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(中英文对照)Singapore’s ‘Battle for merger revisited’ 新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版第二部分

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Related website:

1. DR Poh’S Part 2:

http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/01/14/singapores-battle-for-merger-revisited-part-ii/

2.  Dr Poh’s Part I can be read here.    

3.The response to Part I from Mr Burhan Gafoor, Singapore’s High Commissioner to Australia, can be read here.    

4.Lim Chin Siong: Letter to The Straits  TImes Website:

https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/12/26/lim-chin-siong-i-am-not-a-communist-%e6%9e%97%e6%b8%85%e7%a5%a5-%ef%bc%9a-%e6%88%91%e4%b8%8d%e6%98%af%e4%b8%80%e4%b8%aa%e5%85%b1%e4%ba%a7%e5%85%9a%e5%91%98/

新书:1963年冷藏箱的50周年        张素兰 2

林清祥 2-page-001          赛查理回忆录

The historical background

For the benefit of the younger generation, it is necessary to describe the historical background at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, i.e. the period prior to merger and Operation Coldstore.

Let us not forget that World War II was a ferocious battle between two imperialist camps for control of global wealth. In the Southeast Asia, it was fought out in the colonies with total disregard for the untold sufferings it brought upon the local population, including our forebears in Singapore and Malaya. Therefore, their desire for independence from colonial Britain in the aftermath of World War II was fervent and uncompromising.

   

With the end of the War in 1945, Britain sought to reimpose its exploitation of the colonies including Singapore even though as a member of the newly-established United Nations, it was obliged to grant them independence. Hence it began casting about for the person or party, most committed to protect British interests in Singapore, upon whom it could bestow independence. In brief, Singapore was still a colony in the period before merger and Operation Coldstore, with Britain having the final say in all matters affecting us. It had the right to suspend the constitution.

 

Unless history is to be revised, no one can deny that Britain abandoned Malaya and Singapore during World War II and that it was the colonised people and the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) that bore the brunt of resisting the Japanese invaders. However, with the Emergency unleashed in 1948, the CPM was a decimated force in Singapore by the 1950s. Historian TN Harper has quoted the 1959 Singapore Special Branch report by the police commissioner that the CPM strength was low: an estimated 40 full party members, 80 ABL cadres, 200 or so sympathisers and less than 100 released for ‘White Area work’.[I]

However, the mood of anti-colonialism was unabated. Even Lee Kuan Yew saw that the way ahead for him politically was to take on the appearance of an anti-colonial fighter though he recognised that his future rested firmly with the British.[ii] Chin Peng in My Side of History (2003) revealed that Lee had contacted the CPM for support when the PAP was being formed. At that time in 1954, Lee was fully aware that Samad Ismail was a communist, yet he appointed him the pro-tem chairman of the PAP at its inaugural meeting at Victoria Memorial Hall.

Because of the pressure for independence from the people, including the efforts of the Anti-British League (ABL), the British allowed an anti-colonial party – the PAP – to come into existence legally in 1954. Its founding constitution stated that it stood for independence, freedom of speech and assembly, human rights, abolition of detention without trial and even socialism. With the advent of the PAP, the clandestine ABL lost its relevance as anti-colonial activists could now join the PAP openly. In the sense of being at the forefront of the struggle against British colonialism for independence, the PAP in 1954 was the successor of the ABL.

The anti-colonial, democratic and socialist platform of the PAP ensured its landslide victory in 1959. But by 1961, it was becoming clear that the PAP leadership under Lee was not carrying out the goals listed in its 1959 electoral platform notably that of releasing political prisoners and trade unionists detained by the Lim Yew Hock regime. Lee’s PAP was also tightening the screws on the rights of trade unions to organise to protect its members’ welfare and hard-won benefits.

And so the test came in April 1961 during the Hong Lim by-election, when Ong Eng Guan cashed in on the failings of the PAP leadership. His election platform prioritised the release of all political prisoners, abolition of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (subsequently Internal Security Act) and easing of restrictions on trade union activities.

However Lee was assured of CPM support for the Hong Lim by-election. Citing Special Branch files, Lee Ting Hui referred to the letter that CPM leader in Singapore Fong Chong Pik (the Plen) wrote to Lee assuring him that the CPM was not interested in overthrowing Lee; on the contrary it was keen to continue the alliance with him.[iii] Lee Kuan Yew believed in his own propaganda that the communists were all powerful and that he would thus win Hong Lim easily; he forbade Lim Chin Siong and the trade unionists to speak on the PAP platform during the campaign. He wanted to demonstrate that he had no need for Lim and that he was capable of getting the votes by himself. Lee lost Hong Lim in a clean and fair election.

On the other hand, the British Acting High Commissioner PBC Moore recognised the depth of feeling that the electorate had for the key issue in the by-election: freeing of the political prisoners as the PAP had pledged in the 1959 election. In Moore’s view, ‘everybody in Singapore except the PAP seemed to know before the election that Ong Eng Guan was going to win’.[iv]

British strategic interests in the region at that time rested on its military base in Singapore from where it could effectively interfere in neighbouring countries as near as Sukarno’s Indonesia or as far as Mao’s China. But with the ground swell of anti-colonialism in Singapore, Britain was faced with the prospect of whether the base would be able to serve its purpose given Singapore’s largely hostile population. Therefore, to contain this threat to their interests, the British enticed the otherwise reluctant Tunku to accept merger with Singapore by expanding ‘Malaysia’ into the Grand Design, with the British Borneo states and Brunei thrown in. With the conservative Tunku in charge, the base would be safe.

In an interview with a German journalist in early 1961, the Tunku had said that merger was something in the distant future. He was clearly not keen on merging with the predominantly Chinese-populated Singapore. However within a month of the PAP loss of Hong Lim, the Tunku did a 180-degree turn. He was persuaded to agree to merger.

Even with communist support, Lee Kuan Yew’s political life was at stake with the loss of these two by-elections in 1961. It was not the communists that Lee feared, it was the larger anti-colonial movement that had lost faith in the PAP. Merger was a life-line thrown by Britain to save Lee in order to secure its strategic interests in the region.

So we now come to the issue: whether the motive for Operation Coldstore arrests was justified on security grounds as evidenced by existing acts of violence and riots; or a premeditated conspiracy with preparatory acts in furtherance of an uprising for which weapons had been procured and stocked, and secret arms training conducted, etc; or whether the arrests of Operation Coldstore were simply politically motivated to mow down legitimate opposition.

The Internal Security Council (ISC) did not have the luxury of blatantly arresting the political opposition, much as the British wished it could decimate the anti-colonial forces openly. Given the international climate of post World War II and the setting up of the United Nations, Britain would have to present any arrests for political domination under the guise of ‘security’. The assessment of the British officials in Singapore was that the ‘subversives forces were not plotting an insurrection as did the communist cadres in Malaya in 1948’, hence taking police action against them might well remove all hope of bringing about Malaysia peacefully, for it would raise the political temperature in Singapore and strengthen the support for the opposition.[vi]

On the part of Barisan Sosialis and the people’s movements in Singapore, there was no unconstitutional struggle, no plot or conspiracy for insurrection, no Occupy Raffles Place as we know the occupy movements today, to justify Operation Coldstore. Rather it was Selkirk who had to alert London that Lee would advocate a policy of provocation of Lim Chin Siong and his associates with a view of forcing them into unconstitutional action justifying their arrest. The UK high commissioner hoped that the colonial secretary would be able to impress on Lee when he visited London of the risk to merger of such a course and ‘our doubts whether we could give our support’.[vii] Specifically, Lee was in favour of a Special Branch proposal to create ‘just the right degree of provocation to force Lim Chin Siong into taking action’ by removing Federation-born leaders in the Barisan and trade unions to the Federation.[viii]

Lee had to give the impression that the arrests were not against his political opponents but a security exercise in conjunction with Malaya. So for the arrests to be seen as a Pan-Malayan security arrest, he insisted that the meeting of the Internal Security Council deciding on the arrests, be held in Kuala Lumpur and not in Singapore; he further insisted that the Tunku should arrest Lim Kean Siew, Ahmad Boestamam and other Malayan leaders. The Tunku refused to play ball.[ix] Thus Operation Coldstore, scheduled for 16 December 1962, was called off at the eleventh hour. This state of affairs goes to show that there were no pressing security issues to justify Operation Coldstore!

Azahari’s rebellion in Brunei had taken place a week earlier on 8 December. The Barisan Sosialis gave it moral support as it was wont to do in international solidarity with colonies rising up to overthrow colonial rule. The British were confident that the revolt would be squashed quickly. So before the Brunei uprising dissipated, the order came from London, giving Selkirk the green light to arrest us in Singapore to which the Internal Security Council concurred.[x] Lee grasped it as a ‘heaven sent’ opportunity.[xi] It allowed the ISC to claim there was concrete evidence of communist terrorism being plotted and spin a security scare while all that happened was that we expressed verbal expression of international solidarity. Till today, no evidence of any Barisan Sosialis involvement in the Brunei uprising has been presented. It would be the easiest way to settle the issue if indeed such evidence exists.

 

The security myth trotted out to justify Operation Coldstore is further and completely debunked by Lee’s insistence to arrest Ong Eng Guan[xii] and three members of his party, the United People’s Party (UPP).[xiii] Lee was afraid that Ong would capitalise on the arrests and pose a threat to him at the next general election.[xiv]

As stated earlier, merger was a life-line thrown to Lee after the PAP lost the Hong Lim and Anson by-elections in 1961 to a hostile Singapore electorate, which also threatened British strategic interests in the region, that were being safeguarded by the military base in Singapore. Therefore, it was no small wonder that Lee worked feverishly to get the Tunku to agree to merger to the extent of ‘fawning and bowing to the princeling’, as he put it.[xv]

Here I would say to Lee’s propagandists that they would do well to have a holistic reading of his works. Lee Kuan Yew had said, in no uncertain terms, that he agreed to Operation Coldstore to clinch merger – which is a political matter and NOT a security concern. In a letter dated 12 February 1963 to Lord Selkirk, Lee said:

It was because of your Government’s firm assurance given by your Deputy endorsing the view of your High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur that if the arrests were not agreed to, then merger and Malaysia would fail that made us agree….

It was because of this appraisal of the Federation position by your Government and the assurance that you would dissuade them from departing from the publicly agreed terms that we agreed to the decision of the I.S.C.[xvi] [The I.S.C. decision referenced is the mass arrests of Operation Coldstore.]

Therefore, Lee had to conceal his role and responsibility in Operation Coldstore as he was well aware that this move was against the people’s anti-colonial aspirations. Upon return to Singapore from Kuala Lumpur on 2 February 1963 – the day of Operation Coldstore – he denied responsibility for it, saying if he had had his way, Operation Coldstore would not be executed.[xvii] And the next day, pressured by fellow members of the Internal Security Council, the British and the Federation, he denied his denial!

Lim Chin Siong

The official PAP propaganda has it that Lim Chin Siong was a communist. Lim himself refuted this allegation in his letter to the Straits Times published on 31 July 1961. He said: (Linked to https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/12/26/lim-chin-siong-i-am-not-a-communist-%e6%9e%97%e6%b8%85%e7%a5%a5-%ef%bc%9a-%e6%88%91%e4%b8%8d%e6%98%af%e4%b8%80%e4%b8%aa%e5%85%b1%e4%ba%a7%e5%85%9a%e5%91%98/)

i m not communist-page-001

Your editorial comments and news reports in the last week have focused attack on me. By repeating the fiction that I am a Communist front-man I suppose my political antagonists hope that it would stick in the minds of some.

While Mr. Lee and his men keep crying Communism to cover up a multitude of sins, let me, for my part, try to set the record straight.

Let me make clear once and for all that I am not a Communist or a communist front-man or, for that matter, anybody’s front-men.

Lee Kuan Yew in his Radio Talks, subsequently published in Battle for Merger (1962), produced documents obtained in a raid on an ABL outfit in 1953/4 and claimed that the handwriting was that of Lim’s. Notwithstanding this opinion from the police handwriting expert, what these documents prove is simply that they are ABL and not CPM documents. A strong anti-colonialist, Lim had always admitted that he was in the Anti-British League.

The ABL was not a party with an ideology. Its membership was not limited to adherents of Marxism-Leninism or to the working class; the bourgeoisie was welcomed. Thus, members of the ABL hailed from all strata of society, embraced different worldviews and were only glued together by an anti-colonial commitment.

Clearly, the ABL was not the CPM and should not be confused as such even though in the climate of the early 1950s, it had to operate in the twilight zone since the British had declared Emergency and outlawed all anti-colonial activities, causing the demise of the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU).

If the PAP logic concludes that the ABL is communist, would not that conclusion logically apply to the PAP itself as well?

Meetings at Barisan Sosialis HQ

01 01-page-001  02 03-page-001 04 05-page-001 06 07-page-001 08 09-page-001 10 11-page-001 12 13-page-001 14 15-page-001 16 17-page-001 18 19-page-001 20 21-page-001 22 00-page-001-2 封面与封面-page-001

The Barisan Sosialis was a democratically constituted party that must listen to its cadres and grassroots.

In the atmosphere of that time after the phony merger referendum where the democratic process was obviously flawed: anti-colonial fighters for freedom locked up without trial; the Legislative Assembly prorogued indefinitely to avoid disclosing the terms of merger; and a phony merger referendum (whose choices were best characterised by David Marshall as choices to beat your mother, wife or daughter) had just been foisted on the electorate; it was no small wonder that Barisan cadres and rank-and-file were questioning the fairness or even the viability of the constitutional path. All avenues of lawful activities had been blocked in the name of the law or guise of it by the powers-that-be.

The Barisan Sosialis, as a legally constituted party that abided by the rules of parliamentary democracy and elections, was faced with the insurmountable obstacle of a grossly uneven playing field that was always tilted against it. An analogy to the current tenacious struggle of the BERSIH (CLEAN) movement across the causeway illustrates Barisan’s dilemma at that historical epoch.

 

Barisan Sosialis cadres in the branches were activists, not well paid civil servants. The threat of arbitrary arrest constantly hung over their heads. These young and brave activists struggled on at great sacrifices to themselves and their families for the lofty cause of social justice and freedom from colonial rule. We had to address their legitimate fears and disillusionment with the so-called constitutional path dished out to us by colonial Britain and the PAP. Hence these meetings and debates in Barisan Sosialis headquarters where all views and skepticism could be expressed and encouraged to be aired. These meetings were open with minutes recorded, and taken out of context by Mr Gafoor. These meetings concluded with the Barisan Sosialis cadres and members affirming the constitutional and parliamentary path.

It is not true as Mr Gafoor suggested that the Barisan did not recognise Singapore’s independence in 1965. Lim Chin Siong smuggled a letter out of Changi prison in which he asked Barisan cadres to accept this fait accompli and to move on despite the crippling blows. This letter was openly read out to Barisan assemblymen. Apparently, Mr Gafoor forgot to mention the Barisan ‘rump’ intentionally left behind by Lee Kuan Yew to his advantage when the entire moderate leadership of Barisan had been wiped out in Operation Coldstore.[1]

Poh Soo Kai

傅树介照片

Mr Gafoor claimed that I was not an unwitting dupe of the communists. As evidence, he mentioned a Katong bomber incident in December 1974.

1974年加东爆炸案

What proof can he proffer that this bomber was a member of the Communist Party of Malaya apart from bare assertion? Would the files be opened for scrutiny?

Just as Lai Tek was a known British agent infiltrated into the highest level of the CPM, so could bogus revolutionary groups be set up by the Special Branch or similar intelligence organisations like the CIA and MI6 in this devious game of spy and counterspy with unwitting and innocent youth duped into executing extreme violence. I have reasons to believe that the outfit to which the bomber belonged is a fake radical group called the Singapore Revolutionary Party.

I hereby state categorically that I have not treated any bomber, communist or non-communist that:

I, my wife Grace and G Raman went in the stealth of the night to Masai in Johore to treat an injured bomber. Lee even publicly told the people of Singapore that as a medical doctor, I would be charged and judged by my peers in the Singapore Medical Council and struck off the rolls. Up till today, I have not heard from the Singapore Medical Council on so serious a charge.

I have consistently asked for a public trial. Should evidence of the alleged crime that I had committed be presented in a court of law, I will accept its verdict.

It still pains me that on the basis of this serie noir (dark thriller), my wife Grace, was subject to arrest and tortured for a month.

 

Surprisingly, these new sensational charges of treating the injured bomber were never added to my charge sheets.

What if the Barisan Sosialis had won in a fair and clean election…

What if Operation Coldstore had not been carried out and the Barisan Sosialis had won in a fair and clean election?

This prospect has been and remains so terrifying to the PAP that its propaganda has repeatedly raised the spectre of a “communist millennium”. There would certainly be no such millennium should the Barisan accede to power in a fair and clean election. I reiterate that even as late as 18 July 1962, PBC Moore wrote that, though the British colonial office was of the view that Lim Chin Siong was a communist,

(T)here is no evidence that he is receiving direction from the C.P.M., Peking or Moscow. Our impression is that Lim is working very much on his own and that his primary objective is not the communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional Government of Singapore. It is far from certain that having obtained this objective Lim would necessary prove a compliant tool of Peking or Moscow.[2]

As a founder member of the PAP as well as of the Barisan, I can assure the people of Singapore that the Barisan was established to carry forward the founding constitution of the PAP, much of which was incorporated into the constitution of the Barisan.

There would be freedom of speech and assembly; the ISA would be abolished. There would be social justice and economic dignity for the sick and disabled, the old and retired and other vulnerable groups.

There would not have been the wave after wave of arbitrary arrests and imprisonment without trial that we have witnessed under the PAP to instill fear in the population and keep itself in power. The ridiculous arrests of Church and other social activists as alleged Marxists would not have happened.

There would certainly be no astronomical salary for ministers; no polarisation of wealth in society; ministers would have to declare their assets on taking office and be prohibited to have personal holding companies, exposed to the lure of investing in tandem with the Government Investment Corporations (GICs); and definitely, OCCUPY Raffles Square would not be deemed an illegal assembly!!

We would have promoted a robust 2-party system for checks and balances in the parliament which till today I would very much welcome.

Dr Poh Soo Kai was Assistant Secretary-General of Barisan Sosialis. He was imprisoned twice under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) – which allows for detention without trial – for a total of 17 years by Singapore’s PAP government.

Notes

[1] ‘Note of Meeting held with Mr Lee Kuan Yew’, attended by Minister of State Lord Lansdowne, Lord Selkirk and Mr West in Lee Kuan Yew’s office, 27 November 1962, CO 1030/ 1159:

“He (Lee Kuan Yew) considered that it was necessary to take in the leaders before Malaysia, leaving the lesser men to be proceeded against more quietly and gradually after Malaysia. At this point he said with surprising candour that it was to his advantage to preserve a pro-communist rump in opposition. He thought that this strengthened his position in Singapore.”

[2] No. 363, Moore to Secretary of State, 18 July 1962, CO 1030/1160.

Sources

[i] EJ Linsett, ‘The security threat to Singapore (Communism and nationalism)’, 24 July 1959, DO 35/9870, PR0, cited in TN Harper, “Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story’”, in Comet in our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, ed Tan Jing Quee and K S Jomo (2001), p. 31.

[ii] Colonial Office assessment, 1958. ‘Singapore – Political situation and outlook’, August 1958, CO 1030/451, Future of Singapore.

 “Lee Kuan Yew and moderate leaders of the PAP regard the continued presence of UK in Singapore as an assurance for themselves. They considered it unavoidable that in order to be consistent with the public image they have created, they must continue to be highly critical of U.K. Policies”.

[iii] Lee Ting Hui, The Open United Front: The Communist Struggle in Singapore 1954-1966 (1995), p. 197.

  [vii] Selkirk to R Maulding, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 April 1962, CO 1030/ 998.

[viii] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 April 1962, DO 169/247 Telegram 224 .

[ix] Secret 996, UK Commissioner, KL to Commonwealth Relations Office, 28 December 1962, CO 1030/1160.

“Tunku’s refusal to authorise arrest of Members of Parliament was genuine due to professional advice given to him that there was no security case which could justify it. Reason for his anger was realisation that Lee was taking advantage of atmosphere of urgency to include a number of political opponents in list of arrest on purely political grounds and by implicating the Tunku was hoping to shift the onus.’

[x] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Report on Internal Security Council meeting, 14 December 1962, CO 1030/1160.

[iv] PCB Moore to WIJ Wallace, Colonial Office, 22 May 1961, CO 1030/1149, Political situation, Singapore 1960-1962.

[v] Secret 263, Selkirk to Colonial Office, 17 July 1961, CO 1030/1149.

[vi] ‘Singapore Political and Security Situation’, United Kingdom Commission in Singapor, 10 April 1962, CO 1030/998.

[xi] Moore to Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 10 December 1962, CO 1030/1160.

[xii] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 January 1963, CO 1030/1576, p. 49, para. 2(b):

Lee has mentioned on several occasions that he fears Ong Eng Guan may attempt to make political capital out of the arrest. He wants to make it clear that if Ong Eng Guan were to cause serious trouble, action would have to be taken against him. I told Lee we could give no undertaking at this stage and that he was not a communist (he agreed) and there would have to be a strong case to take any action against him.

[xiii] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 January 1963, CO 1030/1576, telegram 53, p. 63:

Lee in effect admitted that the object of the U.P.P. arrests was to strengthen his own chances of political survival….The Director of Special Branch admitted however that he had been directed specifically by the Prime Minister to select several members of the U.P.P. for arrest and that it would never have occurred to Special Branch to propose these names for arrest. It is clear therefore that Lee’s purpose is to bring home to all who might entertain the idea of making political capital out of the arrests that they would not themselves be safe from arrest. In this way he hopes to ensure that the Chinese speaking electorate are not encouraged to transfer their political allegiance to Ong Eng Guan.

[xiv] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 January 1963, CO 1030/1577,

[xv] Record of Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew on July 25, 1961, CO 1030/1149, p. 93

[xvi] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 February 1963, DO 169/248, Secret No. 108, appending text of letter dated 12 February received from Lee Kuan Yew.

[xvii] ‘Lee: Reds were ready for violent action’, The Straits Times, 4 February 1963.

新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版第二部分

编者说明:作者文章内的部分插图为本网站附录;本中文本词句如与原文本有出入之处,均以英文本原文为最终解释权。

一、本文章网址:

http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/01/14/singapores-battle-for-merger-revisited-part-ii/

二、傅树介医生本篇片文章第一部分网站:Dr Poh’s Part I can be read here.

三、新加坡驻澳大利亚最高专员回应傅树介医生本篇文章第一部分的网站:The response to Part I from Mr Burhan Gafoor, Singapore’s High Commissioner to Australia, can be read here.

历史的背景

为了年轻一代着想,是有必要叙述有关上个世纪50末到60年代初的历史背景,如有关在(新马)合并之前的时期和(1963年)冷藏行动。

让我们不要忘记二次世界大战来年整个资本主义阵营为了控制世界的财富而发生惨烈的战役。在东南亚,在这些殖民地国家里,包括新加坡和马来亚在内,殖民主义者漠视这些国家人民的痛苦。所以,在二次世界大战后这些国家的人民渴望摆脱英国殖民主义者的殖民统治而独立的愿望是强烈和不可妥协的。

在1945年二次世界大战结束后,英国寻求重新剥削它的殖民地包括新加坡,  尽管英国是新成立的联合国的员国有责任让殖民地独立.   因此,它开始制造了一个可以承诺为保护英国在新加坡的利益的政党或个人。简单的说,当新加坡在合并和冷藏行动之前还是一个殖民地时,英国人在所有的问题还是持有最后话语权以至于影响我们。他们有权终止宪法。

在1945年二次世界大战结束后,英国寻求重新剥削它的殖民地包括新加坡,  尽管英国是新成立的联合国的员国有责任让殖民地独立.   因此,它开始制造了一个可以承诺为保护英国在新加坡的利益的政党或个人。简单的说,当新加坡在合并和冷藏行动之前还是一个殖民地时,英国人在所有的问题还是持有最后话语权以至于影响我们。他们有权终止宪法。

无论如何,反对殖民主义的情绪并没有因此而低落。就是李光耀自己也看到,尽管他认识到自己的未来是必须紧紧依靠英国人,但是,为了政治前途,他必须是把自己扮演成反对殖民主义的战士。[ii]2003年出版的陈平:《我方的历史》揭露,在人民行动党成立初期,李光耀已经与马来亚共产党接触并寻求获得支持。在1954年,李光耀已经清楚知道沙末.伊斯迈尔(Samad Ismail)是一个共产党员,但是,李光耀还委任他作为在维多利亚纪念堂举行人民行动党成立大会的筹备委员会主席。

那是由于要求独立的压力来自人民和抗英同盟的努力  英国人只好批准人民行动党在1954年成为合法存在的政党。人民行动党成立的党章已经声明,它为争取独立、言论、集会和人权的自由,要求废除不经审讯的扣留法律和社会主义纲领。随着人民行动党的诞生,抗英同盟的秘密组织的存在已经不再需要了。抗英同盟的积极分子已经公开的加入人民行动党。从这个意义上而言,人民行动党已经替代了抗英同盟,成为了反对英国殖民主义争取独立的先锋力量……

一个反对殖民主义、争取民主和社会主义的平台确保了人民行动党在1959年的大选取得了压倒性的胜利。但是,到了1961年,在李光耀领导下的人民行动党已经非常清楚显现了它不再继承它在1959年选举时所许下的明确目标:释放所有被林有福政权所拘留的政治犯和工会领袖。李光耀的人民行动党也恐吓要紧缩工会为维护工人的权利和争取血汗利益而领导和组织其会员进行抗争到底的权利

为此,考验(人民行动党)终于到来了。在1961年的芳林补选期间,当王永远提出了人民行动党领导人没有实践诺言。他在自己的竞选活动中提出了优先释放所有在押政治犯、废除防止公共安全法令(俗称‘公安法令’,其后又改称为‘内部安全法令’)和停止限制工会的活动。

无论如何,李光耀获得了马来亚共产党的承诺支持芳林的补选。李廷辉引述了政治部的档案,马来亚共产党在新加坡的领导人方壮壁(李光耀授予的代号为‘全权代表’)写给李光耀的信中保证马来亚共产党对于推翻李光耀并不感兴趣;相反地,马来亚共产党热衷于继续与人民行动党建立联盟的关系[iii]。

李光耀相信自己所宣称的共产党是非常强大的。为此,人民行动党将会赢得芳林区的补选;他禁止林清祥和他的工会领袖在人民行动党的竞选群众大会上演讲。他要展示自己并不需要依靠林清祥的(影响力),自己有能力取得选民的支持。李光耀在这场干净和公平的补选失败了。

在另一方面,英国驻新加坡副最高专员PBC Moore深深的意识到在这次补选的主要问题是:人民行动党在1959年大选时许下的释放政治犯是一个极其重要的问题。他的观点是。“在芳林区补选前,除了人民行动党外,全新加坡人民都知道王元必然会赢得这场补选”[iv]

英国人在那个时候战略上的兴趣是放在新加坡的军事基地。因为这将会可以有效的干预(新加坡)邻国的事务,特别是靠近新加坡的苏卡诺的印度尼西亚,或者是毛泽东的中国。但是,在新加坡的社会上所嗅到的是反对殖民主义的气氛。英国人所面对的是:在这样众多敌对人口的环境下,新加坡的基地是否能够达到其设想的目的。为此,为了制止这种情况对它们的利益的影响,英国人诱使东姑勉强接受新加坡加入马来西亚,以‘扩大’马来西亚成为庞大的计划。这包括加入了北婆罗洲和汶莱。英国人相信,在保守的东姑管理下,它们的军事基地将会安全的存在。

在1961年初,东姑接受德国记者的访问时说,合并是一件未来的事。东姑非常清楚,他说,他不积极在与以华人占多数的新加坡进行合并。无论如何,在人民行动党失去芳林区补选后不到一个月,东姑在这个问题的态度产生180度的转变。他被说服同意接受新加坡加入马来西亚的合并。

在1961年7月,人民行动党面对第二次的考验。那就是安顺区补选。马绍尔采取了与王永远在芳林区补选一样的立场。为了确保自己的选票的诚信,李光耀把释放政治犯的责任推给了英国人。他说,那是英国人没有在内部安全理事会上提出来(注:5)李光耀把‘憎恨’推给了英国人。尽管如此,李光耀在安顺区干净和公平的补选还是失败。

即便是在共产党的支持下,李光耀在其1961年的政治生涯中还是失去这两场补选。李光耀害怕的不是共产党,而是一个强大的反对殖民主义运动对人民行动党失去信心。英国人为了确保自己在本区域的战略利益而抛出了合并来拯救李光耀。

所以,现在我们可以看到这个问题:确定冷藏行动的目的到底是基于存在着暴力和骚乱的行为的保安原因;还是有预谋的先发制人的行动为防范。因为为了起义而获取与储存屋契作为秘密的军事训练……等等;或者,冷藏行动仅仅就是一个简单的政治目的是把合法的反对党连根拔起。

内部安全理事会并无法大方的打开逮捕反对党。英国人只是希望可以通过逮捕行动公开削弱反对殖民主义的力量。考虑到二次世界大战后和联合国的成立的国际氛围,英国人要提出任何为了政治控制目的而进行逮捕行动,只能是假借‘安全’的理由。英国人对新加坡(政治局势)的评估是‘颠覆势力并没有像马来亚共产党的干部在1948年那样蓄谋进行暴动’。因此,使用警察行动对付他们可能会让他们失去人民希望和平的愿望,这将会使新加坡的政治温度升温进而加强反对者获得支持的力量。【vi】

在社阵和人民运动的这一边,并没有任何的非宪制的斗争,没有任何计划或阴谋的暴乱,没有像今天出现各国的占领运动一样,占领莱佛士坊的行动来确定冷藏行动的合法性。而是Selkirk提醒伦敦有关李光耀在鼓动对林清祥和他的同伴的挑衅。迫使他们进行非宪制推进斗争,这样可以找到逮捕他们的证据。英国最高专员希望,在李光耀访问英国时,殖民地秘书可以警告李光耀:这样的做法是对合并有危险的,而英国人可怕不会支持【vii】。特别是李光耀倾向于政治部的建议创造‘适合挑衅的条件迫使林清祥采取行动’,把在马来亚出生的社阵和工会领袖移到马来亚联合邦。【viii】

李光耀必须给人制造一个印象,这个逮捕行动并不是要对付反对党,而是一项为了安全的理由而配合马来亚联合邦政府采取的行动。所以整个逮捕行动似乎是一项泛马来亚性的逮捕行动。李光耀一定要绝对逮捕行动的会议在吉隆坡举行;李光耀个人进一步要求东姑必须逮捕林建寿、阿末.波斯达曼和其他马来亚的领袖。东姑拒绝与他一起进行这场游戏【ix】.因此,原定在1962 年12月16日进行的冷藏行动计划在晚间11点被取消。这个事件将出示证明没有任何涉及威胁安全问题可以确认采取冷藏行动!

在汶莱的阿.查阿里的起义提早在12月8日发生。社阵对于汶莱的起义给予道义上的支持。这种道义上的支持是展现国际间相互支持殖民地人民起来推翻殖民统治的团结惯例英国人有信心汶莱的这场起义将会很快的被镇压下来。因此,在汶莱的起义被全部镇压下来前,伦敦向Selkirk发出指示,同意在新加坡逮捕我们,这就是内部安全理事会的介入。【x】李光耀不失时机抓住了这个‘上帝送来’的机会【xi】.这就让内部安全理会能宣称说他们有足够的证据证明蓄谋进行共产党恐怖活动和造成对安全产生威胁。直到今天,并没有任何证据可以证明社阵与汶莱的起义事件与任何关联。事实上,要证明社阵是否涉及汶莱的起义事件有关联的最简单的防范就是提交现有存在的事实根据。

威胁安全的神话来确认冷藏行动的合法性,可以从李光耀当年坚持要逮捕王永元【xii】和他的人民统一党【xiii】三位党员而追溯到揭穿,李光耀害怕王永元利而用逮捕乘机行动以获取更多的选票,确保自己在来届大选的胜选。对自己在未来的大选产生威胁【xiv】

正如我在前面所叙述的一样,1961年行动党在芳林区和安顺区补选失败是选民对行动党怀有敌意的反应,也是威胁到英国人以新加坡为军事基地以保护其在本区域的战略利益的讯号。为此,合并就是这两场补选后抛向李光耀的一个救生圈。所以,对于李光耀以表现极其‘奉承和卑躬尽乞’态度与东姑一道合作同意合并的条件。【xv】

在这里,我要说的是,李光耀的宣传者他们会有一个全面阅读李光耀的作品。李光耀十分明确的说过, 他同意冷藏行动是与合并相关联的——这是一个政治问题,而不是一个涉及威胁安全的问题。在1963年2月12日,李光耀致给Lord Selkirk的信里说道:

“这是您的副手给予坚定的保证,批准了吉隆坡最高专员的观点,假设逮捕行动不被获准,那么,合并和马来西亚(计划)将失败所以我得同意……”

“正是因为您的政府对联邦局势的这个评估和保证,您会劝阻他们离开(顾虑)公共同意的条件而我们同意内部安全理事会的决定【xvi】”(内部安全理事会的决定是指大规模逮捕的冷藏行动)

因此,李光耀在冷藏行动计划里隐蔽了自己的角色和责任。因为,他知道这是与人民的反对殖民主义运动背道而驰的。在1963年2月2日,他从吉隆坡回到新加坡时,他拒绝承担这个涉及冷藏行动的责任。他说,假设我可以有自己的方式,冷藏行动将不会出现。在隔天,来自内部安全理事会的成员、英国人和马来亚向他施加压力,他又否定了自己的否认!

林清祥

行动党的官方已经宣传林清祥是一个共产党员。林清祥在1961731日致给海峡时报的信中已经驳斥了这些指控(见:林清祥致给海峡时报信件网址: https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/12/26/lim-chin-siong-i-am-not-a-communist-%e6%9e%97%e6%b8%85%e7%a5%a5-%ef%bc%9a-%e6%88%91%e4%b8%8d%e6%98%af%e4%b8%80%e4%b8%aa%e5%85%b1%e4%ba%a7%e5%85%9a%e5%91%98/

i m not communist-page-001

他说,

你们的编辑部文章和新闻在上个星期集中焦点在攻击有关我的问题报道。不断的编造神话,说我是一个共产党前线人物。我的政治对手希望这样将会使我的形象烙在一些人的脑海里。

李先生和他的人在叫嚣共产主义是为了要掩盖许多阴谋的当儿,让我直接明确本身的立场。

让我做一次性明确清楚的申明:我不是一个共产党员,或者是共产党的前线人物,或者是任何人的前线人物。

李光耀在他的12讲里,随后出版书名叫《合并的斗争》(1962年)提供了在1953/1954年从抗英同盟搜获的文件资料,然后说这是林清祥的手迹。尽管如此,从警方的笔迹专家鉴定这些文件只是简单的证明他们是抗英同盟的文件,而不是马来亚共产党的文件。林清祥是一个坚定的反殖民主义者。他承认自己是一个抗英同盟的成员。

抗英同盟不是一个具有意识形态的政党。他的成员并不限于马克思列宁主义的追随者,或者工人阶级。也包括了资产阶级分子。因此,抗英同盟的成员是来自社会的各个阶层,包括具有各个不同的世界观和凝集了反殖民主义的承诺。很明显的,抗英同盟并不是马来亚共产党。即使在50年代初期有这样的氛围也不可以混淆一谈的。在英国人宣布紧急状态和所有的反殖民主义活动是非法时被削弱。即使在50年代初期在英国人宣布紧急状态和所有的反殖民主义活动是非法组织,包括了抗英同盟和马来亚民主同盟。

假设人民行动党把抗英同盟视为是共产党的结论,那逻辑上岂不是也适用于人民行动党本身了吗?

在社会主义阵线总部的会议

党章 01

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社会主义阵线是一个建立民主基础的政党。它必须听取自己的干部和基层的意见。

在虚假合并全民投票后的当时的气氛是明显有缺陷的:反殖民主义者在不经审讯的情况下被监禁;立法议会通过无限期休会避开了披露有关合并的条件;和一个虚假的合并全民投票(马绍尔所说的,你是要选择打你的母亲、妻子或者女儿)偷偷的欺骗选民;为此不少的社阵干部和成员对于公平或者甚至宪制斗争的道路产生怀疑。在法律伪装的幌子下,所有的合法途径已经被当权者所堵塞。

社会主义阵线是一个合法的政党。它是受制于议会民主和选举的约束。它面对着周边许多不能克服的障碍,钳制着它的活动场所。目前在马来西亚的BERSIH运动所面对的困境就如当年所社阵经历的历史困境一样。

社会主义阵线支部的干部是活跃分子,但不是有待遇良好的公务员。随意的逮捕威胁不断的挂在他们的颈项。这些勇敢的年轻人是为了社会正义事业和从殖民地统治中解放出来而战斗是建立在自我牺牲和他们的家庭基础上。我们必须重视他们对英殖民主义者和人民行动党的恐惧和对所谓宪制斗争的道路的绝望。因此,当时,在社阵总部进行的这些会议和辩论所产生的各种看法和怀疑可以公开的发表和鼓励。这些会议都是公开和有记录的。Mr Gafoor断章取义。这些会议记录了社阵的干部和成员确定了宪制斗争和议会斗争的道路。

Mr Gafoor说,社阵不承认新加坡在1965 的独立不确实的。林清祥在1965年让人从章宜监牢里偷偷带出来的一封信,呼吁社阵干部接受这个即成的事实,不要理会目前遭受到的打击并继续前进。这份信是公开在社阵的集会上宣读的。明显的,Mr Gafoor忘记提及有利于李光耀的全面逮捕了全部温和派的社阵领导人,为李光耀的统治创造一个有利的局面【I】

傅树楷

傅树介照片

Mr Gafoor说,我不是一个无辜者。我是被共产党设立陷阱让我做了他们要做的事情。我知道自己在做一个共产党员该做的事情。他以有关1974年12月在加东发生的汽车爆炸案事件作为例子以支持他对我的指控。

1974年加东爆炸案

除了空洞的指责外,他能够提供什么证据证明这个爆炸案涉嫌者是马来亚共产党的成员?他们可以把这个案件的档案公开解密让人审核吗?

正如众所周知的历史,莱特是英国人潜伏在马来亚共产党的最高领导层的。因此,政治部是否可以也同样设立一个假的集团,或者类似于中央情报局或是英国的M16的情报组织进行这种分裂的特务活动和诱使不知情和无辜的青年人涉及这种执行极端的暴力的反特务活动。我有理由相信,这个制造爆炸者是属于一个虚假的极端集团。它的名称为:新加坡革命党。

我在此明确的表明, 我并没有为任何涉及爆炸案件的人,不论他是共产党员或者非共产党员进行任何的治疗。

李光耀没有取得任何我为爆炸案件的人进行治理,因此,他捏造了我的妻子、G.拉曼和我在夜间潜到马来西亚的马西为一个伤者治疗的故事。他公开的告诉新加坡人民,身为一位医务人员,我将会因此被控告。我也将会被我在新加坡医药理事会的会员将裁决并遞夺我的医生资质。

直到今天,我并没有听到任何新加坡医药理事会对我发出的任何这样严厉的指控。

我不断的要求进行公开的审讯有关这起案件。把指控我涉及有关此案件的所有证据呈上法院。我将会接受法院的裁决。

对我而言,这个恶意的指责至今还是一个极其的伤痛。它导致了我妻子GRACE被捕并被在牢内遭受虐待一个月。

让人惊奇的是,这项最新的耸人听闻的指控我为爆炸案伤者治疗的指控没有加入我的诉状中。

假设社会主义阵线赢得一个公正和清洁的选举的话……

假设没有进行冷藏行动和社阵在一个干净和公平的选举中取得胜利?

对人民行动而言,这一直是一个令他们恐惧的预期情况。他们的宣传机构一直不断的进行宣传‘共产主义千禧年’的幽灵。对于社阵而言,在一个公平和干净的选举让它们取得政权的话,可以肯定的是绝对不会有共产主义千禧。我再一次强调,即便是在1962年7月18日,PBC Moore 写道,虽然英国殖民地办公室的认为林清祥是一个共产党员。

根本就没有证据证明,他接受来自马来亚共产党、或者是北京、或者说莫斯科的指示。我们的印象是林清祥依靠自己非常努力的工作和他的主要目标并不是共产主义社会,而是取得控制新加坡宪制的政府。假使林清祥达到这个目标的话  我不能肯定他会愿意一直做北京 或莫斯科的工具。【2】

我作为一个社阵的发起人之一,我可以向新加坡人民保证,社阵的成立是继续为弘扬人民行动党所制定的宪法。这大多数都列进了社阵的党章。

这就是:言论与集会自由、废除内部安全法令、社会正义、让所有病者和残障者有尊严、老年人和退休人士以及其他脆弱的人也是一样的。

这将不会发生一波接一波的蓄意逮捕行动和不经审讯被拘留在监牢的事件。我们见证了在人民行动党统治下,在人民当中灌输了恐惧的心理和自己牢牢掌握了政权。以指责教会活跃分子和其他的社会活动者为马克思主义而被逮捕的时间将不会发生。

部长们将绝对不会领取天文数字的薪金;不会出现财富不均的两极化的社会;部长们在担任公职之日必须宣誓呈报自己的财产,以及禁止个人拥有自己控制的公司,公开和清晰有关与政府投资公司(GIC)的投资关系;‘占领莱佛士坊’不是一个非法的集会!!

我们将会促进在国会的两党制作为监督和平衡作用。一直到今日我仍然会乐见这个制度的推行。

傅树介医生是社会主义阵线的助理秘书长。他在不经审讯的内部法令下被人民行动党总关押了17年。

备注:

    【1】档案编号:1962年11月27日CO 1030/ 1159: 国务大臣 Lord Lansdowne, Lord Selkirk and Mr West与李光耀先生在李光耀办公室会谈记录。    

“他(李光耀)考虑到,假设有必要的话,在马来西亚(成立前)把领导人抓进去,留下少部分人在马来西亚(成立后)继续以比较平静和有次序的反对。在这个问题上,他令人惊奇的直率的说法,这样说有利于维持共产党在反对党的残留势力。他认为,这将加强他在新加坡的地位。”

  【2】1962年7月18日,第363号,编号CO 1030/1160,Moore致给国务大臣的信件    

链接:

     【i】EJ Linsett,《(共产主义和民族主义)对新加坡的安全威胁》。1959年7月24日,编号:DO 35/9870,PRO,引述自TN Harper,“林清祥和‘新加坡的故事’”,我们天空的彗星:林清祥的年代,编辑:陈仁贵和K. S. JOMO (2001),第31页。      【ii】1958年的殖民地评估报告。“新加坡——政治局势和展望”,编号: 1958年8月 CO 1030/451,未来的新加坡。     

“李光耀和现代化的人民行动党领袖重视新加坡继续留在英联邦是对自己的一种保障。他们认为,他们必须继续高度的批评英国的政策,作为保持他们在大众面前所树立的形象,这是不可避免的。”

     【iii】李廷辉:《公开同统一战线——1954年-1966年(1995年),第197页     【iv】1961年5月22日PCB Moore 致信WIJ Wallace,殖民地办公室:新加坡的政治局势》,编号:CO 1030/1149     【v】1961年7月17日Selkirk致信殖民地办公室,密件:263,编号:CO 1030/1149.     【vi】1962年4月10日,英国最高专员公署:《新加坡的政治与安全局势》,编号:CO 1030/998.     【vii】1962年4月28日,Selkirk 致信 R Maulding,殖民地国务秘书,编号:CO 1030/ 998.     【viii】1962年4月24日,Selkirk 致电文244号 殖民地国务秘书,编号:DO 169/247       【ix】1962年12月28日,最高专员公署致函吉隆坡共和联邦联络处,编号:CO 1030/1160.     

“东姑拒绝授权逮捕国会议员基本上是基于顾问提供给他的意见,因为没有任何涉及安全的原因可以确定。他愤怒的原因是实际的。李光耀借题紧急的气氛加入了一份要逮捕的反对党名单,是纯粹基于这种因素和暗示东姑通过这样的方式把责任转移到东姑的身上。”

【x】1962年12月14日Selkirk致信殖民地国务秘书:内部安全理事会会议记录 .编号:, CO 1030/1160.     【xiv】1963年1月31日Selkirk致信殖民地国务秘书,‘1963-1965新加坡内部安全理事会’编号:CO 1030/1577     【15】1961年7月25日与李光耀进行会谈的记录,编号:CO 1030/1149, p. 93 第93页     【xvi】1963年2月13日Selkirk致信殖民地国务秘书,编号:DO 169/248.密件号码:108,附件:受到李光耀2月12日的来信。     【xvii】李:‘共产党已经准备进行暴力行动’,1963年2月4日海峡时报。     【xi】1962年12月10日Moore致信殖民地国务秘书,编号:CO 1030/1160.     【xii】1963年1月23日Selkirk致信殖民地国务秘书,编号:CO 1030/1576, 第 49页, 第 2段(b):    

他在不同的场合里已经说过,王永远可能企图累计累积资本以避免被逮捕。他要明确的说,假设王永远要制造严重的麻烦,他将会采取行动对付他。我告诉李,在这个阶段,我们将不会承担任何责任,同时。他(指王永远)这不是一个共产党员(他同意这个观点)。而且,这不是要具有确凿的证据才可以采取行动对付他。

李实际上承认,对人民统一党的逮捕行动目的是要加强自己的政治生存……无论如何,政治部主任承认,他受总理特别指示列出几个要逮捕的人民统一党成员。但是,这几个名字并不在政治部提交的名单里。这是非常明显的,李的目的是要把那些可能具有想要累积政治资本的避开被逮捕。这样,他们就不会被逮捕。因此。从这方面而言,他确保受华文教育的选民就不会受鼓动转向他们的同盟者王永远。

    【xiii】1963年1月29日Selkirk致邮电53号殖民地国务秘书,第63页,编号:CO 1030/1576

 

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