人民论坛

小溪细水汇集而成形成汹涌的大海洋

(中英文本对照)历史学家覃炳鑫博士谈李光耀——第一部分

留下评论

 March 26, 2015

share from http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/TOC)

《公民在线》网-2015325

Your browser does not support native audio, but you can download this MP3 to listen on your device. 

Malaysia’s independent radio station, BFM 89.9 interviewed Thum Ping Tjin, Research Associate at the Centre for Global History at the University of Oxford and co-ordinator of Project Southeast Asia, on Lee Kuan Yew’s

新书:1963年冷藏箱的50周年

Lee Chwi Lynn: So just for the uninitiated, because I think colonisation is a phrase that most of us will be more than familiar with, but decolonisation – I suppose that is the process of removing said colonisers?

Thum Ping Tjin: Yes, it kind of spans several levels, because on one level you have the very obvious transfer of power which is the term that the British like to use, because it’s very clear-cut. You lower one flag, then you raised the other flag and that’s it.

But at a deeper level you have to ask yourself, when you have a whole generation of political leaders in a colony who have been raised in the schools of the coloniser to think like the colonial power, and then you hand power to them, how much do they then defer from the interests of the colonial power?

So decolonisation is not just transfer (of) political power but it’s a process of social cultural change where we learn to adapt, in that we find our own identity, find our own past through the world.

And when we look at decolonisation in the context of Malaysia and Singapore, I think one figure that we had to talk about is of course Lee Kuan Yew, who was an important figure in shaping of Singapore and post separation from Malaysia. And its relatively safe to say that his legacy is Singapore.

Lee Chwi Lynn: So going back in time in 1965 when he was faced with the challenge of forming this nation state where one hadn’t existed before – how would you described his reaction to Malaysia’s expulsion of Singapore?

Thum Ping Tjin: Well, it is very interesting how you phrase that question because there are so many assumptions within that question that directly come from the way the Malaysia and Singapore governments have shaped (and) kind of portrayed the narratives of our history.

So the fact that they use 1965 as a significant date, the fact where you say that he was faced with a challenge of forming a nation-state, the one that never existed, and the fact that you say Malaysia’s expulsion of Singapore – of course, we see it differently in Singapore. The PAP says they voluntarily chose to leave but I think you really need to understand separation in the context of Malaysia in order to understand Lee Kuan Yew and how he saw things.

Because Lee Kuan Yew’s goal was to reunify Singapore with the rest of Malaya before the partition of Malaya in 1946, the people of Singapore and the people of the rest of Malaya – Malaya in the geographical sense being the whole peninsular – did not perceive Singapore as a separate entity, and the partition of Malaya into Singapore and the Federation was a very traumatic and destructive act and it was the avowed goal of politicians on both sides of the Causeway to reunify Malaya.

I mean, why should some white people from the other side of the world come and tell us on what should be one country, what shouldn’t be another country? And the fact is most Singaporeans had family or were even born north of the Causeway. So when the PAP was elected in 1959 the central plank of his campaign was reunification. In fact, every single political party that ran in 1959 campaign explicitly on a platform of merger with the Federation to the reunification of Malaya.

So in order for any political party to be successful – in 1957, a survey found 90% of Singaporeans in favour of merger – this was not just an ideal; it was, for a politician, something that you have to campaign openly for.

The problem is after Merdeka in 1957, Tunku Abdul Raman and the leaders of UMNO were less and less keen on merger and the fundamental fact was that if you have political parties based on race and you had reunification, there would be more Chinese than Malays in Malaya, I think 43.3 versus 43.1%. And that would then undermine UMNO’s political dominance.

So leaving aside any question about race and who is the rightful owners of the country – this is not a racial issue. Let us think of it as an electoral issue – you don’t want to dilute your own electoral base, so Tunku Abdul Raman and the other leaders said, why should we bring Singapore back in if it means that our hold on power will be loosened? They are politicians, they are pragmatic people, they know that they need to win elections so that’s why they became very unenthusiastic – increasingly unenthusiastic – about reunification.

Lee Kuan Yew, in order to reunify Malaysia had to play the race card very very strongly. He had to play the Communist card very strongly and he had to say Singapore was an existential threat to the Federation if it was outside of the Federation.

So that is the background, so after playing this card very strongly, you have merger but on terms in which Singapore is basically excluded from the rest of Malaysia. Sabah, Sarawak in the Federation – their citizens have certain rights. They can move around and vote wherever and they are equal. But Singapore, Singaporeans can only vote in Singapore. Singapore politicians can only run in Singapore.

Now put yourself in Lee Kuan Yew’s shoes. He has achieved merger and on the back of merger, let us  not forget he won the 1963 elections in Singapore as a consequence of all the events of merger, the deals and compromises. He was able to win an election which people had thought the PAP would lose. It was his big triumph, he has nothing else to turn to the electorate with, nothing else to campaign on in 1963 except merger, but there was such a massive success that they squeaked home.

Now, what is his next ambition? If you know Lee Kuan Yew, he is not going be satisfied with being in Singapore, he is a man of great ambition, he is a man with great towering intellect, he thinks he can do better than anyone else in Malaysia for Malaysia.

So he wants to go north, he wants to become Prime minister of Malaysia and therein you have the fundamental problem, because in order to now overturn the limitation of Singapore’s politicians being limited to Singapore, he now has to turn around and ignore everything he said between 1960 and 1963 or so, about Singapore being Chinese and dangerous and communist and now turn around and say, “No, we are all Malaysian and we should have a Malaysian Malaysia, we should all be equal.” And this of course, you know, (means) he has reneged on all his promises to Tunku Abdul Raman and after provoking in the worsening of the racial situation, now he’s trying to make an about face.

Lee Chwi Lynn: This is a massive reversal.

Thum Ping Tjin: Yes, massive reversal, and of course this then eventually leads to the conclusion on both sides. Basically by 1965, you have one of two options. Either Singapore leaves Malaysia or Kuan Yew leaves Malaysia, you know, leaves power.

And Lee Kuan Yew had a choice – do I keep myself in power by taking Singapore out, or do I ensure the future of Malaysia by taking myself out? And he made his choice: He chose to take Singapore out of Malaysia against the majority of his Cabinet, half of whom were Malaysia born, against the advice of his closest advisers. You know, Toh Chin Chye and Goh Keng Swee were both born in Malaysia and very passionately committed to the Malaysian ideal. Malaysia still could have worked but Lee Kuan Yew would never have been Prime Minister and that was the choice he made.

So faced with this choice in the challenge of forming a nation-state, to go back to your question: I think that he would have been incredibly, sorely disappointed; but he would have been very very relieved because now he was unchallenged once again as the leader of Singapore and he could do things his way as he saw best.

 

Lee Chwi Lynn: So with all that you know with that background, with all the challenges that came with trying to put things together and having to take them apart again – how did that informed the first few years of Singapore’s growth, in the first years of Singapore’s creation as a nation-state?

Thum Ping Tjin: Well, he has to very much distinguish Singapore from the rest of Malaysia, and here again you see something very interesting, because from the moment he was elected in 1959 he had been seeking to create a Malayan identity.

 

They set up a na tional language Institute which sought to develop and teach Malay. Until 1957 or so, Singapore was the artistic intellectual capital of Malaya and it produced a lot of innovative Malay language literature and they wanted to develop that. But the moment we separated, suddenly you have to assert a separate identity for Singapore and because of all the racial issues and because of the majority, it became very natural to emphasise the Chinese identity, the English language identity to distinguish yourself from Malaysia and to now assert a whole new trajectory and identity for Singapore that is not Malayan but Singaporean.

So that really inform the first few years; and of course, you know you have to seek a new economic path, but again this was a huge tension with the central government. Because even though the merger agreement gave Singapore a lot of autonomy in terms of its economic policies, industrialisation, labour policies, they still face huge problems struggling with Kuala Lumpur, which had a far more protectionist attitude (compared) to Singapore, which is fundamentally a free-trade port. Cannot escape from that. So they were free of that for the first time in two years, so that also enabled them to quickly move in that direction.

历史学家覃炳鑫博士谈李光耀

 

您的浏览器的软件可能无法支持这个视频。但是,您可以下载MP3来聆听.

马来西亚独立电台BFM89.9邀请牛津大学全球历史中心的客座研究员和牛津大学东南亚项的协调员覃炳鑫博士就李光耀的逝世进行访谈。(译者按:覃博士也是《新加坡1963年冷藏行动50周年纪念》(The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore)一书的共同作者之一。他撰写的文章是:《‘骨肉团聚’:新加坡中文社群与人他们对新马合并的观点》(Flesh and bone reunite as one body”Singapore Chinese-speaking and their Perspectives on Merge)。他还撰写了一篇极其重要的文章:《Lim Chin Siong was wrongfully detained林清祥被拘留是错误的!》https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/10/04/lim-chin-siong-was-wrongfully-detained)

冷藏行动中文版以下是访谈的全文中文翻译。(本中文翻译内容如与英文原文有不符之处,均以英文版本为最终的解释权。)

Lee Chwi Lynn: 由于缺乏有关这方面的知识,因此我想,殖民地化是一个术语。这是大家所熟知的。但是,非殖民化——我假设这是去殖民主义者的过程。

覃炳鑫博士:是的。这是跨越几个层次的。因为因在某种程度上它有非常明显的权力移。这是英国人喜欢使用的词句。因为这是非常明显的区分的。您降下一面旗帜,你又升起另一面旗帜。

但是,再深一层思考下去。你的问自己,在殖民地时代当一代人的政治领袖,他们在学校升起殖民的旗帜时是具有殖民地权利的想法的。接着,把权力移交给他们时,他们从殖民地哪儿可以获得多少利益?

所以,非殖民地化就不是一个纯粹政治权利的转移的问题了。这是一个社会文化进程的改变。我们必须尝试去接受它。为此,我们要通过是这个世界去寻找自己的过去。

当我们在看马来西亚和新加坡的非殖民化的情况时,我想,其中一个主要的任务我们必须谈及的当然就是李光耀了。他在塑造新加坡和新加坡从马来西亚分离后是一个极其重要的人物。相对安全的说,他的遗产就是新加坡。

 

Lee Chwi Lynn: 这样,让我们回到1965年,当他面对这个国家诞生时的挑战。这是前所未有的——您怎样看待新加坡被马来西亚驱出出去?

覃炳鑫博士:好的。您提出的这个问题是让人感到非常有兴趣的。因为,在这个问题上是有许多不同的假设的。马来西亚政府和新加坡政府对这个问题有着不同版本描述我们的历史。

所以,事实上他们把1965年视为是一个具有意义的日子。事实就如您所说的,他(指李光耀)面对着建立一个国家的挑战,这是前所未有的。正如您所说的,新加坡被驱出出马来西亚——当然,我们才能够方面来看这个问题是有不同的。人民行动说,他们是自己选择脱离。当时, 我想,您必须确实要真正的了解到(新加坡)从马来西亚分割出去的情况。这样,您才可能了解李光耀和他是如何看待这些事情的。

1946年前,马来亚与新加坡分割开来。因此,李光耀的目标是要新加坡与马来亚其他州重归统一。让新加坡人民和马来亚人民重新团聚在一起。马来亚在地理上的认知是整个马来半岛——这个马来半岛并没有把新加坡视为分割开来的一部分。把马来亚(半岛)和新加坡(岛)分割开来是一个极其沉重的创伤和具有破坏性。这就成了长堤两岸的政治家公开提出的政治目标(指新加坡岛与马来亚半岛的重新统一)。

我的意思是说, 为什么在地球的另一边的白人为什么要到这儿来告诉我们要成为一个统一的国家?或者不要成为一个统一的国家?事实上,许多新加坡人的家庭成员甚至是出生在长堤的北段。因此,1959年当行动党上台执政的运动核心任务就是重归统一。事实上,在1959年参与竞选运动的每一个政党在竞选纲领上都明确的的提出要新加坡与马来亚重归统一。

这就是说,如果任何一个政党想要取得选举的胜利——1957年的满意调查发现90%的新加坡赞成合并——这不仅仅是一个理想!而是每一个政治家在开展运动时必须公开声明的目标。

问题是在1957年的独立。东姑.阿杜拉曼和巫统的领袖对合并感不兴趣。问题实质的根本在于:假设一个政党的组成是建立在种族基础上,那一旦重归统一,那么马来亚将出现华人躲过马来人的情况。我想,这个比例大约是在43.3%43.1%之间,这样将会破坏巫统的政治优势。

让我们暂且把有关种族的问题搁置一边。问题是:我们的国家的真正主人是谁?——这可不是一个种族问题。让我们看一看选举的课题——稀释自己的选票。因此,东姑.阿杜拉曼和他的领袖说,为什么我们要把新加坡拉回来。这不是意味着我们会失去手中的权利吗?他们都是政客,他们是实用主义者,他们自己知道必须赢得选举。这样就是为什么他们这样的不乐观——在重归统一的课题上是极其不乐观的。

李光耀为了要马来西亚的重归统一必须热衷于操弄种族注意的牌,他必须热衷于弄共产主义的牌。他必须说,新加坡如果被排除在马来西亚之外将会存在极大的威胁。

就是这个历史背景。好了。(李光耀)在热衷于操弄了这些牌后,新加坡与马来西亚合并了。但是,新加坡与马来西亚合并的基本条件是建立在不属于不包括在马来西亚联邦的一个州。沙巴和沙捞越是属于马来西亚联邦的一个州——他们拥有和马来西亚其他州的公民一样的权利。他们可以在马来西亚联邦自由行动和拥有投票权,他们的地位和马来西亚人民一样是平等的。但是,新加坡人只能在新加坡内部旅行自己的投票权。新加坡的政治家只能在新加坡进行政治活动。

您为李光耀设身处地想想吧。他已经取得了合并和背靠合并。让我们不要忘记,他在新加坡赢得了1963年的大选是在一连串有关合并的事件上——这是包括了交易和妥协。当人们以为行动党会输掉(这次选举)时,他确实赢得了这场选举。这对他而言无疑是说一个极大的胜利。在1963的选举运动中,他除了有关合并的课题外,并没有任何(有利的条件)足以改变选民的支持。他就这样凯旋而归。

好了。现在他的另一个野心是什么?假设您了解李光耀。您就知道,他并不满足于自己留在新加坡。他是一个具有野心的人。他是一个属于高智商的人。他认为一旦加入马来西亚,自己可以比任何人做的更好。

因此,他北上了。他想要成为马来西亚的总理。其中一个根本的问题是,因为,与其现在推翻新加坡的政治家被限制在新加坡进行政治活动。他现在推翻和忘记了自己在1960年和1963年以及后来所说的有关新加坡的华人以及威胁和共产党的论调。他现在反过来说,“现在我们都是马来西亚人。我们必须要有一个马来西亚人的马来西亚。我们必须平等。”理所当然,您可以想象得到,这是他对东姑.阿杜拉曼所做的一切承诺的食言。在挑起和激化种族关系之后,现在他开始苦楚自己的真面目。

Lee Chwi Lynn: 是一个极大的倒退啊!

覃炳鑫博士:是的。这是一个极大的倒退。理所当然的接着就导致双方的结局。基本上在1965年,您可以有一到两个选择。要吗新加坡离开马来西亚,或者李光耀离开马来西亚。这就意味着李光耀失去了权力。

对李光耀而言, 他只有两个选择——是把新加坡从马来西亚开出来让自己继续保有权利。或者,我确保未来的马来西亚将把自己除掉?李光耀做出了决定:他决定把新加坡从马来西亚分割出来,这是与他的内阁向背的,因为超过一半的内阁成员是是在马来西亚出世的,特别是与他最亲近的顾问,杜进才和吴庆瑞。他们对马来西亚是有的理想是充满感情的。马来西亚可以继续存在,但是,李光耀却绝对不会成为马来西亚的总理,这就是李光耀做出的选择。

好了,现在回到您的问题。他面对着这个选择建立一个国家的选择。我想,同时非常失望的。但是,他得到了极大的解脱。现在,他已经再一次成为新加坡不可挑战的领袖了。他可以根据自己的设想做要做到事,这就是您所看到的。

Lee Chwi Lynn: 好了。依据您所知道的这些历史背景。那就是把所有的事情尝试放在一块儿和尝试把它们分开。——如何看待新加坡开始的几年的增长?在第一年新加坡被视为是一个非真正的国家。

覃炳鑫博士:是的。李光耀与马来西亚其他州有着很大的区别。在这点上,您可以看到一个有趣的问题。因为,当他在1959 年当选后。他就开始以一个马来亚人的身份出现。

他们设立了一个国家语文学院,目的在于推广和教导马来语。直到1957 或者之后,新加坡是马来艺术文化中心。它产生了许多现代化马来语文学。他们要推广开来,但是、当时(新加坡和马来亚)被分割开来了。突然间,由于种族问题和属于少数种族的关系,必须维护分割开来的新加坡身份。他就很自然的强调华人的身份了。英语本身就与马来西亚区分开的。而现在新加坡要维护新的轨道和身份不是马来西亚而是新加坡人本身。

因此,刚开始的几年是真正的不正常的。当然,您是知道,你必须寻找新的经济出路,但是,与中央政府还是存在着极其紧张的关系的。尽管合并的协议给予新加坡在经济上、工业上和劳工政策上拥有的很大自主权。他们还是面对做与吉隆坡直接按的巨大的问题。(与新加坡相比)这包括了更多的保护主义的态度,那就是自由贸易的港口的基本问题。这是无法避免的问题。在开始的两年是免费的。因此这就让它们可以迅速的朝着这个方向前进。(待续…………)

 

 

Advertisements

发表评论

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / 更改 )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / 更改 )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / 更改 )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / 更改 )

Connecting to %s