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LIM CHIN SIONG : I AM NOT A COMMUNIST 林清祥 : 我不是一个共产党员

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 (编者按:本文包括了林清祥在1961年7月31日致函《海峡时报》的函件:《我不是一个共产党员》和1963年2月2日他在新加坡冷藏行动被捕后2个月,行动党政府的国防部长林金山引用内部安全法令下正式拘留林清祥的罪状。)

LIM CHIN SIONG :I AM NOT A COMMUNIST

 

Lim Chin Siong’s letter in “Straits Times” of 31st July 1961

Your editorial comments and news reports in the last week have focused attacked on me. By repeating the fiction that I am a Communist front-man I suppose my political antagonists hope that it would stick in the minds of some.

While Mr. Lee and his men keep crying Communism to cover up a multitude of sins, let me, for my part try to get the record straight.

Let me make of clear once and for all that I am not a Communist or a communist front-man, or for that matter, anybody’s front-man.    

My political association with Mr. Lee began in 1954 when together we conceived and brought into existence the PAP. I was at one time its assistant secretary general and a PAP assembly man.

Since 1956, and particularly since my release from jail in 1959, Mr. Lee has sought to isolate me from the rest of my colleagues and the party by smearing me as a Communist front-man. Despite this sustained smear in private, he found it fit to persuade me to accept the post of political secretary.

Not only was I reluctant to accept the post, but I had offered to withdraw from politics if he so desired it. He did not desire it. Instead he wished to show the people that I was identified with the government.    

For my part I was prepared to do what he urged of me, because I felt I should do everything in my power to support the PAP Government so that there could be stability in Singapore and we could get down to solving some of the problems that face our people.

Having denied me any participation in the party and Government, I was still to be used as political secretary to give the impression that the workers and the Government were one.  

But this position could not go on for ever. During the Hong Lim by-election I gave my categorical support to the PAP though the election sub-committee was instructed by Lee not to allow me to appear at any party mass rallies.  

After the defeat at Hong Lim the campaign against me was intensified. At the party conference some Ministers tried to attribute the causes of defeat to me and my associates in the trade unions.  

Every protest or criticism from the party branches against the absence of the internal party democracy or the policies of the Government was considered to be engineered by me. By trying to turn me into a whipping-boy it was hoped to cover the failings and sins of the leadership.  

However, I and my colleagues had felt it our responsibility to remind the leadership of its every deviation from party policies in respect of civil liberties, trade unions and the release of detainees in the hope of getting it to rectify.

In spite of the blatant disregard of our advice, we continued to emphasise the important of the left-wing unity. This was taken to mean that we add no alternative but to support the Government.  

On the question of our constitutional future we had proposed, what we considered, certain minimum and realistic demands so as to help point the way ahead. Instead of considering these proposals the party leadership had committed the entire people and party to Malaysia proposals without letting anyone know the details.  

Even when they acted in this callous manner, we sought for the details in the hope that proper consideration could be given to the matter.  

The leadership, on the other hand, was more interested in playing politics. They said they were going further than we – who are now branded as the Communist left- by demanding ‘the total eradication of colonialism’ .

Quite obviously, it was their intention to impress the people by this apparent militant stand, but when we asked for certain concrete steps to be taken to strength the anti-colonial stand we saw how nervous and jittery the leadership became.

In their nervousness they began the shout about Communism and chaos, ex-pecting to frighten some people into believing them. The Communist left who are supposed to be arch-conspirators have now, we are told, been taken for a ride by the British. How funny can people get?

My meeting with Lord Selkirk have been few and far between. If meeting Lord Selkirk makes one a plotter then Mr. Lee is the greatest of all plotters for he has dealings with Lord Selkirk more  than anyone else in Singapore.   By crying Communist on the one hand and British Imperialism on other Mr. Lee must have hoped to win sympathy from both the Chinese-educated and the English educated.

Unfortunately, he treats the people as simple on-lookers who could be impressed by his political acrobatics. This time of course he has learnt that the people are not all that simple.

Amid all his song and dance, Mr. Lee has been forced to make three important admissions:

1.He has agreed to consult the people on the question of merger, and this what we have asked for all the time.          

2.He now declares that he will not start a wave of arrests of political opponents, in contrast to his threats of earlier days, though he still  hopes that the British will do it for him.

3.He now openly promises to release the detainees. Sometime ago Mr. Lee stated that so long as the Federation Government remains anti- Communist and there are British bases in Singapore it would be impossible for Singapore to become Communist. He now raises the alarming prospect of a Communist Singapore.

Mr. Lee contradicts himself this time without his usual sophistry. We may look forward to such further contradiction.

LIM CHIN SIONG

SINGAPORE           i m not communist-page-001

 http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19610731-1.2.89.1.aspx

林清祥在1961年7月31日致函《海峡时报》

林清祥:《我不是一个共产党员》

你们的编辑部评论和新闻在上个星期火力全开集中攻击我。你们不断的重覆虚构我是一个共产党前线人员。我想这是我的政治对手企图把我的塑造成这样的形象烙印在人民的脑海里。  

当李先生和他的人一直不断通过叫嚣有关共产主义来掩盖新加坡的多数问题时,让我就我个人在这方面的问题予以直接的说明。

我在此一次性明确的重申:我不是一个共产党员或者是共产党统一战线的成员,或者,对于这个性质的问题的任何人的前方人员。   

我和李先生之间的政治联系关系是在1954年开始的。当时我们一起构思并实现了人民行动党的诞生。我一段时间是它的副秘书长和行动党的召集人。

自从1956年开始,也别说我在1959年从监牢里释放出来后,李先生就一直在想方设法把我与我的同志分隔孤立开来。同时,在党内一直流言着把我描绘成是一个共产党统一战线者。尽管这些有关我的诽谤的流言在党内继续不断,但是,李先生还是说服我接受为一个政治秘书的职位。

我勉强接受他献议的这个职位.同时,我向他提出了建议,假设他同意的话,我可以退出政治活动。但是,他不同意。事实上,他的目的是要告诉人民:我被确认为是与政府在一起的。

就我而言,我准备接受他对我提出的要求。因为,我认为,我必须力尽所能支持人民行动党政府。这样新加坡局势才会稳定下来,同时,我们就可以静下心来解决我们的人民所面对的一些问题。

即便是我被委任为政治秘书,我也不允许对政府规划的政策提出任何看法。与此同时,我很快的发现,我的(政治秘书)职责是支持政府的任何决策或者是及时的发言。

让我继续担任政治秘书的同时,又拒绝我参与党和政府的工作的目的是在让人们产生一个印象:工人和政府是在一块儿的。

但是没这样的情况已经一去不复返了。在芳林补选时,我给予人民行动党全力的支持。可是,补选委员会却接受李(李光耀)的指示,不让我在任何党举行的群众大会上出现。 (行动党)在芳林(补选)运动失败后,反对我的声音更加尖锐了。在党的会议上一些部长企图把(芳林补选)失利的原因归咎于我和我有关的工会。

从党的支部发出的每一个抗议或批评抗议党内缺乏民主或者反对政府的政策等都被视为是由我一手推波助澜造成的。为了掩盖领导层的(在芳林补选)失利和罪恶,他们把我当成了代罪羔羊。

无论如何,我和我的同志认为,我们有责任去提醒领导层,他们已经乖离了(人民对)公民自由权利、职工会和释放政治拘留者的愿望。党必须纠正这些错误的政策。

(他们)罔顾了我们强烈的劝告,我们还是继续强调左翼运动的团结的重要性。这就说,我们为此别无选择必须支持政府。

在谈到我们未来的宪制问题上,我们已经建议,我们已经考虑了一些最低和现实的要求,这样有助于向前推进。与其考虑我们的建议,党的领导层在未告知任何详情的情况下向全体人民和党承诺了接受马来西亚的提议(马来西亚联邦计划)。  

即便是他们采取了这样横蛮的态度,我们仍然抱着寻求知道(大马来西亚计划)的详情的愿望,以便为(大马来西亚联邦计划)给予适当的考虑建议。

但是,在另一方面,领导层更热衷于玩弄政治(把戏)。他们说,他们比我们看得更远——哪些标榜着共产党员的左翼要求彻底的消灭殖民主义。

非常明显的。他们的目的是要人民让对这个军事立场有着时刻的印象。但是,当我们问到有关采取加强反殖立场的几个关键性的步骤的问题时,我们看到的是这个领导层是变得坐立不安和神经兮兮。

在他们出现神经兮兮时,他们叫嚣有关共产主义和其他杂音了,进而期望可以造成一些人的恐惧心理而相信他们的说法。现在左翼共产主义者将视为主要的同谋者。我们被告知英国人将扮演主要角色。这是多么有趣的事,人民会接受吗?

我和休克力克爵士之间的会面次数是少之又少。假设与休克力克爵士的会面可以制造一个阴谋的话,那么,李先生就是一个所有阴谋家中最伟大的了!(因为)在新加坡与休克力克会面人当中,他势必任何人的次数都来得多。

非常不幸的是,他把人们都视为简单淳朴的人,以为对他的政治演技存有印象。这回他终于明白人们并没有他想象中的那样简单和淳朴。

李先生在他的这些演唱被迫承诺了以下三项事项:

(一)他已经同意,必须征询人们有关合并问题的意见。这是我们长期以来一直的要求;

(二)与他早期面对危机时形成的对比,他现在承诺将不会展开逮捕政治异己分子的行动。他还设想英国人仍然会帮他干这样的事;

(三)他现在公开承诺将会释放政治拘留者。在过去一段时间,李先生说,只要马来亚联合邦政府仍然是反共的和英国军事基地还在新加坡,新加坡将不可能成为共产主义国家。他现在提出来新加坡将成为一个共产主义国家的警号。

李先生一反过去的过去那样的诡辩而是自相矛盾。让我们拭目以待他在未来继续这种自相矛盾的表演。

林清祥

新加坡

i m not communist-page-001  

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19610731-1.2.89.1.aspx

ATTACHMENT:DETENTION ORDER ISSUED BY MINISTER  OF  DEFENCE: LIM KIM SAM

林清祥英文01-page-001                  林清祥英文02-page-001

林清祥英文03-page-001                      林清祥英文04-page-001

Statement as required under Section 11(2)(b)of the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960

Detainee’s Name:   LIM CHIN SIONG

Grounds on which a Detention Order is made:

That you since 1948 has consistently acted in a manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore in that you have been actively, knowingly and willingly assisting the illegal Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) by pro­moting subversive activities initially amongst youths during your school days and later amongst the masses in the labour and political fields.

Allegations of Facts

1. That you in 1948 were a member of the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL) a Communist satellite organisation banned by the Government in 1948 for Communist United Front activities. You then became leader of the Little Devils Corps, an ancilliary organisation of the CPM using young children for intelligence and courier purposes to assist the Communist Terrorist Organisation. You were also active in CPM underground work amongst students in Pontian.

2. That you in 1949 whilst studying in Chinese High School, Singapore, maintained contact with the CPM by becoming a member of the Anti-British League, another CPM satellite organisation.

3. That you on 13.8.51 were arrested on suspicion of being a member of the Anti-British League.

4. That you in October 51 undeterred by your arrest, next became involved as one of the organisers of the Communist-inspired examination boycott as part of the CPM supported agitation against the Government and that you were subsequently expelled from the Chinese High School for your Communist activities.

5. That you in 1952 through your zeal and efficiency in Communist indoctrination work, were promoted to leader of a cell consisting of Seet Chay Tuan and Koh Thong Eng both of whom have been arrested for Communist activities. You conducted Hsueh Hsih (Communist indoctrination) cell activities using Marxist, Leninist and CPM publications for study.

6. That you in 1954 were one of the leaders of the Communist­inspired agitation against National Service Registration and that you passed on CPM directives to the student leaders who organised illegal assemblies and “stay in” strikes.

7. That you in 1955 were transferred from underground activities within the Singapore People’s Anti-British League to open front work in political parties and trade unions in furtherance of CPM United Front policy.

8. That you in 1955 became Paid Secretary of the Communist-controlled Singapore Spinning Works’ Union and later together with other CUF workers, you penetrated the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers Union (SFSWU). Secured in the post of Secretary-General, you succeeded in aligning 27 other Unions under SFSWU leadership and used this mass body as the principal vehicle for CUF activities in Singapore. The SFSWU was banned by Government following the Communist inspired October 1956 riots.

9. That you by September 1955 became the undisputed leader and spokesman of the trade union movement under your guidance, Communist in­doctrination through Hsueh Hsih discussion groups and pro-Communist cultural activities e.g. Communist songs and dances were introduced into the Unions. You made numerous inflamatory speeches and press statements attacking the :..colonial government, the emergency regulations and the national service.

10. That you in November 1955 solicited international support for CPM. on the eve of the Baling Peace Talks in a congratulatory message to the Communist movement for colonial freedom in London. In the message you propounded the CPM view that independence in Malaya could not be achieved • without the repeal of the Emergency Regulations and the Public Security Bill and legal recognition of the CPM.

11. That you in September 1956 played a leading part in stirring up agitation amongst the workers and students over the proposed introduction of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (PPS0). At the instigation of the CUF cadres under your leadership, widespread rioting by workers and students broke out in October 1956 and that you were arrested in late October 1956 together with other CUF workers for Communist activities and released in June 1959.

12. That you after your release in June 1959 and on your appointment as Political Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, returned to the CUF scene, and were appointed advisor to several pro-communist trade unions the most important being the Communist trade unions the most important being the Communist-controlled Singapore General Employees’ Union. Under your guidance the SGEU grew in influence and assumed a position similar to that occupied by the SFSWU in 1956.

13. That you in 1960 were selected to the Secretariat of the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC and that in May 1961 when the Malaysia Plan was enunciated, you and 5 other pro-communist secretaries of the STUC Secretariat came out in June 1961 to oppose Malaysia in support of the CUF policy. Your plans were foiled when the STUC was dissolved.

14. That you and your pro-Communist associates then set up the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU). Since August 61 the SATU of which you were the advisor, had won over the support of firstly 43 and later 37 other pro-Communist trade unions and has become an important and integral part of the CUF movement in Singapore.

15. That in May 61 when the Malaysia plan was enunciated, the Communist saw that a strong Central Government capable of dealing more strongly with the Communists would be created when the PAP came out in support of the Malaysia Plan, the Communist saw that their hopes of capturing the PAP was foiled. Led by you, the pro-Communist broke away and form a new party, the Barisan Sosialis where you held the vital poet of Secretary-General.

16. That you were personally responsible for winning over many PAP supporters for the Barisan Sosialis. Realising that the CPM failed in the Federation because it had failed to win the Malays over to its cause, you set out to win over Malay support for the Barisan Sosialis. You started off in this direction in August 61 by :-

             a. Advocating strong support for the Utusan Melayu Strike;

             b. Visiting a Malay fishing village at Tuas;

            c. Inviting two foremost Malays involved in the Utusan Melayu Strike (Said Zahari and Hussein Jahiddin, both now under detention) to attend Barisan Sosialis inaugural meeting.

17. That you in March 61 were responsible for publication of the Party’s newspapers in Malay – the “RAKYAT” when told that “RAKYAT” would never sell to the Malay public you replied that you were determined to see that “RAKYAT” came out in print even if it had two or three issues as what you wanted most was to see that the party’s aims and policies were put across to the Malays in their language.

18. That you were mainly responsible for formulating and implementing CUF policies of the Barisan Sosialis which was from its start the vehicle of CUF line on these issues.

19. That you were quoted in a December 61 article in the “Bintang Timur” a left—wing Indonesian paper as preferring a merger between S’pore and Indonesia rather than with the Federation of Malaya. Well in anticipation of Indonesia’s confrontation towards Malaysia, you had in September 61 warned that the “Mighty Malaysia Plan” inspired by the British colonial Power so that when Indonesia claims back the Borneo territories it will have to tangle with Malaya. That this is to create an artificial struggle 5etween the Asian People so that British influence would remain in the area to protect and defend Malaya.

20. That a CPM propaganda document in Malay entitled: “Utusan Warta Berita” published in South Thailand in October 61 by the Central Department of Malay works carried long extracts of your speech at the inaugural of the Barisan Sosialis on 17.9.61. Your speech which dealt with the problems of Merger and Malaysia was described by the CPM as of “great significance” and a “counter blast which crushed all the intimidating charges from Abdul Rahman”. This favourable comment in a CPM publication implies complete endorsement of your views by the CPM.

21. That you in January 62 exploited the Malaysian Socialist Conference in Kuala Lumpur, and through your pressure and influence, successfully used it as a means of furthering CUF activities and that you successfully persuaded the conference to adopt the following pro—communist deliberations.

(a) That the conference would pass a resolution opposing Malaysia and expressing no confidence in the PAP policy on Malaysia.

(b) That the PAP delegates would be allowed little opportunity to speak during the conference and if possible, to force them out of the Conference.

(c)  That no anti—Communist resolution would be passed at this conference.

(d) That the Barisan Sosialis would be fully consulted on all developments concerning the conference before, during and after the proceedings.

22. That you had a decisive say in matters pertaining to the Permanent Liaison Secretariat formed at the 2nd Malaysian Socialist Conference. The CPM has announced its approval of the Malaysian Socialist Conference on several occasions in propaganda documents. Clearly the CPS’ sees in the conference especially the Permanent Liaison Secretariat, a valuable asset for the CUF workers which all the left—wing parties in Malaysia can be united under Communist Leadership.

23. That you throughout 1961 and early 1962, you warned of violence in the event of Merger and Malaysia being forced through. That you at an SGEU 2nd District Branch Meeting on 29.12.61 warned that more conspiracy with the British could be expected if merger comes through and that they (the pro—Communist) would have no choice but to counter with force.

24. That you in the latter half of 62 in conformity with CPM policy and in reappraisal of the political situation discarded any talk of violence. In its stead, you advocated peaceful constitutional struggle S7eaking at a SGEU 2nd District Branch meeting on 15.6.62 on violence and peace “you said that victory in the anti—colonial movement must depend on the people’s feeling being roused and this could only be done by organization and education and that the difficulties which faced the CUF today should not dishearten them and they should seek to achieve their aims thro peaceful and legal means. You added that violence could only be justified against violence.

25. That you on 12 September 1962 made a policy speech at a comfort Party for Referendum Workers at the Hokkien Association. You analysed the trend of the future struggle after defeat of the CUP at the Referendum. You said that the struggle would continue on the present constitutional basis as long as peaceful constitutional means were open to them. Your main objective was to strike down the PAP and win the next general election and that you could do this by winning over the petty bourgeoisie. The Referendum, you said showed that you had to win over the entire people which could only be done by uniting the middle class around the workers and farmers. This is in line with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategy of a “Worker-Peasant Alliance” as a base on which the Government should operate.

26. That you repeated the policy you laid down at the Sept. 12 speech on at least two other occasions – at Barisan Sosialis 62 Annual Conference and in his 62 New Year message.

27.That you on 14 October 62 at the annual conference, laid down the stages of future struggle as follows:

     a. extend activities outside Singapore and get the cooperation of all leftwing anti-colonial forces in Malaysian and Afro-Asian countries;

      b. try their best to form the Government and through constitutional means, establish a Central Government of Malaysia;

         c. consolidate and strengthen the Party by perfecting its organisation and by intensifying political education. This was to be done by holding more cadre-training classes to “educate” all the party members so that they may not be politically mature, but also well-trained ideologically.

28. That you on 1 January 1963, as Secretary-General of Barisan Sosialis, issued a New Year message which reiterated the stand taken at the September 12 speech and at the Annual Conference in October 62. In addition you warned that “reactionary forces are massing their strength to end democracy in this country. “By this you meant the emergence of neo-colonialism in the form of the Malaysian Federation and the exclusion of the leftwing- from participation in constitutional politics by repression and police terror under cover of anti-Communist propaganda. You added that if this continued, the country would end up as a facist and military dictatorship and “the leftwing forces must then make the necessary judgement on the matter” possibly a hint of possible adoption of more militant CUF tactics.

29. That you and the Barisan Sosialis advocated support for Indonesian claim over West Irian and the Brunei Revolt of 8th December 62. This was conformity with the Communist policy of supporting any uprising against colonial powers for self-determination. 

30. That you provided guidance to a mass rally held on 19 December to declare support for. the Brunei rebels and especially to arouse Malay support for the revolt.

林清祥在1963年2月2日在内部安全法令下的冷藏行动中被捕。林清祥被捕后2个月由国防部长林金山签发的正式拘留令.(本译文转载自<林清祥与他的时代(下册)第26页>)

在1951年至1969年期间 ,林清祥被扣留了三次。1951年8月13日起被扣留一个星期,据说是涉嫌卷入‘抗英同盟’及罢考活动。第二次是1956年10月10月26日凌晨之1959年6月4日,‘理由’是虽经第一次被扣留,仍继续进行参透活动。第三次于1963年2月2日被扣至1969年9月。这‘控状’是在被监禁超过2个月后,扣留令才发出的。其译文如下:

被扣者名字:林清祥

发出拘留令原因:

‘自1948年起,你一贯地、积极地自觉与自愿地,通过首先对在校的年轻人,接着在工运与政治界的群众中进行与推动广泛参透活动,以协助非法的马来亚共产党,构成对新加坡安全之威胁。’

‘控状’根据‘事实’为:

(一) 1948年你是马共卫星组织‘新民主主义青年’成员;该组织因展开共产党统一战活动于1948年被政府封禁。之后,你成为马共属下为利用儿童替马共暴徒刺探军情而设立之‘小鬼队’之组织之领袖。你同时活跃于马共小笨珍学生中之地下工作。

 (二) 1949年在华侨中学念书时。你保持与马共联络,成为马共属下卫星组织‘星洲抗英同盟’成员。

(三) 1951年8月15日,因受嫌成为‘抗英同盟’成员而被捕。

(四) 尽管如此,被释放后1951年10月,你又卷入马共支持用来反政府之罢考行动,成为其组织者之一,结果你被开除出学校。

(五) 1952年由于你在宣传共产主义工作中之热忱与效力,你被升为一包括薛济团,与许统英在内之小组之领袖。薛与许曾因涉嫌共产党活动而被捕。你用马列主义组织学习小组进行共产主义宣传。

(六) 1954年内是共产党煽动之反国民服役之领袖之一,你将马共指示转达予非法集会与集中之学生领袖。

(七) 1954年内从地下‘抗英同盟’活动转移到政党与工会的公开活动以促进马共统一战线工作。

(八) 1955年你成为共产党控制之‘新加坡纺织工友联合会’受薪秘书,随着与其他共产党统一战线工作人员渗入‘新加坡各业工厂、商店职工会’。成为它的总务后,你联合了其他37工团,在‘各业工厂、商店职工联合会’领导下以它为主要工具在新加坡进行统战工作。1956年10月,在共产党煽动的暴动后,‘新加坡各业工厂、商店职工会’被封闭。

(九) 1955年9月你成为你指导下工运不可争辩的领袖与发言人,通过‘学习’与讨论小组,亲共文化活动如共产党歌曲与舞蹈被介绍到工会以进行共产主义宣传,你发表了无数煽动性演讲及声明以攻击殖民地政府,紧急法令及国民服役法令。

(十) 1955年11月华玲会谈前夕,为了替马共争取国际支援,你写信予‘伦敦殖民地自由运动’,信中你表达了马共的看法,认为除非马共获得合法地位。紧急法令与公安法令被取消,否则马来亚不能获得真正独立。

(十一) 1956年9月在工人统一学生中煽起反对拟议通过之公安法令活动中你起了主导作用。在您领导下之共产党统一战线干部之煽动下,工人与学生于56年10月进行暴动,随着你与其他马共统战干部被捕,59年6月你获得释放。

(十二) 56年6月释放后,你受委为财政部政治秘书,你照旧回到马共统战阵线,被委为多间亲共工会顾问,其中最主要的为共产党控制之‘泛星工友联合会’。在你指导下,‘泛星工友联合会’增长了影响力并具有了像1956年新加坡‘各业工厂、商店工友联合会’似的位置。

(十三) 1960年你被‘新加坡职工总会’选为秘书团秘书之一。1961年5月当马来西亚计划公布,你与职总声明反对马来西亚计划以支持共产党统一战线之政策,新加坡职总接着解散了而你的计划受挫。

(十四) 你与你的亲共同僚也成立了‘新加坡工团了会总会’(SATU)。从1961年8月起你 当顾问之SATU先取43工团而接着37亲共工团之支持成为马共在新加坡统战工作重要组成部门。

(十五) 61年5月当马来西亚计划公布了,马共见到行动党支持它意味将出现一强大中央政府能更强硬对付共产党,而他们希望夺取行动党已失败。在你领导下,亲共分子退党组织了‘社会主义阵线’,你担任了秘书长要职。

(十六) 是你个人争取了许多行动党的支持者投向社阵,发现到马共在联邦失败是因为无法取得马来人支持,你致力争取马来人支持社阵。61年你朝这个方向努力。

               a.  全力支持马来前锋报之工潮;

                b.到大士马来渔民村访问;

               c.邀请两名著名涉及马来前锋报之马来人士出席社阵成立典礼,他们是赛.查哈  利和胡森.查依仃。

 (十七) 1961年3月你负责你负责出版社阵马来文(RAKYAT)版,当你被告知它不可能在马来人中销售,你指示即使仅能售出一两份还是要出版,因为你决心见到党的目标与政策能通过马来族自己的语文转达给他们。

(十八) 社阵的共产党统一阵线政策主要是由你策划与执行的,它一开始计时共产党统战对各项问题推行其路线的工具。

(十九) 1961年2月印尼左翼‘东星日报’曾引用你谈话‘宁可让新加坡与印尼合并而不要与马来西亚合并’。预料到印尼将对抗马来西亚,你于1961年9月警告说:英国殖民当局提出的马来西亚计划是为了使一旦印尼要求收回北婆三邦时只好面对马来亚。这是人为制造亚洲人互相斗争以保留英国的影响力。

(二十) 1961年10月,一份由泰南马来工作中央部门出版的马共马来文之文件,长篇摘引你于1961年9月17日社阵成立时之演讲。你的演讲谈及合并与马来西亚,该马来文件形容你演讲内容具‘深重意义’并‘粉粹了东姑鸭都拉曼的各项职责’。这项好评说明马共完全支持你的看法。

  (二十一) 1962年正月,你利用了在吉隆坡召开的五邦社会主义大会,通过你的压力与影响,成功用它来进行共产党统一战线活动,成功地促成它讨论以下亲共课题:

       a. 促使大会通过及反对马来西亚计划并表明对行动党对马来西亚之政策的不信任。

       b.不予行动党代表充分时间发言,且可能时,迫他们推出大会。

       c.促使大会不致通过任何反共议案。

       d.社阵在大会进行前、种与过后对大会各项事务发展应受到充分咨询。

(二十二) 对第二次五邦社会主义者大会成立的永久联络秘书处,在讨论事项中你保有决定性发言权。马共在其宣传文件中,几项表明赞许马来西亚五邦社会主义者大会——特别是它设立的永久秘书处,将是一有价值的资产以通过它团结马来西亚所有左翼政党在其领导下。

(二十三) 1961年底及62年初,你警告若硬行通过合并与大马将会导致暴乱。1961年12月29日在泛星工联第二分会你发言警告硬行通过合并,将会出现更多右派与英殖的阴谋,到时亲共份子只好被迫以暴力反抗。

(二十四) 1962年下半年,在对局势重新评价时,为吻合马共政策,你摒弃有关暴力的谈吐。相反,一再强调和平宪制斗争。62年6月15日,在泛星工会第二分会演讲时,‘你说反殖斗争的成败决定如何通过组织和教育去提高人民觉悟,今天面对的困难不应使大家颓丧,应继续通过和平与合法途径去达到目标。’你说暴力之应用只能在暴力镇压下才能说得过去。

(二十五) 1962年9月在一项于福建会馆举行的慰劳党全民投票工作人员会上,你分析了共产党统一阵线在全民投票失败后局势。指出只要和平宪制斗争环境还存在,应继续在当前和平宪制斗争基础上进行未来的斗争。你说今后目标是击垮行动党,取得小资产阶级支持以争取来届大选胜利。全民投票结果显示我们需要争取全民支持,这可通过团结中小资产阶层,及工农群众,这与中共以‘工农联盟’的战略作为基础进行政府操作的路线一样。

(二十六) 你至少在两次集会上重覆你于9月12日演讲拟订下之政策:一次在社阵62年常年大会,另一次在你发表的63你新年献词。

(二十七) 1962年10月14日于社阵常年大会上你订下来年斗争阶段:

           a.将获得扩展至新加坡之外,争取马来西亚与亚非左翼反殖力量支持。

           b.尽力设法组成政府并通过宪制途径组成马来西亚中央政府。

           c. 通过健全党组织与政治教育以巩固及加强党。这可通过开办更多干部训练班以教育他们, 使他们不但政治上更加成熟,思想上也提高。

(二十八) 1963年正月作为社阵秘书长,在新年献词中你重申9月12日及党常年代表大会上讲话之立场,并补充说‘反动势力准备用合并的强大力量以终止本国之民主’。你指的是新殖民主义以马来西亚形式出现,左翼在他们的反共藉口下被排挤出宪制斗争途径,受到警方白色恐怖镇压。你指出若这倾向继续下去,本国将出现法西斯与军人等专政,‘左翼到时只好作必须的判断’,暗示可能采取更左的共产党统一阵线策略。

(二十九) 你及社阵主张支持印尼收回西伊里安及62年12月8日汶莱之革命。之主张吻合共产党支持任何反对殖民地国家及要求自治的起义之政策。

(三十) 1962年12月19日,你指导一项为支持汶莱叛乱者的群众大会,特别为了鼓起拿来群众支持该叛乱。

林金山 签

新加坡国防部长

林清祥英文01-page-001                                       林清祥英文02-page-001 林清祥英文03-page-001                                        林清祥英文04-page-001

One thought on “LIM CHIN SIONG : I AM NOT A COMMUNIST 林清祥 : 我不是一个共产党员

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