人民论坛

小溪细水汇集而成形成汹涌的大海洋

(中英文对照)Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版

2条评论

By Poh Soo Kai, Guest Contributor

傅树介/文 中文译者:伍德南

3 December 2014 Posted in: Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore  http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/12/03/singapores-battle-for-merger-revisited/

按:澳大利亚国立大学的网站《新曼达拉》(New Mandala)邀约傅树介医生撰写一篇有关新加坡的文章,傅医生写了本文,于2014123日贴上该网站。

张志贤

The merger issue

2015 is the fiftieth anniversary of Singapore’s separation after almost two years of being part of the Federation of Malaysia (16 September 1963 – 9 August 1965). The event is marked as the day when the island gained independence. The British colonial rulers formally relinquished its residual power over Singapore’s defence, foreign affairs and internal security to the newly-formed Federation of Malaysia when merger came into effect. Reunification was the aspiration of its people as the island was severed in 1946 by the British after being part of the Straits Settlements for 120 years, save for the Japanese Occupation (1942-45).

However the merger scheme which Lee Kuan Yew’s PAP government concluded with the Federation of Malaya government’s Tunku Abdul Rahman was an outright failure. It is thus curious that for the official celebration of SG 50, the PAP government should choose to highlight the 12 radio broadcasts that Lee Kuan Yew as prime minister made between 13 September and 9 October 1961 which was published as The Battle for Merger (1962). The book was reprinted in 2014, with much official hype but no new insights. The deputy prime minister and concurrently coordinating minister for national security and minister for home affairs who launched the reprint, stressed the importance of the PAP’s push for the 1963 merger thus:

It was a time when momentous decisions had to be made for Singapore. A wrong decision then would have been calamitous and Singapore might still be trying to shake off the dire effects today.

[Ministry of Home Affairs, Speech by Mr Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, at the launch of the reprint of “The Battle for Merger”.]

12讲再版封面 12讲

The 1963 merger was a wrong decision. The disastrous outcome was foreseen by the opposition Barisan Sosialis.  We wanted reunification with Malaya, but NOT on the terms that Lee obtained. Those simply could not work. They did not address the fundamental ethnic issue which was handled differently in Malaya and Singapore. The Alliance, the ruling party which dominated Malaysian politics, was an alliance of ethnic-based political parties. It had control of Singapore’s internal security through the internal Security Act (ISA) which provided for detention without trial. The PAP had accepted that Singapore would have fewer seats than its population size warranted, weakening its representation in the Federal government.

Lee insisted that we ‘opposed merger’ fearing that we would be arrested and detained without trial by the Tunku as Malaysia’s prime minister. We countered with the declaration that Barisan leaders were willing to be arrested and imprisoned before merger took place. Contrary to the PAP’s proposals, we insisted that the people of Singapore should have the same rights and responsibilities as any other Malaysian citizen. The ‘autonomy’ in labour and education for Singapore which the PAP obtained was meaningless if the ISA was not abolished.

After Malaysia was formed on these faulty terms, the PAP found itself in the margins of Federal politics when the Tunku rejected its attempts to replace the MCA as his Chinese coalition partner.  The PAP then, in a volte-face, resorted to so-called championing of equal political rights for the Chinese.  Ethnic tensions were stoked in response by UMNO extremists championing Malay rights. Riots broke out in Singapore in 1964, and Separation came to be seen as the only way to avoid further outbreaks of ethnic-based violence.

The merger of Singapore into the larger Federation of Malaya with an entrenched rightwing government was introduced by the British, and rushed through to save Lee Kuan Yew’s political skin. The British were not prepared to give Singapore independence outside of merger with the Federation, fearing that its military bases on the island would be jeopardised if our genuine leftwing party won the 1963 election. Lee was keen on such a merger, expecting that the Tunku would act against the leftwing of his party. There was no vision of democracy or equality for the new society that was enunciated.

Lee had made clear to the British that should there be no role for him, he would not go into Malaysia. As prime minister since 1959, he threw everything he had to push for merger and to discredit his opposition as communists. Based on this charge, the PAP expelled its leftwing members, who then formed the Barisan Sosialis party led by Lim Chin Siong. The Internal Security Council, comprising of the Singapore, British and Federation of Malay governments, duly carried out Operation Coldstore on 2 February 1963 and subsequent weeks, with a total of 133 arrested.

Building up a reading list

Among those imprisoned in 1963, were individuals who refused to sign statements ‘renouncing’ or condemning communism – the only way to gain release. Dr Lim Hock Siew, imprisoned for almost twenty years, refused to sign a statement renouncing violence in 1975. He retorted that it was like asking him to announce that he would stop beating his wife, giving the impression that he was imprisoned for wife-beating. He would never lift a finger to justify his detention.

For more than twenty years following the release in 1982 of the last of the political prisoners then (save for Chia Thye Poh) we maintained silence about our wrongful imprisonment.  The political climate was stifling; we were warned of re-arrest should we ‘cause trouble’, which included maintaining contact with one another. There was also the need to focus on making a living. Only gradually were attempts made among ex-political prisoners to meet up socially.

Following The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (1998) , Said Zahari, who certainly did not have any communist links but was imprisoned for 17 years, published his autobiographical account Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir, and Tan Jing Quee co-edited (with Jomo KS) Comet in our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History; both accounts came out in 2001. They were spurred on by Lee’s narrative of his heroic deeds and flawless judgment, and demonising of his leftwing opponents as subversive communists at every turn.

赛查理回忆录     林清祥 2-page-001

The momentum grew with Tan Jing Quee and Michael Fernandez speaking about their imprisonment at an arts forum on Detention-Healing- Writing in 2006. Tan then come up with The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore, (2010) and The May 13 Generation: The Chinese Middle Schools Student Movement and Singapore Politics in the 1950s. The two books, available in both English and Chinese, challenge the state bifurcation of English-speaking students as apolitical and Chinese-speaking as manipulated by the Malayan Communist Party. The book launches drew a capacity audience. The latter in particular was attended by about 300 elderly Chinese-speaking former political activists who for decades had hidden their past, even from their children and grandchildren, who accompanied them to the event.

华惹一代   513事件

The detainees of the 1950s and 1960s were not the only ones who began to find a voice.  A younger group of  lawyers, dramatists, political activists, and social and church workers arrested in Operation Spectrum in 1987 as ‘marxist conspirators’ had also started to stir. They connected with the 1963 and 1970s detainees to produce Our Thoughts Are Free: Poems and Prose on Imprisonment and Exile (2009). The next year, Teo Soh Lung (imprisoned without trial 21 May 1987-26 Sept 1987; 19 April 1988-1 June 1990) published Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner. At the book launch, Teo stated,

‘I call for the ISA to be abolished. The ISA and its predecessors have destroyed many lives from the time of the British to today.’

张素兰 1   张素兰 2

Since then, her comrades have put out collections of essays by Catholic church workers who were Operation Spectrum survivors,[i] and on Singapore’s political exiles from the 1970s[ii].

The growth of the social media, resulting in the proliferation of publishing outlets, made its impact during the campaign for the hotly-contested election of the president in August 2011. Citizen journalists,  invited to the debates, asked the candidates to state their position on the ISA. Former cabinet minister Tony Tan justified the legislation on grounds that terrorism is a real threat, which led Dr Lim Hock Siew to challenge him to repeat his statement so that they could meet in a court of law, and to call for an independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the allegations against all ISA prisoners. His challenge is still on YouTube.

Operation Coldstore documents: Demanding accountability

Except for the 1990s, the ISA has been used in every decade in postwar Singapore. Operation Coldstore remains the most controversial, as it paved the way for the PAP’s unbroken rule and constitutes its founding myth of ‘riding the communist tiger’. What it did, in effect, was to eliminate Lim Chin Siong and the Barisan Sosialis from the 1963 general election. Lim had won the confidence not only of the Chinese-speaking labour unionists, but also the English-speaking left, mostly coming out from the University Socialist Club. I was one of them.

Documentary evidence from the colonial archives, analysed by historians such as TN Harper, Geoff Wade[iii] and PJ Thum[iv],  has shown that

the British and the Federation governments were not going to accept a leftwing government in Singapore; they came to Lee’s rescue by abetting in Operation Coldstore. I too made a trip to the Kew Archives in the early 1990s.  There is insufficient evidence that Lim Chin Siong, the key target to be destroyed politically, was a member of the MCP—which did not stop the demonising of him as such in the 2014 Battle for Merger. Choice quotations from the Colonial Office include:

While we accept that Lim Chin Siong is a Communist, there is no evidence he is receiving orders from the CPM, Peking or Moscow. Our impression is that Lim is working very much on his own and that his primary objective is not the Communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional government of Singapore. It is far from certain that having obtained this objective Lim would necessarily prove a compliant tool of Peking or Moscow.[v]

Also, Lee was,

quite clearly attracted by the prospect of wiping out his main political opposition before the next Singapore elections…advocating a policy of provocation of Lim Chin Siong and his associates with a view to forcing them into unconstitutional action justifying their arrest. [vi]

The specific reason given for our arrests was that the Barisan was supplying arms and logistical support for the popular uprising led by Azahari in Brunei on 8 December 1962. The British had minuted how this charge was formulated:

Lee had in mind a statement calling for the crushing of the revolt pointing out that organisation, training and arms could not have been provided within the Borneo territories and drawing the conclusion that there must have been foreign intervention. As to arrests, Lee said that information about the recent contacts between Azahari and Lim Chin Siong coupled with Barisan Socialis’ statement giving open support for the revolutionaries provided a heaven-sent opportunity of justifying action against them.[vii]

Lim Chin Siong as Barisan leader had a meal in a restaurant with Azahari, leader of the socialist Partai Rakyat Brunei, who was stopping by Singapore, in full view of the head of Special Branch. Our statement of moral support for the Brunei popular uprising was no different from those that the Barisan had issued for other anti-colonial uprisings. Strangely for the danger we were alleged to pose in our fraternal relations with Azahari, our arrests were postponed for two months after the Brunei uprising as the Tunku and Lee could not agree on the list of detainees!

The authorities had indicated that they would produce evidence of our clandestine involvement in the Brunei uprising, but never did. I am still waiting.

Operation Coldstore was a set-up against Lee’s political opponents. On its fiftieth anniversary, I declared in the blurb of The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore: Commemorating 50 Years:

I maintain that I was imprisoned for being part of a slate of left-wing anti-colonialists who were going to pose a challenge to Lee Kuan Yew in the election of 1963. The charges of communism and subversion, used to frame people like me, have simply been chanted repeatedly to this day. Our rejection of the charge has been ignored outright, without any attempt to supply evidence or specific details which we could answer.

新书:1963年冷藏箱的50周年

To date, we have received only a non-reply, in the form of the re-printing of the Battle for Merger, the Cold War diatribe of the day. The government has to content itself with targeting school children and blitzing the mainstream media, using the same language and materials from half a century ago, and resurrecting the failed ‘merger’, implicitly to justify Coldstore, though the event itself is not ever mentioned. The impression given is that with the radio talks the PAP won the hearts and minds of the people. If that had been the case, Coldstore would have been unnecessary.

Even more impossible to justify than our arrests is the length of the imprisonments. Detention orders were renewed every two years, without any limit at the minister’s pleasure. Lim Hock Siew would have received at least 8 extensions of such orders under section 8A of the ISA, 1960, a printed form with the name of the detainee and date typed in. How many such orders would Chia Thye Poh, – imprisoned on 29 October 1996, restricted to Sentosa island from 17 May 1989, then to Singapore from 28 November 1992 and freed of restrictions on 27 November 1998, – have received?

The present PAP leaders have chosen to identify themselves with the gross injustices using the ISA inflicted by their party elders, and to cling to a narrative of history that has been seriously questioned.

Dr Poh Soo Kai was Assistant Secretary-General of Barisan Sosialis. He was imprisoned twice under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) which allows for detention without trial for a total of 17 years by Singapore’s PAP government.

[i] Fong Hoe Fang, ed. That We May Dream Again (2009)

[ii] Teo Soh Lung and Low Yit Keng, eds. Escape from the lion’s paw : reflections of Singapore’s political exiles (2009)

[iii] Geoff Wade, ‘Operation Coldstore: A Key Event in the Creation of Modern Singapore’, in The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore: Commemorating Fifty years, eds. Poh Soo Kai, Tan Kok Fang, Hong Lysa (2013).

[iv] Thum Pingtjin, “‘The Fundamental Issue is Anti-colonialism, not Merger’: Singapore’s ‘Progressive Left’ , Operation Coldstore and the Creation of Malaysia”,  Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore Working Paper series no. 211, November 2013.

[v] High Commissioner, Singapore to Secretary of State, 8 September 1962, CO 1030/1159 in TN Harper, ‘ Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”’ in Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, eds. Tan Jing Quee and Jomo KS (2001), p. 41.

[vi]  High Commissioner Singapore to Secretary of State, CO 1030/998, 28 April 1962, cited in Tan Jing Quee, ‘Merger and the Decimation of the Left-Wing in Singapore,’ in Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore, eds. Poh Soo Kai, Tan Jing Quee and Koh Kay Yew (2010)  p. 283.

[vii] High Commissioner to Secretary of State CO 1030/1160, no 572, 10 December 1962.

新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版

作者:傅树介/文         中文译者:伍德南

 

按:澳大利亚国立大学的网站《新曼达拉》(New Mandala)邀约傅树介医生撰写一篇有关新加坡的文章,傅医生写了本文,于2014123日贴上该网站。

张志贤

合并课题

2015年是新加坡脱离马来西亚的50周年;在并入马来西亚联邦将近两年(从1963年9约16日至1965年8月9日)后分家,这标志这个岛国独立了。当年,在实现合并后,英国殖民统治者正式放弃其控制新加坡防务、外交事务及内部安全的剩余权力,将之移交给新成立的马来西亚联邦。除了日治时期(1942-45年),新加坡经历英国以直辖殖民地方式统治了120年,于1946年从马来亚被分割开来,新加坡人民是渴望跟马来亚重归统一的。

不过,李光耀的人民行动党政府跟马来亚联邦政府的东姑阿都拉曼所达成的合并方案,却遭遇彻底失败。因此,令人难以理解,建国50周年的官方庆祝活动,行动党政府竟会选择高调宣传李光耀在任总理时,于1961年9月13日至10月9日发表的电台12讲;讲稿后来以《争取合并的斗争》一书,结集出版(1962年)。这本书于2014年再版,除了官方大肆宣传,别无深层新意。副总理兼国家安全统筹部长及内政部长张志贤准将在再版发布会上,强调行动党推动1963年合并所扮演的重要角色,说:

当时,新加坡必须作出重大的决定。一个错误的决定将会导致灾难性的后果,而今天的新加坡可能还在设法摆脱其可怕的恶果。

[摘自:副总理兼国家安全统筹部长及内政部长张志贤准将在《争取合并的斗争》再版发布会上的演讲。]

12讲再版封面     12讲

1963年的合并是个错误的决定,反对党社会主义阵线事前已预见其灾难性后果。我们要跟马来亚重归统一,但并非按李光耀所争取的条件,那样的条件根本行不通。他们没有针对根本的族群课题,马来亚和新加坡处理的方法不同。主宰马来西亚政坛的执政党“华巫印联盟”,是族群本位政党的联盟。联盟政府通过内部安全法令(内安法)来控制新加坡,该法赋予不经审讯可进行拘留的权力。 行动党又接受少过按人口比例应得的国会议席,因此削弱了新加坡在联邦政府的代表权。

李光耀硬指我们‘反对合并’是因为害怕被马来西亚首相东姑逮捕和不经审讯拘留。我们反驳此说,并宣告社阵领导人情愿在合并前被捕入狱。行动党的建议相反,我们坚持的要求是,新加坡人民跟其他马来西亚公民享有相同权利、负相同责任。如果不废除内安法,新加坡在劳工和教育方面的‘自主权’根本毫无意义。

马来西亚基于这些错误条件成立后,行动党企图取代马华公会在联盟中的华人政党地位,遭东姑拒绝后,发现自己处于边缘化。于是,行动党来个大转变,诉诸所谓的要为华人争取平等权益。巫统党内的极端分子以争取马来人权益回应,造成族群关系日趋紧张,导致1964年在新加坡爆发种族冲突,而分家被认为是避免种族冲突再度爆发的唯一途径。

把新加坡并入右翼政府霸占的、范围扩大的马来亚联邦,是英国人的主意,并匆匆拼凑成立,借以挽救李光耀免遭政治厄运。英国人不准备让新加坡在跟马来亚联邦合并的框架外取得独立,因恐怕,倘若我们真正左派政党赢得1963年大选,或将危害在岛国的英国军事基地。李光耀热衷于这样的合并,期待东姑将会替行动党对付左翼。新社会的民主画面或平等前景,根本没有得到阐述。

李光耀曾向英国人清楚表示,如果没有如何角色可让他扮演,他将不要加入马来西亚。自1959年开始担任总理的李光耀,不遗余力地推动新马合并,并诋毁其对手是共产党。基于这些指控,行动党开除了党内的左翼党员,后者便成立了由林清祥领导的社会主义阵线。由新加坡、英国和马来亚联邦三方政府组成的内部安全理事会安按计划于1963年2月2日采取“冷藏行动”,经历几个星期,总共逮捕了133人。

建立起阅读书单

于1963年被捕入狱者当中,包括这样一些人,他们拒绝为获释而发表声明‘表明放弃’或谴责共产主义;这是当时取得释放的唯一途径。遭拘禁几近20年的林福寿医生,于1975年拒绝签署‘表明放弃’暴力的声明。他极力反驳道:这好比是要他宣布从此不再打老婆,给人的印象是他因打老婆而遭监禁。他绝不轻易苟同拘禁他的正当性。

打从1982年当时最后一名政治被拘留者(谢太保除外)获释以后的20多年期间,我们对遭受错误监禁保持缄默。这期间,政治氛围令人窒息;我们被警告,如果‘制造麻烦’,包括彼此保持来往,将会再遭逮捕。同时,也是因为大家也忙于设法维持生计。前政治被拘留人士是逐渐逐渐地尝试进行社交聚会的。

在《新加坡的故事:李光耀回忆录》(The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew(1998年)出版后,跟共产党肯定没有任何关系却被拘禁17年的赛查哈里,也出版了自传体的叙事《人间正道》(Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir),再跟着是陈仁贵和K S 佐莫联合编著的《林清祥和他的时代》(“Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history”);后两本书是同于2001年出版,是受到李光耀叙述自己在每个转折点的英雄事迹、准确无误的判断以及把左派对手妖魔化成共产党颠覆份子等等叙事的激发而成书的。

赛查理回忆录      林清祥 2-page-001

随着陈仁贵和费南迪斯(Michael Fernandez)于2006年在的一个讲题为“监禁-伤愈-写作”人文座谈会上,叙述监禁遭遇,之后,潮流的势头逐浪高。接下来,陈仁贵又编辑出版了《华惹》时代风云 : 马大社会主义俱乐部对当代新马政治的影响The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore,) (2010))及情系五一三 : 一九五零年代新加坡华文中学学生运动与政治变革 (The May 13 Generation: The Chinese Middle Schools Student Movement and Singapore Politics in the 1950s

这两本书,有英文本和中文本,挑战官方定性区分的说法:讲英语的学生对政治冷漠,讲华语的学生被马来亚共产党操控。两本书的推介会引来许多听众,尤其是后一本书的推介会,来了约300位年老的、讲华语的前政治活跃分子,他们几十年来一直隐藏自己过去的经历,甚至没让陪同来出席推介会的儿女和孙子女知道。

华惹一代   513事件

不仅仅是1950年代和1960年代的被捕者开始发声。在1987年的“光谱行动”中,被指涉及“马克思主义阴谋”而遭逮捕的比较年轻的一群律师、戏剧工作者、政治活动分子、社会工作者及教会工作者,也已开始涌动。他们跟1963年和1970年代的被拘留者联系,出版了《我们的思想是自由的:坐牢者和流亡者的诗歌与散文(2009)》(Our Thoughts Are Free: Poems and Prose on Imprisonment and Exile )(2009)。隔年,张素兰(两度不经审讯遭拘禁:1987年5约21日-1987年9月26日;1988年4月19日-1990年6月1日)出版了《跨越蓝色大门:一名政治被拘留者的回忆》(Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner)。在新书推介会上,张素兰郑重表示:

“我要求废除内部安全法令。内安法及其前在的同类法令从英国人统治时期直到今天,摧毁了许多人的生活。”

张素兰 1  张素兰 2

接下来,张素兰的同志们也把幸免于“光谱行动”的天主教会工作者[i]和1970年代的新加坡政治流亡者[ii]的文章,结集出版。

社交媒体的兴起,言路广开,冲击了竞争剧烈的2011年8月的总统选举活动。在总统候选人的辩论会上,受邀出席的公民社交媒体的新闻工作者(Citizen  journalists)要求各候选人陈述对内部安全法令的立场。前内阁部长陈庆炎认为内安法是正当的,因为真实存在恐怖主义威胁。对此,林福寿医生挑战他重复他的这一谈话,以便双方在法庭见面;林医生也要求成立一个独立的调查委员会,调查所有内安法的被拘留者所面对的指控是否属实。在YouTube视频网站仍可看到林福寿医生的挑战视频。(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zk-TH257ggI

 

 “冷藏行动”文件:要求追究责任

在战后的新加坡,除了1990年代,每一个十年段都曾动用内安法进行逮捕。“冷藏行动”仍旧最具争议性,它为行动党连续不断执政,铺平道路;同时,也构筑起其‘骑在共产党老虎背上’的杜撰神话。利用内安法取得的结果,是把林清祥和社阵排除在1963年的大选之外。林清祥不仅获得讲华语的职工运动者的信任,也得到讲英语的左派的信任;后者大部分来自新加坡大学社会主义俱乐部,我就是其中之一。

根据英殖民地部门的档案文献,经哈珀(T N Harper)、韦杰夫(Geoff Wade)[iii] 和覃炳鑫 [iv] 等几位历史学者的探究分析,事实证明英国政府和联邦政府是不会接受在新加坡出现一个左翼政府的;他们出手拯救李光耀,配合采取“冷藏行动”。我也曾于1990年代初到过伦敦的克尤档案馆(Kew Archives)查阅档案资料。没有足够的证据可证明林清祥,一个被锁定要加以摧毁的政治对象,是马共党员。然而,2014年再版的《争取合并的斗争》仍旧不放弃对他的妖魔化。在此着重摘录英殖民地公署的一段档案资料:

尽管我们都认为林清祥是个共产党,但没有证据证明他在接受马共、北京或莫斯科的指令。我们的印象是,林清祥在很大的程度上是自主工作的,而他的主要目的并非要实现共产主义的黄金时代,而在于掌控新加坡的宪制政府。远远无法肯定,在实现这一目标后,林清祥必然会听命于北京或莫斯科,成为其工具。[v]  

同时,李光耀是,相当明显地专注于在新加坡下一届大选之前,一举扫清其政治对手 ….. 在采取一项策略,恣意挑衅林清祥及其伙伴,想迫使他们诉诸非宪制斗争手段,制造逮捕他们的理据。[vi]

逮捕我们的特举理由是,社阵提供军火和后勤支援,支持于1962年12月8日由阿查哈里领导的文莱人民起义。对于这一指控,英国档案馆的资料如此记录:

李光耀脑中备妥了声明,吁请镇压文莱起义,指说组织工作、训练和武器等事项在文莱境内是无法办到的,而结论就是,必定有外来干预。至于逮捕行动,李光耀说,有关阿查哈里跟林清祥近日有过接触的情报,加上社阵发表声明,公开支持文莱革命者,真是天赐良机,正是对付他们的正当理据。[vii]

林清祥以社阵领导人的身份,是在政治部头目的眼皮下跟在阿查哈里在餐馆聚餐的;后者是奉行社会主义的“文莱人民党”的领导人,时在新加坡作过境停留。我们对文莱人民起义表示道义上支持的声明,跟社阵发表过支持其他反殖民主义起义的声明,是没有分别的。真是奇怪,我们对文莱人民表示兄弟般的支持所构成的危险,却要等到东姑和李光耀对逮捕名单达致协议后才逮捕我们,是文莱起义的两个月后才行动。

当局曾表明,他们会提供证据来证明我们曾暗中参与文莱起义,但事实是,我们从未参与。我们还在等待证据。

 “冷藏行动”是李光耀对付政治对手的 蓄谋方案 。在纪念“冷藏行动”50周年出版的《新加坡1963年的冷藏行动-50周年纪念》,我在封底跋言说:

我坚持认为,我之所以遭监禁,是因为我是左翼反对殖民主义者之一分子,在行将于1963年举行的大选中,我们对李光耀的构成威胁。共产主义和颠覆活动的罪名,经常用来扣在像我这样的人身上,这种伎俩,一再任意重复使用,直至今天。我们对这些指控的据理驳斥,屡遭断然忽视,他们从不试图提供证据或特别案情,以便我们能够进行抗辩。

冷藏行动中文版

至今,我们收到的仅是不作答,其方式是再版《争取合并的斗争》、今日版的冷战式谩骂。政府只是满足于以学生为宣传对象,通过主流媒体大肆帮腔,使用跟半个世纪前相同的语言和资料,重提已告失败的‘合并’,间接肯定“冷藏行动”的正当性,虽然从来不提该事件。给人留下的影响是,行动党通过电台广播演讲,赢得民心。如果事实真是这样,那根本就不需要“冷藏行动”了。

更加难以为其正当性辩解的,是我们遭到拘禁的期段。拘留令每两年更新一次,一再延长拘留,不受局限,只要部长高兴。根据1960年内部安全法令第8A条,林福寿医生应当是接到过8张延长拘留令,在印刷表格打上被拘留者的名字和相关日期。谢太保到底接到过多少份这样的延长拘留令呢?他是在1966年10月29日被捕入狱的,1989年5月17日限制拘留在圣淘沙岛上,然后于1992年11月28日被押回新加坡岛拘禁,到1998年11月27日才解除限制令获释。

行动党的现任领导选择认同他们党前的老辈利用内安法所造成的冤屈案,继续死抱那些早已遭受严格质疑的历史叙事。

 备注:

傅树介医生曾任社会主义阵线的助理秘书长。他曾遭行动党政府两度援引新加坡的内部安全法令,被捕入狱,不经审讯,坐牢共17年。

[i] 方可弘 编辑《让我们再筑梦吧!》(2009)

[ii] 张素兰和刘月玲合编:《狮爪逃生:新加坡政治逃亡者思辨集》(2009)

[iii] 韦杰夫著:《“冷藏行动”:现代新加坡在建国道路上经历的重大事件》,收录于由傅树介、陈国防和孔莉莎联合编著的《新加坡1963年的冷藏行动-50周年纪念》

 [iv] 覃炳鑫著:《根本课题是反对殖民主义,而非合并:新加坡的‘进步左翼’、“冷藏行动”及马来西亚的创建》,新加坡国立大学亚洲研究所的工作报告系列,编号211,2013年11月21日。

 [v] 英国驻新加坡最高专员致英国国务大臣的报告,1962年9月8日,CO 1030/1159;见哈珀著《林清祥和‘新加坡的故事’》(‘Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”)与见陈仁贵和K S 佐莫联合编著的《林清祥和他的时代》(“Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history”)一书第41页。

 [vi] 英最高专员致国务大臣信(编号CO 1030/1030/998, 1962年4月28日,见陈仁贵著,“合并与新加坡左翼的式微”,收录于傅树介、陈仁贵和许赓猷联合编著的《华惹世代:大学社会主义俱乐部和战后马来亚与新加坡的政治》第283页)

[vii] 英最高专员致国务大臣信(编号CO 1030/1160, 572号,1962年12月10日)

 

Advertisements

2 thoughts on “(中英文对照)Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版

  1. Pingback引用通告: Weapon of the powerful? By Dr. Hong Lysa | 人民论坛

  2. Pingback引用通告: 重新检视新加坡“争取合并的斗争” | 新国志

发表评论

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / 更改 )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / 更改 )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / 更改 )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / 更改 )

Connecting to %s