singapore,’ in Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore, eds. Poh Soo Kai, Tan Jing Quee and Koh Kay Yew (2010)  p. 283.

[vii] High Commissioner to Secretary of State CO 1030/1160, no 572, 10 December 1962.


作者:傅树介/文         中文译者:伍德南


按:澳大利亚国立大学的网站《新曼达拉》(New Mandala)邀约傅树介医生撰写一篇有关新加坡的文章,傅医生写了本文,于2014123日贴上该网站。







12讲再版封面     12讲

1963年的合并是个错误的决定,反对党社会主义阵线事前已预见其灾难性后果。我们要跟马来亚重归统一,但并非按李光耀所争取的条件,那样的条件根本行不通。他们没有针对根本的族群课题,马来亚和新加坡处理的方法不同。主宰马来西亚政坛的执政党“华巫印联盟”,是族群本位政党的联盟。联盟政府通过内部安全法令(内安法)来控制新加坡,该法赋予不经审讯可进行拘留的权力。 行动党又接受少过按人口比例应得的国会议席,因此削弱了新加坡在联邦政府的代表权。








在《新加坡的故事:李光耀回忆录》(The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew(1998年)出版后,跟共产党肯定没有任何关系却被拘禁17年的赛查哈里,也出版了自传体的叙事《人间正道》(Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir),再跟着是陈仁贵和K S 佐莫联合编著的《林清祥和他的时代》(“Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history”);后两本书是同于2001年出版,是受到李光耀叙述自己在每个转折点的英雄事迹、准确无误的判断以及把左派对手妖魔化成共产党颠覆份子等等叙事的激发而成书的。

赛查理回忆录      林清祥 2-page-001

随着陈仁贵和费南迪斯(Michael Fernandez)于2006年在的一个讲题为“监禁-伤愈-写作”人文座谈会上,叙述监禁遭遇,之后,潮流的势头逐浪高。接下来,陈仁贵又编辑出版了《华惹》时代风云 : 马大社会主义俱乐部对当代新马政治的影响The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore,) (2010))及情系五一三 : 一九五零年代新加坡华文中学学生运动与政治变革 (The May 13 Generation: The Chinese Middle Schools Student Movement and Singapore Politics in the 1950s


华惹一代   513事件

不仅仅是1950年代和1960年代的被捕者开始发声。在1987年的“光谱行动”中,被指涉及“马克思主义阴谋”而遭逮捕的比较年轻的一群律师、戏剧工作者、政治活动分子、社会工作者及教会工作者,也已开始涌动。他们跟1963年和1970年代的被拘留者联系,出版了《我们的思想是自由的:坐牢者和流亡者的诗歌与散文(2009)》(Our Thoughts Are Free: Poems and Prose on Imprisonment and Exile )(2009)。隔年,张素兰(两度不经审讯遭拘禁:1987年5约21日-1987年9月26日;1988年4月19日-1990年6月1日)出版了《跨越蓝色大门:一名政治被拘留者的回忆》(Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner)。在新书推介会上,张素兰郑重表示:


张素兰 1  张素兰 2


社交媒体的兴起,言路广开,冲击了竞争剧烈的2011年8月的总统选举活动。在总统候选人的辩论会上,受邀出席的公民社交媒体的新闻工作者(Citizen  journalists)要求各候选人陈述对内部安全法令的立场。前内阁部长陈庆炎认为内安法是正当的,因为真实存在恐怖主义威胁。对此,林福寿医生挑战他重复他的这一谈话,以便双方在法庭见面;林医生也要求成立一个独立的调查委员会,调查所有内安法的被拘留者所面对的指控是否属实。在YouTube视频网站仍可看到林福寿医生的挑战视频。(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zk-TH257ggI




根据英殖民地部门的档案文献,经哈珀(T N Harper)、韦杰夫(Geoff Wade)[iii] 和覃炳鑫 [iv] 等几位历史学者的探究分析,事实证明英国政府和联邦政府是不会接受在新加坡出现一个左翼政府的;他们出手拯救李光耀,配合采取“冷藏行动”。我也曾于1990年代初到过伦敦的克尤档案馆(Kew Archives)查阅档案资料。没有足够的证据可证明林清祥,一个被锁定要加以摧毁的政治对象,是马共党员。然而,2014年再版的《争取合并的斗争》仍旧不放弃对他的妖魔化。在此着重摘录英殖民地公署的一段档案资料:


同时,李光耀是,相当明显地专注于在新加坡下一届大选之前,一举扫清其政治对手 ….. 在采取一项策略,恣意挑衅林清祥及其伙伴,想迫使他们诉诸非宪制斗争手段,制造逮捕他们的理据。[vi]





 “冷藏行动”是李光耀对付政治对手的 蓄谋方案 。在纪念“冷藏行动”50周年出版的《新加坡1963年的冷藏行动-50周年纪念》,我在封底跋言说:








[i] 方可弘 编辑《让我们再筑梦吧!》(2009)

[ii] 张素兰和刘月玲合编:《狮爪逃生:新加坡政治逃亡者思辨集》(2009)

[iii] 韦杰夫著:《“冷藏行动”:现代新加坡在建国道路上经历的重大事件》,收录于由傅树介、陈国防和孔莉莎联合编著的《新加坡1963年的冷藏行动-50周年纪念》

 [iv] 覃炳鑫著:《根本课题是反对殖民主义,而非合并:新加坡的‘进步左翼’、“冷藏行动”及马来西亚的创建》,新加坡国立大学亚洲研究所的工作报告系列,编号211,2013年11月21日。

 [v] 英国驻新加坡最高专员致英国国务大臣的报告,1962年9月8日,CO 1030/1159;见哈珀著《林清祥和‘新加坡的故事’》(‘Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”)与见陈仁贵和K S 佐莫联合编著的《林清祥和他的时代》(“Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history”)一书第41页。

 [vi] 英最高专员致国务大臣信(编号CO 1030/1030/998, 1962年4月28日,见陈仁贵著,“合并与新加坡左翼的式微”,收录于傅树介、陈仁贵和许赓猷联合编著的《华惹世代:大学社会主义俱乐部和战后马来亚与新加坡的政治》第283页)

[vii] 英最高专员致国务大臣信(编号CO 1030/1160, 572号,1962年12月10日)



(中英文对照) The Battle for Merger re-staged: SG 50 and the killing of two birds with one red herring 再版《争取合并的斗争》:新加坡建国50周年 和一石二鸟

作者: Dr. Hong  Lysa  孔莉莎 (网址:http://minimyna.wordpress.com/) ——中文译者:伍德南   日期:November 25, 2014

Note: This is the original posting of ‘The Battle for Merger re-staged’. (minimyna essay number 11, posted on 7 November 2014)  When I learnt that the Film Appeal Board had just heard Tan Pin Pin’s presentation in her appeal against the ‘Not Allowed for All Ratings’ classification for To Singapore, With Love  and its decision would be released in a matter of days, I deleted references to the film, and retitled the essay ‘ The Battle for Merger re-staged: SG 50 and the art of shadow-boxing’.   The section, ‘Pesky Birds’  has been updated following the Appeal Board’s decision.

12讲     《当前宪制斗争的任务》

(Chinese text: Lim Chin Siong (editor), The Constitutional Struggle Ahead. The first in a series of compilation of speeches and essays  on merger published in 阵线报 the Chinese language paper of the Barisan Sosialis. Courtesy of Ong Sooi Eng 王瑞荣)

Pomp and Circumstance

A few weeks ago, those in Singapore who listen to ministerial speeches would have felt that the 1950s and early 1960s had descended on them.  The airwaves were blasting out rhetoric from the cold war era of stark political categories in all its unabashed crudity and oppressiveness. The most senior cabinet members, the prime minister brigadier-general (res) Lee Hsien Loong and rear-admiral (res) Teo Chee Hean, deputy prime minister, coordinating minister for national security and minister for home affairs dispensed a singular history lesson emanating from what is clearly a polemical political tract from the last half a century.

The full weight of the government was thrown behind re-sanctifying as gospel truth the 12 radio talks of then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew: how he rescued the country from being over-run by communists who were ascendant, subversive and violent, in a period of great upheaval and civil unrest manipulated from behind-the-scenes by communist hands. The Battle for Merger, delivered between 13 September and 9 October 1961, and published in 1962, was ‘pivotal in lifting the curtain on the communists and exposing their hidden manoeuvrings’ and won public support for the referendum on merger.

The fanfare orchestrated to greet the gravely-intoned regurgitation of the communist vs non-communist framework to understand Singapore’s past was accompanied by students making the requisite school excursion to visit to the allied exhibition, and the hint of public disciplining two academics for their works.

Despite the hype, the 1961 text was simply recited.  There is no new evidence or perspectives that would justify its reprinting.

Most significantly former prime minister/senior minister/minister mentor Lee Kuan Yew himself viewed the exhibition, and it was relayed by the deputy prime minister that the author had praised the team who had put up the exhibition for their ‘thorough research’.

Incredibly the government decided to put its credibility on the line to defend and propagate this document whose value fifty years since it was written surely lies in its historicity, not its veracity.

What thorough research?

The re-print includes an introductory chapter ‘The Battle for Merger—the Historical Context by Associate Professor Albert Lau, National University of Singapore.  It does not read like a work written in 2014 at all. It simply echoes the key lines of the Radio Talks, citing only like-minded publications without engaging at all with either documentary material or analyses which have emerged which question the premises of this PAP narrative.

This essay goes overboard in its zealousness, kicking an own goal in the process.

In one telling elaboration on just how brilliant and righteous it all was, we are told that at one point in the negotiations between the governments of Singapore and the Federation on the merger scheme, Singapore citizens were going to be accorded Malaysian nationality, not citizenship. The opposition Barisan Sosialis pointed out that Singapore citizens would become second-class citizens.  By his own account, and repeated in the 2014 essay, the Barisan’s challenge immediately instigated the prime minister Lee Kuan Yew to ‘implore’ both London and Kuala Lumpur to ‘use similar terms’ for the people of Singapore and of the Borneo territories, who were to be conferred Malaysian citizenship. If the Federation refused, merger would certainly be rejected by the people of Singapore in the promised referendum.

Clearly, the PAP government had not given due attention to the most basic of concerns for the largely immigrant population.   The vigilance of the Barisan and the pressure it asserted contributed to the outcome that Singapore citizens automatically became Malaysian citizens, even though the Barisan insisted that the change was only cosmetic as the representation that Singapore had in the Malaysian parliament was way below what its population figure warranted.

Yet then and now in the 2014 chapter, their intervention has been called ‘propaganda’, and another proof that they were against merger and therefore they were communists.

The 2014 chapter credits the radio talks with playing a vital part in defeating the ‘communists and pro-communists’ and winning the people over as seen in the referendum where 71 % voted for the PAP ‘option’.

The whole referendum exercise was nothing more than the government fixing the rules at every turn to obfuscate and confuse, playing on the people’s fear of what the Federation government might or might not do if merger fell through. Those responsible have continued to congratulate themselves for being very clever about it.  Then PAP chairman Toh Chin Chye said of the referendum in a 1996 interview,

‘The ballot paper was crafted by Lee Kuan Yew. Whichever way you voted, you voted for merger. …Few understood the ballot paper….How do choose? Which way do you vote? But we got away with it. We won… ‘ [Melanie Chew, Leaders of Singapore (1996), p. 92]

The National Museum of Singapore’s new interactive exhibition SINGAPURA 700 YEARS reportedly includes ‘hands-on experience’ such as casting a vote to decide Singapore’s merger with Malaya and taking a history quiz. One wonders if the museum visitors ‘reliving’ that ‘experience’ will understand the ballot paper more clearly than those casting their votes on 1 September 1962.

The PAP government had simply rammed through its terms of merger.  The Battle for Merger was one key propaganda exercise to this end. One blogger, a former political detainee has shown far greater understanding of the nature of the publication than academics seem to have. Ong Sooi Eng (王瑞荣) has juxtaposed the Radio Talks with booklets that the Barisan Sosialis published at the time explaining its position on merger.

They are ‘propaganda’ only as much as Battle for Merger is, and the publications should be read against one another.

Singapore’s merger with Malaysia proved to be a failure with consequences not necessarily for the better for the people and the societies in the long term.  The Barisan’s pointing out that if the fundamental difference in the politics of ethnicity adopted by the Federation and Singapore were not addressed, merger would only lead to conflict was but stating the obvious. And that was exactly what came to pass.

The well-worn ‘what if’ scenario, almost in verbatim refrain since the days of S Rajaratnam in the 1960s has it that if the

‘communists and their pro-communist CUF allies had won, and Singapore had fallen under communist rule in the 1960s…we would have gone a different path….Even if Singapore had survived, life would have been harsh and miserable.’

The re-printing of Battle for merger brings another ‘what if’ scenario to mind:

what if merger was intended to work, and the result of genuine consultation with the people of all the political units concerned, and not an immediate political expedience. What if the Federation, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah had negotiated a Malaysia that actually had a chance of working? We would all have gone on a different path….

What revisionist history?

The battle for merger has been re-staged ostensibly out of concern that ‘revisionist writers’ have emerged who ‘portray the fight as a merely a peaceful and democratic disagreement over the type of merger. They ignore the more fundamental agenda of the communists to seize power by subversion and armed revolution’. Historians Geoff Wade and Thum Ping Tjin have figured in the footnotes appended to deputy prime minister Teo’s speech as two such purveyors of this at best ignorant view.

The deputy prime minister actually appended ‘a sampling of the more credible books on the CPM and the communist struggles between the 1940s to the 1960s’ in the written copy of his speech. It comprises a number of authors who were given access to the documents of Singapore’s Internal Security Department.  One has to wonder why these individuals were deserving of such trust. Included in this list and cited in the 2014 essay is the poisonous and scandalous Dennis Bloodworth, Tiger and the Trojan Horse (1986). Bloodworth was also given interviews with the top PAP leadership, and even Mrs Lee Kuan Yew. Would all this make the book more credible or incredible?

Also making it to the minister’s recommended reading list is hagiographic accounts by MCP leaders and members.

However, the idea that ‘revisionist history’ is the work of historians in Singapore today who challenge the state narrative on the dangers of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, perhaps with an agenda in mind is quite misconceived. The seminal work of such ‘revisionism’ was in fact written more than a decade ago.

林清祥 2-page-001


As any undergraduate who has done modules on Singapore, or even  eighteen-year olds in junior college who have done a research project on that part of Singapore history would know, Cambridge University historian TN Harper’s ‘Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”’  [ in Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history, edited by Tan Jing Quee and Jomo KS, 2001] cited then commissioner of police Linsett’s 1959 report to the Internal Security Council to the effect that in his estimate, MCP strength was low: 40 full party members, 80 ABL (Anti-British League) cadres; 200 or so ‘sympathisers and less than 100 ‘released for ‘white area work’.

The report also spoke of ‘much uncoordinated ‘cell activity without either lateral or vertical contact’, [ EJ Linsett. ‘the security threat to Singapore (Communism and nationalism)’ 24 July 1959, DO 35/9870, PR0]

Harper’s ‘revisionist’ essay has long become the established paradigm for scholars. Credible research on post-war Singapore history has to be cognizant of it. Wade and Thum build on Harper’s study. A document featured in the study which has become de riguer to cite reveals that at the height of the bargaining among the ISC members on the list of people to be arrested, deputy high commissioner Philip Moore asserted:


While we accept that Lim Chin Siong is a Communist, there is no evidence he is receiving orders from the CPM, Peking or Moscow. Our impression is that Lim is working very much on his own and that his primary objective is not the Communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional government of Singapore. It is far from certain that having obtained this objective Lim would necessarily prove a compliant tool of Peking or Moscow. [Selkirk, British high commissioner, Singapore to Secretary of State D Sandys, 8 September 1962CO 1030/1159 in Harper p. 41]

The PAP Story denies that Lim Chin Siong was capable of thinking, discernment, and comprehending and adjusting to political developments in Singapore that he himself was in the forefront of. It freezes him in this caricature that is applied generally the Chinese-speaking students, trade union leaders and members. It alleges that the self is alive, and has human agency. The ‘other’ is one-dimensional and timeless in its perfidy.

Pesky Birds In his heyday, Lim Chin Siong was the PAP’s feared political nemesis; he has become the albatross around the party’s neck. Any hint that Lim was not a MCP member, was not a subversive and had no intention of supplying arms to the Brunei rebellion would raise questions about Operation Coldstore, and the morality of how the PAP came to rule Singapore. Yet Lim, who died in 1996, is not the main target in the 2014 exercise of re-staging the Battle for Merger.  Similarly the historians who write ‘revisionist history’ are but sideshows or collateral damage.

That honour goes to the former political detainees who have in the last decade step by accelerated step made their narrative public through interviews, speeches posted on youtube, and credible publications.  They have continued to insist that they have never been communists or subversives, and  refused to sign any ISD statements, the only way to obtain release. Said Zahari, Lee Tee Tong, the late Dr Lim Hock Siew, Dr Poh Soo Kai, and Chng Minoh endured imprisonment for as long as it took for them to earn the right to demand accountability.They have also reaffirmed that Lim Chin Siong was their legitimate and respected leader.


The former long-serving political prisoners and their counter-narratives have been studiously avoided by the authorities, leaving it for academics to sniff condescendingly that one has to be aware that they may have an ‘agenda’. They do indeed have an agenda, and have made that very clear: demand for evidence of the charges they were accused of, and the abolition of the Internal Security Act which as their cases show has been thoroughly abused.

The re-staged Battle has been carefully circumscribed to those couple of years; there is no mention at all of Operation Coldstore, which remains the elephant in the class/room.

Instead the MCP is served as red herring.

Tan Pin Pin’s To Singapore, with Love has been given the same treatment. The MCP members from Singapore who are not allowed to return to home unless they first report to the Internal Security Department featured in the documentary have been made fair game in the re-staging of the Battle for Merger, which apparently had been planned for SG 50 way before To Singapore, with Love made its appearance. The film was given a Not Allowed for All Ratings classification on 10 September 2014.

The interviews with the MCP members from Singapore have been condemned by the prime minister as ‘self-serving personal account, conveniently inaccurate in places, glossing over inconvenient facts and others, which will sully the honour and reputation of the security people, and the brave men and women who fought the communists, all those many years.  (Today, 3 October 2014)

Yet the MCP members who could produce evidence of citizenship within a specified time frame were allowed to return to Malaysia unconditionally as part of the Hadyai Peace Accord (1989)  by which the MCP agreed to disband their armed units and destroy all their weapons. The Malaysian security forces were engaged in jungle warfare against the MCP for fifty years. Since 1989, there have not been any official statements to the effect that the returnees have posed security risks to the country.

Tan Pin Pin’s appeal against the Media Development Authority’s classification was rejected by the Films Appeal Committee on 12 November  citing the Film Classification Guidelines which provided that “films deemed to undermine public order, national security and/or stability will be disallowed for all ratings”. The FAC agreed that the film condoned ‘the use of violence and subversion as a means to achieve political ends in Singapore’. This verdict was of course no surprise, despite mainstream commentators’ view that the film showed that the old men and women interviewed were once ‘militants who would have used violence to overthrow the legitimately elected, non-communist regimes in Singapore and Malaysia if they had a chance.’ (Chua Mui Hoong, ‘To JB, for a movie’ Straits Times 28 September 2014). One would have thought that read this way, there was every reason for the the film to be screened from the point of view of ‘national education’.

Yet while the segments of the To Singapore with Love which were given most public attention were the Chinese-speaking septuagenarian former MCP members resident in South Thailand and Bangkok, their narratives would not be the ones that the audience would find the most compelling.

The most forthright, reflective, poignant and inspirational interviewee who holds the film together has been carefully left out in official disparagement of the interviewees.

Just as the former political prisoners who continue to insist that they were political threats to the PAP, not security risks to their country, have not received any direct rebuttals from the authorities, there has not been any explanation given for Dr Ang Swee Chai having to remain in exile, standing by her husband Francis Khoo Kah Siang.


The late Francis Khoo (d 2011), lawyer, church and civil society activist  managed to escape in February 1977 while his friends were arrested under the Internal Security Act on charges of being Euro-communists. Most were released within three months, after signing statements and for some, television confessions. Khoo made his way to England. His return to Singapore entailed an Internal Security Department interrogation. Doubtlessly he would have to reveal the identity of those who helped him get across the causeway.

As Dr Ang tells the story in the film, Francis’s mother, a feisty peranakan matriarch who had been pressuring him to return, said to him ‘If you come back, I’ll take a gun and I’ll shoot you, then I will shoot the chief of ISD’ when she understood the situation.

By Dr Ang’s account, Francis Khoo did not simply pine for home, but continued his commitment to social justice in the new land and beyond. A refugee, she lent her surgical and organizational skills to the cause of the Palestinians—a nation of refugees, particularly the victims of war. She co-founded the British charity Medical Aid for Palestinians,  and co-authored War Surgery Field Manual (1996), based on her experience of  treating Palestinian victims of war atrocities.

Dr Ang sought special leave from the Ministry of Home Affairs to journey home with Francis’s ashes. She would not dream of doing that on a British passport as an expatriate widow.

In ordinary circumstances, Dr Ang Swee Chai could well be lauded as a model Singaporean.  As it is, she is reconciled to the fact that her siblings would bring her ashes home when she dies.

The elderly MCP members in To Singapore, with Love serve as red herring in being additional ammunition for the re-staging of the Battle for Merger, and as the reason for the NAR decision, which in effect shuts out Dr Ang’s narrative, the most difficult to re-write into a security risk story. Reality Check


It has been endlessly said that every society needs a narrative that knits it together. Such a narrative should articulate the fundamental and attractive values underlying it.

  The Battle for merger does the opposite.


Its idea of the ‘essential facts of our nationhood’ is that students should be able ‘to name one communist or one communalist.’


Sg 50 can indeed be an occasion for Singaporeans to reflect and take stock of their society’, to ask ‘how did we get here from there, in the span of 50 years’.

  An occasion for breaching the polarization that afflicts our history.


The occasion for the authorities to demonstrate that they possess wisdom, are ‘their own men’, even-handed, inclusive, humble, forward-looking.

And above all true to themselves and to the people of Singapore.

再版《争取合并的斗争》:新加坡建国50周年 和一石二鸟

注:本文原题是“再版《争取合并的斗争》”   (见《minimyna》博客2014年11月7日贴出的博文http://minimyna.wordpress.com/2014/11/07/the-battle-for-merger-re-staged-sg-50-and-the-art-of-shadow-boxing/)。当获悉影片上诉委员会刚聆听过陈彬彬针对媒体发展管理局将其纪录片《星国恋》列为“任何分级均不允许”(Not Allowed for All Ratings)评级决定的上诉,并将择日宣布决定,我便不提该纪录片,而把文章的题目改为“再版《争取合并的斗争》:新加坡建国50周年 和太极拳”。在上诉委员会作出决定后,‘恼人的鸟儿’一节也作了补充。

《当前宪制斗争的任务》                 12讲



好几个星期前,聆听部长演说的新加坡人好像是置身于1950年 代以及1960年代初期。弥漫空间的强烈声浪,散播着冷战时期的说辞、彻头彻尾的政治腔调,显现露骨的粗暴和咄咄逼人之势。内阁中的最高级成员,总理李显龙准将(战备)和副总理兼国家安全统筹部长及内政部长张志贤准将 (战备)祭出了一堂异常的历史课,追本穷源,明显是过去半个世纪的一场政治论战的事迹。

政府倾全力要把时任总理李光耀的电台12讲,重新供奉为 圣经 :在势力蒸蒸日上、从事颠覆活动、诉诸暴力的共产党人在幕后操控的大动荡、民事动乱的时期,他拯救了国家,不使国家落入共产党人之手。《争取合并的斗争》的电台演讲,是在1961年9月13日至10月9日之间播放的,册子是在1962年出版,它“对揭开共产党人的面纱、暴露他们的隐蔽操控活动,起了关键性作用”,并赢取公众支持合并的全民公投。 大吹大擂的活动,迎来了声调高亢的“共产党对非共产党”节目返潮上演,借以了解新加坡的过去;与此配合,安排学生以必要的课外活动方式,参观配合“再版”活动举行的展览会; 同时,似乎是在训斥两位学术界人士,非议他们的著作 尽管大肆宣传 ,1961年的说词照搬不误,根本没有任何新事证或视野足以说明 再版的必要性。 最具意义的是,前总理/内阁资政李光耀本人参观过展览会,据副总理转述,作者称赞工作团队经过‘透彻的调查研究’,举办了展览会。 令人不可思议,政府竟决定将自身的可信任度的防线置于捍卫和宣扬该文集;可以肯定地说,自发表以来的50年 间,该文集的价值是在于其历史性而非其真实性。  


再版本加插新加坡国立大学副教授刘坤华撰写的一篇题为“争取合并的斗争――历史事境”的绪言,读来根本不像是写于2014年。它简直就是附和电台演讲的主旋律,仅是引述同类看法的刊物的言论,根本没有触及已面世的、质疑行动党的叙事前提的文献资料或分析文章。 该篇绪言表现得过分热情,冲昏头脑,以致把球踢进自己的球门。


显然,行动党政府对以移民为主的新加坡人的最基本利益,漠不关心。社阵的警觉和施压结果,让新加坡公民得以自动成为马来西亚公民,尽管正如社阵所说,这只不过是装门面,因为新加坡在马来西亚国会的代表议席,大大少过按人口比例所应得的席位。 然而,按过去和当今这篇2014年绪言的说法,社阵的介入,反被指为“宣传”,是他们反对合并的又一证据,因此,他们是共产党人。 这篇2014年绪言赞许电台演讲,认为在击败“共产党人和亲共份子”、赢得民心方面,起了关键作用,有71%的人在全民公投中赞成行动党“选项”,就是证明。 整个全民公投的操作,只不过是政府在每一个转折点制定条规,混淆视听,玩弄人民的恐惧情绪,譬如,害怕联邦政府在实现合并后会做什么事,或又不会做什么事。负责其事者一直在自我庆贺,认为自己所做之事是非常聪明的。时任行动党主席的杜进才于1996年的一次访谈中说,

“公投选票是李光耀精心策划的。无论你怎么投,你都是投赞成合并 ….. 很少人明了公投选票 ….. 如何选择?你怎样投票?但我们借此过关了。我们赢了 …” [Melanie Chew著《新加坡的领导人》(1996)第92页)]



一位博客、前政治被拘留者王瑞荣对出版物作用的理解,似乎比学术人士来得更透彻。他把电台演讲跟社阵当时为解释其合并立场所出版的文集,并行阅读。 如果说社阵的册子是“宣传品”, 那么 《争取合并的斗争》不也一样是“宣传品” 吗? 这些出版物应当比照阅读。


老掉牙的‘倘若 … 将会怎样’的剧本,从1960年代拉惹勒南有影响力的时候开始,几乎是一字不差的台词是这样的,倘若“共产党人及其亲共的共产党统一战线的同盟军在1960年代获胜,而新加坡因此陷入共产党统治 … 我们就会走上了一条不同的道路 … 即使新加坡得以存在,生活将会是艰苦而悲惨的。”

再版《争取合并的斗争》,也把另一出‘倘若 … 将会怎样’的剧本呈现在人们眼前:倘若立意要实现能够运作的合并,达致由各有关的政治组织的人民开诚布公协商的结果,而非一蹴而就的政治权宜安排,将会怎样呢?倘若马来亚联邦、新加坡、砂劳越和沙巴协商成立一个能够实实在在运作的马来西亚,将会怎样呢?我们大家都会走上了一条不同的道路 ……  


《争取合并的斗争》 似乎是为了因应‘修正主义作者’ 而再版的,借以指这些作者“认为这场斗争仅仅是一场通过和平和民主方式,对合并形式进行的争论。他们不理会关于共产党人要通过颠覆活动和武装斗争夺取政权的更根本议程。” 

张志贤副总理 的文字版演说辞的脚注,指韦杰夫(Geoff Wade)和覃炳鑫两位历史学者都 犯了这个错误。 副总理的文字版演说辞的一条脚注的原文是: “有关1940年代至1960年代期间马共和共产党人斗争的比较可靠著作举例”。书目的作者中,有好几位曾获准参阅新加坡内安局文件。 人们不禁会感到困惑,为何这些人士可以如此获得信任。 列入书目并由2014年绪言引述的一部书是由极其恶毒、具诽谤能事的作者丹尼斯•布拉德沃斯(Dennis Bloodworth)所撰写的《老虎与特洛伊木马》(1986年出版)。行动党的高层领导包括李光耀夫人都曾接受过布拉德沃斯的访谈。综观这一切,这本书到底是可信还是不可信?

纳入部长推荐阅读的书目,也包括马共领导人和党员的回忆斗争经历的叙事著述。 不过,认为‘修正主义历史’是当今新加坡历史学者的杰作、挑战国家关于1950年 代和1960年代共产主义危险的叙事,也许思想上还存有某个议程, 这种看法是相当错误的。其实,早在十多年前就产生了‘修正主义’的萌芽之作。 林清祥 2-page-001 任何做过新加坡专项课题研究课业的大学生,或者甚至是对新加坡历史做过研究作业项目的十八岁上下的初级学院学生,他们都知道,英国剑桥大学历史学者哈珀(T N Harper)撰写的《林清祥和‘新加坡的故事’》(‘Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”)[见陈仁贵和K S 佐莫联合编著的《林清祥和他的时代》(“Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history”)一书];

哈珀在其书中引述前新加坡警察总监琳瑟特(E J Linsett)1959年向内安局所作的报告,大意是说,据他的判断,马共的势力是薄弱的:

正式党员40人,抗英同盟(抗盟)干部80人;另有约200名‘同情者’和不到100名‘白区工作者’。 该份报告也谈提到没有横向关系或纵向关系的‘不大相互配合的’细胞组织的活动[琳瑟特――‘新加坡的治安威胁(共产主义和民族主义)’ 1959年7月24日,编号DO 35/9870, PRO]。

哈珀的‘修正主义’文章被学者们 视为典范,为时甚久。要对新加坡战后历史进行实事求是的研究, 必须对此有所认知。韦杰夫和覃炳鑫两人是基于哈珀的研究成果,进行深入探索。该研究特载的一份文件,已成为必然要引述的珍贵资料,披露了内部安全理事会成员在就逮捕名单进行争议达到最激烈阶段时,副最高专员摩尔(Philip Moore)断言:

尽管我们都认为林清祥是个共产党,但没有证据证明他在接受马共、北京或莫斯科的指令。我们的印象是,林清祥在很大的程度上是自主工作的,而他的主要目的并非要实现共产主义的黄金时代,而在于掌控新加坡的宪制政府。远远无法肯定,在实现这一目标后,林清祥必然会听命于北京或莫斯科,成为其工具。[英国驻新加坡最高专员薛尔克致英国国务大臣森迪斯的报告,1962年9月8日,CO 1030/1159;见哈珀著作第41页]



当林清祥 的声望如日中天之时,他是行动党所畏惧的强大政治对手,成为该党的克星。任何倾向于表明林清祥 也许不是共产党,不是颠覆份子,没有意图要向文莱叛军提供武器 的蛛丝马迹,都会让人质疑‘冷藏行动’的正当性,质疑行动党得以统治新加坡的道德标准。

然而,于1996年逝世的林清祥,却不是2014年 再版《争取合并的斗争》活动针对的主要目标。同样地,撰写‘修正主义历史’的历史学者只被当成过场戏或附带的伤害。 荣誉归于那些坚韧不拔的前政治被拘留者,他们在过去十年来,加紧步伐,通过上载于youtube视频和刊登于诚信刊物的访谈、演说,将自己的叙事公诸于世。他们一再坚持自己从来不是共产党或颠覆份子,拒签内安局的任何声明来换取释放,这是获释的唯一途径。 赛查哈里、李思东、已故林福寿医生、傅树介医生和庄明湖等,经受长期监禁,不肯妥协, 只为了坚持要讨个公道的权利 他们也都重申林清祥是他们所尊敬的理所当然的领袖。 当局刻意回避这些遭长久关押的政治被拘留者以及他们反面叙事,留给学术人士带着优越感和自以为是的态度去嗅察,他们得要觉察出这些人可能有个‘议程’。  然而,经长久关押的前政治被拘留者的的确确有个议程,并且非常清楚地将之表露:要求提供证据来证明对他们的指控,要求废除曾遭彻底滥用来对付他们的内部安全法令。

再版《争取合并的斗争》的活动,谨慎地局限在那几个年头;根本没有提到‘冷藏行动’,它依然是教课室里的一头大象,有待剖析。 于是乎,马共被用来转移视线。

陈彬彬的纪录片《星国恋》遭受相同待遇。在纪录片中介绍了来自新加坡的马共党员,他们不获准回返新加坡,除非先向内安局报告;其实,在再版《争取合并的斗争》活动展开时,他们就已成为任由抨击的对象,是早在《星国恋》之前,显然是为了建国50周年活动而策划的。 该纪录片是在2014年9月10日被当局列为“任何分级均不允许”评级。 跟来自新加坡的马共党员的访谈,遭到总理的谴责,说是“为自己辩解的叙事,有多处根本与事实不符、掩饰难以启齿的真相及其他,会玷污保安人员以及多年来勇敢地跟共产党人斗争的男女们的尊严和声誉。”(见2014年10月3日的《今日报》) 然而,马共成员,只要能够在设定的时限内出示公民身份的证件,就可按1989年签署的、马共同意解散武装部队和完全销毁武器的《合艾和平协议》,无条件回返马来西亚生活。马来西亚保安部队曾跟马共在森林中进行过50年 的战斗。 自1989年以来,从未见过任何官方声明指归来者有危害该国的安全之事。 陈彬彬对媒体发展管理局的评级决定的上诉,于2014年11月12日遭影片上诉委员会驳回,援引影片分级准则条文说,“被视为危害公共秩序、国家安全及/或稳定的影片,属于不允许任何分级”。影片上诉委员会认为,该纪录片宽容 “以暴力和颠覆手段在新加坡实现政治目的”。 这一决定并不令人惊讶,尽管主流评论员认为,影片中受访的年老男女,一度是“斗士,如果有机会,他们就会使用暴力推翻合法当选的新加坡和马来西亚的非共政权”。(2014年9月28日,《海峡时报》:“到新山看一影片”,Chua Mui Hoong撰。) 人们将会认为,这样的解读,就更有充分的理由从‘国民教育’的角度,公开放映这部影片。 然而,尽管《星国恋》最引起公众关注的是那些居住在泰国南部和曼谷的、讲话语的七、八十岁的前马共党员,但他们并非最吸引观众注目的人物。 把纪录片紧扣在一起的最坦率的、具思想深度的、扣人心弦的和令人鼓舞的一位受访者,官方在诋毁各受访者的言论中,小心翼翼地没有提到。 正像那些一直坚持自己是行动党的政治强势对手而非国家安全威胁的前政治被拘留者, 却没有受到当局直接驳斥一样,洪瑞钗医生不得不流亡海外、陪伴丈夫邱甲祥的事迹,也从来没有获得官方的任何解释。 已故邱甲祥(2011年逝世)是个律师、教会和公民团体的活跃份子,在1977年2月份,他的朋友们因被指涉入欧洲共产党活动而在内部安全法令下遭逮捕时,他设法躲避逮捕得逞。大部分被捕者在3个月内发表声明后获释,有的还上电视悔过。过后,邱甲祥径直前往英国。他若回返新加坡,必将招致内安局问话。 毫无疑问,届时他必须交代那些帮助他偷渡新柔长堤的人的身份。 洪医生在纪录片中叙事说,邱甲祥的母亲,一位冲动的土生华人老妈妈,原本力促儿子回来,当她知道情况后,就告诫他不许回来,对他说:“如果你回来,我会找一把枪,我要杀死你,然后我要杀内安局的头子。 据洪医生叙述,邱甲祥并不只是渴望回来,而是要在新地方和以外的领域,继续他为社会正义奋斗的使命。洪医生身为难民,则以自己的外科手术技能和组织能力,献身于巴勒斯坦人的事业,为巴勒斯坦难民特别是战争受害者服务。她是‘英国援助巴勒斯坦人医疗公益组织’(British Charity Medical Aid for Palestinians)的共同发起人,也是《战地外科手术实用手册》(War Surgery Field Manual )(1996出版)一书的合著者;该书是她治疗在战争暴行中的巴勒斯坦受害者的经验总结。 洪医生是在内政部的特别许可下,专程护送丈夫邱甲祥的骨灰踏上归途的。身为死者遗孀,没想到竟然要以持英国护照的外国人身份来办理此事。   在正常境遇,可以赞誉洪瑞彩医生为模范新加坡人。既然不能作为‘生于斯,死于斯’的新加坡人,她只有期待在死后也让亲人护送自己的骨灰回故土。 在《星国恋》纪录片中介绍的年长马共党员,被利用来转移视线,借以增强 再版《争取合并的斗争》的火力,同时也作为决定把《星国恋》列为“任何分级均不允许”评级的理由。这样一来,等于是封杀洪医生的叙事,这部分事迹是最难再编入危害安全的故事之列的。 张志贤 老生常谈,每个社会都需要一个叙事来凝聚社会。这样的叙事应当明确地表述该社会潜在的基本的和吸引人的价值。 《争取合并的斗争》正好是与此背道而驰。 ‘我们国家的必知事实’的理念就是,学生们应当要能‘说出一名共产党人或一名种族本位主义者(communalist)’。

本来,可以借建国50周年 的机会,像部长们所说的, 让新加坡人来回顾和清点 他们社会的方方面面,问一问‘在这50年来,我们是如何从那里走到这里的’。 

借此机会寻求突破口,解决折腾我国历史的两极争论。 当局可借此机会来表现他们是富有智慧的、是 ‘有主见的’、公正不偏的、包容的、谦卑的和前瞻的。 总之,首先,他们自己要真心诚意,也要真心诚意对待新加坡人民。