(中英文对照)Detention without trial: Going beyond Coldstore?《再议新加坡“争取合并的斗争”:第三部分》


本文章作者:傅树介 BY DR. POH SOO KAI


Logically, this piece should be entitled, Singapore’s “Battle for Merger” revisited: Part III, but for the fact that Mr Gafoor, the Singapore High Commissioner to Australia, has deviated from the original grounds of the debate centred around merger and Operation Coldstore, and retreated to the half-century-old People’s Action Party (PAP) practice of making allegations to lock up opponents without having to prove them in any court of law!

Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited, 2014: The poverty of its history debunks Lee Kuan Yew’s radio talks that the mass arrest of February 2, 1963 were on grounds of security with the full weight of the declassified material now available in the British archives.

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I have rebutted the High Commissioner’s first response of 18 December 2014. With reference to his second response of 22 January 2015, it would be flogging a dead horse no less for me to reply to his attempt at a ‘holistic’ reading of the archives. Quite clearly he is happy to display his understanding of how he uses historical documents and makes sense (or non-sense) of them.

The High Commissioner would do well to monitor debates in Singapore. Neutral third parties have emerged, with no stakes in the 1963 events except for the truth. Recent articles carried in “The Online Citizen” and “TR Emeritus” continuing series (now 7 parts) have effectively demolished each and every piece of his so-called documentary evidence by simply going through the sources he cited, and showing what they actually said.

Conspicuous silence of the HC

However, the High Commissioner is conspicuously silent on his boss’ very own admission of the political nature of Operation Coldstore. Or would he be so bold as to say that the letter in question by Lee Kuan Yew to Lord Selkirk was a pure British fabrication: in other words, to call the British, blatant liars?

Let me reproduce the relevant portion of my previous text as reminder.

‘Here I would say to Lee’s propagandists that they would do well to have a holistic reading of his works. Lee Kuan Yew had said, in no uncertain terms, that he agreed to Operation Coldstore to clinch merger – which is a political matter and NOT a security concern. In a letter dated 12 February 1963 to Lord Selkirk, Lee said:

It was because of your Government’s firm assurance given by your Deputy endorsing the view of your High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur that if the arrests were not agreed to, then merger and Malaysia would fail that made us agree….

It was because of this appraisal of the Federation position by your Government and the assurance that you would dissuade them from departing from the publicly agreed terms that we agreed to the decision of the I.S.C. [The I.S.C. decision referenced is the mass arrests of Operation Coldstore.]’

Shifting gear from 1963 to 1974-76

Given that the security pretext for the 1963 arrests of Operation Coldstore is now in complete shambles – in no small part, thanks to the assiduous efforts of the Singapore public in following the issues closely and pouring over the historical material, the High Commissioner shifts gears; he abandons 1963 and leaps into the period 1974-76 focusing on unproven allegations against me for my second arrest in 1976: in other words, resurrecting PAP’s well-worn tactic of the communist bogey.

I was arrested in 2 February 1963 under Operation Coldstore and released unconditionally in late 1973 after 11 years of imprisonment without trial. Immediately, I called a press conference to demand the release of all political prisoners in Singapore. At that press conference, I called Lee Kuan Yew a ‘political pimp’. All this is on record. Ilsa Sharp of the Far Eastern Economic Review who interviewed me then, wondered how long the PAP government would tolerate my challenge to its stifling hegemonic rule over all aspects of political life in Singapore. (FEER December 1973.)

Then I threw myself headlong into setting up a civil rights committee, an NGO, to fight for human rights and civil liberties in Singapore. The pro-tem committee consisted of G Raman, Michael Fernandez, Ong Bok Chuan and I. It was agreed at our first meeting to enlarge the committee by inviting Father Ho, Dr Gwee Ah Leng and Dr Un Hon Hing. However, before we could conduct any activities, I was rearrested. Shortly thereafter, G Raman, Michael Fernandez and Ong Bok Chuan were also arrested.

The formation of the civil rights committee coincided with the effort of the Socialist International (SI) to demand accountability from the PAP government for its horrendous record of keeping political prisoners without trial for over a decade. (Singapore now has the notorious reputation of keeping Chia Thye Poh longer than Nelson Mandela was kept by the apartheid government of South Africa!) I met the SI delegations from UK and Sweden, and provided them with information on political prisoners and detention without trial in Singapore. I sent a tape recorded speech with the same message to our students in UK. Would any responsible Singaporean who supports human rights and democracy, have done less? Devan Nair was sent by the PAP government to the SI conference to defend Singapore. In Brussels, he labelled me a ‘communist’ which was carried in the papers in Singapore. It was the writing on the wall for my second arrest that came in mid-1976, even before Devan returned from Brussels.

However, the PAP government could not cite the above reasons for my re-arrest in 1976 and so the pretext must be sought in sensations like the Katong bomber and the fabricated Masai midnight trip. Interestingly, these events occurred (with one allegedly) two years before my re-arrest in 1974.

I think it would be more honest for Mr Gafoor to produce the 1976 charge sheet and the Government’s statement of facts (still to be proven legally) against me, and any subsequent amendments to it, for full public scrutiny instead of referring to the allegations in convoluted drips and drabs. It is never too late for the Singapore government to try me in an open court instead of hiding behind the Internal Security Act (ISA). In fact, Singapore is morally obligated to as a member of the United Nations that subscribes to the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights. Article 9 (4) of said covenant states:

Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

To repeat, with respect to the Katong bomber, I have challenged the High Commissioner to open up the files. All he had produced do far is bare assertion; he has yet to proffer evidence that I was a pro-communist with proof that the Katong bomber was a member of the Communist Party of Malaya. As I have pointed out in my previous text, I have reasons to believe that the outfit to which the bomber belonged is a fake radical group called the Singapore Revolutionary Party. Just as Lai Tek was a known British agent infiltrated into the highest level of the CPM, so could bogus revolutionary groups be set up by the Special Branch or similar intelligence organisations like the CIA and MI6 in this devious game of spy and counterspy with unwitting and innocent youth duped into executing extreme violence.

Mr Gafoor alleged that I had ‘provided medical aid to the injured bomber through an ex-detainee’ and ‘supplied medicine through an ex-detainee to the 6th Assault Unit … between 1974 and 1976’.

Mr Gafoor framed the issue not as ‘treating’ but providing medical aid and medical supply. It is evident that the High Commissioner does not appreciate that the crux of this issue lies in medical ethics, – unlike his boss, Lee Kuan Yew, who had, at that time, called the bluff in the docile press that he would have me judged by my peers in the Singapore Medical Council and struck off the rolls. If indeed, I had contravened medical ethics, it is strange that to date, I have not heard from the august body and had, in fact, continued my medical practice in 1982 upon my second release.

Rule of Law

Mr Gafoor said that my statement that I have not treated any bomber — communist or otherwise — is a bare assertion. Let me remind Mr Gafoor that under the rule of law, an accused is not obliged to bring proof of his/her innocence. The onus is upon the accuser to bring proof beyond reasonable doubt in any criminal matter. Mr Gafoor’s very comportment belies that Singapore subscribes to the rule of law.

Furthermore, Mr Gafoor has also nothing to be very proud of in producing evidence of my ‘crimes of subversion’ extracted under torture from two ex-detainees. Under the Rules of Evidence, these are inadmissible evidence. No self-respecting courts would rely on such unsafe evidence. It is ironical that these admonitions on what is the rule of law should come from me, a medical doctor, and not a lawyer!

As to the allegation of ‘providing medical aid’ to the bomber via an ex-detainee, XX was suddenly and dramatically thrown into my interrogation room after being severely beaten up by the Special Branch. DSP Szeto and some 8 toughies were in the process of interrogating me. It was a disgusting scene with an injured person on the floor. I calmly told XX not to be afraid and just tell the truth. DSP Szeto was surprised and somewhat disappointed with my reaction. Later, the Special Branch produced his case notes, confiscated from the clinic and showed them to me. His diagnosis and treatment was written in the case notes. As a medical doctor, I had treated him for his sore throat.

As to the allegation of supplying medicine to the assault unit from 1974-76, I had known Ms YY as a traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) practitioner who had occasionally obtained free medical samples from me. It is not unethical nor a crime for a doctor to give out medicine. Her patients were known to her and not to me. Ms YY was forced to witness her husband being severely beaten in Whitley prison. There is no doubt in my mind as to why she signed that statement; I sympathised with her plight. The corroboration mentioned of the other ex-detainee was that of her husband, who was brutally assaulted.

A civilized nation should not resort to such barbaric practices. Unfortunately, Singapore is still in the dark period of the McCarthy era, where thousands of Americans were accused of being communists or communist sympathizers and became the subject of aggressive investigations and questioning before government or private-industry panels, committees and agencies, such that the term ‘McCarthyism’ is now associated with the practice of making accusations of subversion or treason without proper regard for evidence, especially in order to restrict dissent or political criticism. (Quoting freely from Wikipedia’s definition of McCarthyism.)

No human being should be subject to detention without trial. Much less any Singapore citizen in this post World War II era that witnessed the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations, of which Singapore is a member state. We should always be mindful to afford any accused, the rule of law, lest we forget these great words of the eminent jurist, Robert H Jackson at the Nuremberg trial:

We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.

In my alternative vision of Singapore, Mr Gafoor sees Soviet Union!

Last but not least, in response to my vision of an alternative Singapore under the Barisan Sosialis if it could have come to power in 1963 via a fair and clean election instead of being crippled by the arrests of its entire moderate leadership under Operation Coldstore, Mr Gafoor resorted to scare mongering by associating the Barisan Sosialis with the Soviet Union! In all seriousness he asserted:

Hundreds of millions of people suffered misery and deprivation under the yoke of communist regimes, resulting in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc in 1989. Yet Dr Poh asserts in all seriousness that Singapore would have enjoyed a glowing future if the communist-backed Barisan had gained power.

What is there that Mr Gafoor finds objectionable or akin to the Soviet Union, in my vision of an alternative Singapore under the Barisan Sosialis that I have laid out, where:

          There would be freedom of speech and assembly; the ISA would be abolished; and I would add, defamation and bankruptcy suits against political opponents would be outlawed through legislation;

          There would be social justice and economic dignity for the sick and disabled, the old and retired and other vulnerable groups, and I would add, guaranteed via their CPF and other governmental agencies;

          There would not have been the wave after wave of arbitrary arrests and imprisonment without trial that we have witnessed under the PAP to instill fear in the population and keep itself in power. The ridiculous arrests of Church and other social activists as alleged Marxists would not have happened;

          There would certainly be no astronomical salary for ministers; no polarisation of wealth in society; ministers would have to declare their assets on taking office and be prohibited to have personal holding companies, exposed to the lure of investing in tandem with the Government Investment Corporations (GICs);

          Definitely, OCCUPY Raffles Square would not be deemed an illegal assembly!!

          We would have promoted a robust 2-party system for checks and balances in the parliament and I would add, we would introduce a proportional representative system and outlaw gerrymandering.

Let me end by saying I have every confidence that the aspiration for decency and humanity in ordinary Singaporeans will prevail and we will build a society based on solidarity and respect for human rights and democracy. It has been too long overdue!

Dr Poh Soo Kai was Assistant Secretary-General of Barisan Sosialis. He was imprisoned twice under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) — which allows for detention without trial — for a total of 17 years by Singapore’s PAP government.



傅树介发表于2015 2 2







2014 年再议新加坡“争取合并的斗争”:历史的匮乏》一文,以英国档案局大量的解密资料,揭穿了李光耀电台十二讲所谓19632 2 日进行大逮捕是基于维安(维护国家或社会安全)的谎言。

最高专员在2014 12 18 日对我文章所作的第一次回应,我已经反驳过了。至于他2015 1 22 日的第二次回应,要对他那种致力于“全盘”检阅档案的做法作出答复,我怕只会白费力气,没多大意义。他显然很乐意于展示他如何利用历史文件,从中梳理出其意义(或毫无意义)的功力。




最高专员其实该去留意新加坡此刻正在进行中的辩论。除了出于探索真相的目的,和1963 年事件没有其他关系的中立第三方出现了。

“公民在线”(The Online Citizen)和“名誉淡马锡论坛”(TR Emeritus)新近发表的连载文章(现在已刊出七篇),干脆根据最高专员引述的资料来源,找出这些资料真实的说法,进而有效地推翻了他每一篇所谓的文件论据。


我们发现,最高专员对他主子关于冷藏行动出于政治动机的自我供认,却明显在装聋作哑。要不然,他还能怎么样?他难道胆子大到敢说,李光耀写给薛尔克勋爵(Lord Selkirk)的那封信,纯粹是英国捏造的,换句话说,把英国叫做公然撒谎的骗子?



李光耀曾经直截了当地说,他是为了推进合并才同意开展冷藏行动的——那当然是政治,和维安毫无关系。在1963 2 12 日写给薛尔克勋爵的信中,李光耀说:



1963 年转移到1974-76 鉴于1963 年冷藏行动大逮捕的维安面纱,现在已经被彻底揭穿——不只是揭穿一小部分(感谢新加坡公众紧密跟踪这个课题,翻阅大量历史资料才有以致之),最高专员于是转移辩论的标的;他放弃了1963 年,一下子跳到1974-76 年,聚焦于对我在1976 年第二次被捕时所面对的未经证实指控:用另一个说法,他在重新耍弄人民行动党乱套共产党帽子的老把戏。

1963 2 2 日,我在冷藏行动下被捕,在未经审判情况下坐了十一年牢,至1973 年底才被无条件释放。我出狱后马上举行记者会,要求释放所有的新加坡政治犯。

在记者会上,我把李光耀叫做“政治皮条客”。这些都有记录可查。《远东经济评论》当时来采访我的记者艾沙夏普(Ilsa Sharp),还对以铁腕统治新加坡政治生态的人民行动党政府究竟能容忍我的挑战多久表示过担心。(见1973 12月出版的《远东经济评论》)

随后,我投身于建立人权委员会的工作,这是一个旨在为新加坡争取人权与自由的非政府组合(NGO)。临时委员会成员包括G 拉曼(G Raman),迈可佛南迪(Michael Fernandez),王木全(OngBok Chuan)和我。我们在第一次会议上决定要扩大委员会,邀请何约瑟神父(Father Joseph Ho)、魏雅聆医生(Gwee Ah Leng)与翁汉兴医生(Un Hon Hing,音译)加入。然而,在我们还没能开展任何活动前,我就被捕了。不久,G 拉曼、迈可佛南迪和王木全也全都被捕。

人权委员会成立的时间,凑巧和社会主义国际( SocialistInternational, SI)要求人民行动党政府对不经审判把政治犯关押超过十年的可怕记录负责这事碰在一起。(新加坡现在已经因为关押谢太宝比南非种族隔离主义政府关押尼尔森曼德拉(Nelson Mandela)更久而声名狼藉!)我和来自英国与瑞典的社会主义国际代表团见了面,向他们提供新加坡政治犯的信息与不经审判拘留的情况。我也将容纳相同资料的讲话录音带,寄给我们在英国的留学生。任何一个支持人权与民主的负责任的新加坡人,能不这么做吗?人民行动党政府派蒂凡那(Devan Nair)去出席社会主义国际会议,为新加坡辩护。在布鲁塞尔(Brussels),他把我贴上“共产党”的标签,新加坡的报章对此大事作了报道。我第二次被捕的凶兆,甚至在蒂凡那从布鲁塞尔回来之前,就已经在1976 年中浮现。然而,人民行动党政府不能用以上所述作为1976 年重新逮捕我的理由,于是便找了如加东爆炸案和生造出来的半夜赶赴马西(Masai)救人的煽情事件作为借口。有趣的是,这两起事故(其中一起是口说生造的)都是早在1974 年就发生的,即我重新被捕的两年以前。

我想,嘉福尔先生与其零星、迂回地谈论对我的指控,不如干脆把1976 年针对我发出的拘留令,以及政府陈述我罪状(仍待证实的罪状)的声明,连同后来所作的任何修改都一起公开出来,接受公众的审阅。这么做比较公道。新加坡政府仍然来得及起诉并在公开的法庭审判我,不必躲在内部安全法令的后面。实际上,作为联合国的会员国,新加坡在道德上有义务遵照联合国的公民与政治权利国际公约(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)。



我在此重申,针对加东爆炸案,我曾经向最高专员发出挑战,叫他公开有关的文件。他至今拿出来的仍只是空洞的片言只语;他还没有提供能证明加东爆炸案的炸弹手是马来亚共产党党员的证据,以佐证我是个亲共分子。如同我在前文所指出的,我有理由相信那炸弹手所属的组织,是一个叫新加坡革命党(Singapore Revolutionary Party的伪装激进的假组织。就如莱特(Lai Tek)以英国特务的身份渗透打进马共最高层,政治部(Special Branch)或类似的情报机关,如美国中央情报局(CIA)与英国军情六处(MI6)在间谍与反间谍的奸诈游戏中,也可能设立伪革命组织,利用被蒙在鼓里的无辜青年去从事极端暴力的行动。

嘉福尔先生指控我,“通过一名前被扣者给爆炸手提供医药援助”和“介于1974 年与1976 年期间……通过一名前被扣者给第六突击队供应药物”。

嘉福尔先生在加罪于我时,不说“医治”(treating)而改说是提供医药援助和供应药物。最高专员显然对该课题的关键牵涉到医务人员操守这一点很不开心——他不像他的主子,李光耀当时曾经向听话的报章大言不惭,说他要让我在新加坡医药理事会的同业来制裁我,撤销我行医的资格。奇怪的是,我要是当真有抵触医务人员操守的行为,作为专业自律团体的医药理事会为什么时至今日仍悄无动静。实际上,我第二次获释后还继续行医至1982 年退休为止。



另外,嘉福尔先生利用对两名前被扣者动刑取得的供词,作为证明我有“颠覆罪行”的证据。他这么做,没什么值得骄傲的。根据证据法(Rules of Evidence),这些都是法庭不接受的证据。任何一个有尊严的法庭,都不会依赖这类不可靠的证据来判案。讽刺的是,这些关于什么是法治的原则,竟然要由我来说明。我是一名医疗病人的医生,我可不是律师!

为了指控我通过一名前被扣者给炸弹手“提供医药援助”,甲甲在被内安局严重打伤后,忽然并充满戏剧性地被丢进我所在的侦讯室里。司徒副警监(DSP Szeto,音译)和约八名壮汉当时正在盘问我。这样把一个受伤的人丢弃在地板上,真是令人恶心得很。我平静地告诉甲甲,别害怕,告诉他们实情。我的反应,让司徒副警监感到意外,也有些失望。后来,内安局把从诊所搜查到的甲甲的病例记录,拿出来给我看。病例记录上写着对他病情的诊断与治疗。作为一名医生,我给他看诊的是喉咙发炎。

至于对我在介于1974 年至1976 年间给突击队供应药物的指控。



任何人都不该遭受未经审判的拘留。新加坡是联合国的会员国,见证了联合国发表国际人权宣言的后二战时代的新加坡公民,更不该遭受如此待遇。在法治下,我们对别人作出任何指责时都应审慎为要,除非我们遗忘了杰出法学家羅伯特傑克遜(Robert H Jackson)在纽伦堡审判(Nuremberg trial)时所说名言:



最后但同等重要的一点。我为1963 年社会主义阵线如果在公平与干净的大选中获胜上台,而不是因全体温和派领导人都在冷藏行动下被捕而受挫的新加坡,描绘了一个我心目中的另一种景观。嘉福尔先生在对此作出回应时,采用散播谣言、蛊惑人心的恐吓手段,把社会主义阵线和苏联强行挂钩。他一脸严肃地宣称:

数亿人口在共产主义政权统治下受苦、遭受迫害,导致1989 年苏联倒台、苏维埃集团解体。然而傅树介医生却一脸严肃地宣称,假如以共产党为靠山的社阵上台,新加坡将有光明的前景。






——绝对不会有天文数字的部长薪金;不会有一个贫富两极化的社会;部长在就职时须宣布公开资产,禁止拥有可联同政府投资公司(Government Investment Corporations, GICs)一起投资的私人控股司;


——我们会积极促进健康、有活力的两党制,确保国会具备相互制衡机制,我要在此补充,我们会引进比例代表制(proportionalrepresentative system),把杰利蝾螈(Gerrymander)的“包赢”选区划分法宣布为非法。





(中英文对照)People of All Strata Unite In Our Struggle For A Truly Free, Democratic, Just an Fair Singapore 各阶层人民团结起来,为实现一个真正自由、民主、公正和平等的新加坡而奋斗

 Date of posted:   28th Aug,2015

People of All Strata Unite In Our Struggle For A Truly Free, Democratic, Just an Fair Singapore


Note: this statement represents the outcome of a discussion centering on the current political situation in Singapore, and in which several members of the older generation, notably those who have come from the 50s to 80s in the last century took part;

To all those members of that generation who have made the efforts to relate, for the benefit of those of us coming from the generations after them, the history of their struggle in chasing out the British colonialists and gaining independence for this nation, and their deep concern for the future direction of this country we would like to express our sincere gratitude and deep appreciation.


In the 1950s during the last century, struggles on a grand and spectacular scale were mounted to get rid of the British colonialists with the aim of realizing a truly independent Federated States of Malaya, including Singapore. Those were indeed heart-breaking struggles. In the course of that, we incurred ruthless suppression, arrests, imprisonment, and banishment imposed by the colonialists. Numerous patriots even lost their lives in that process. However. we did not succumb to the obscene and despotic power of the suppressors. Instead, we united people of all strata, organize them, and launched our struggles using legal and constitutional means to defeat the government of Lim Yew Hock, which was supported by the British colonialists and established a self-governing government.

With positive support from left-wing organizations and progressive, democratic activists, the People’s Action Party took power, with Lee Kuan Yew at its head. However, Lee Kuan Yew failed to keep his promise which he made to the people before he obtained political power, namely to release all patriotic, progressive and democratic activists detained by the colonialists as well as to scrap the notorious Preservation of Public Security Ordinance.

In an agreement which Lee Kuan Yew conspired and reached with the British, only eight detainees : Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, Chan Chiao Thor, Tan Chong Kin, Sydney Woodhull, Tan Say Jam, Devan Nair, and James Puthucheary were released. All other anti-colonial fighters under detention during that time continued to be incarcerated. Then, the crafty Lee Kuan Yew proceeded to employ dirty tactics to try to drive a wedge between Lim Chin Siong and other detainees! The fruits of our struggle were thus misappropriated in a act of swindle engineered by Lee Kuan Yew.

In order to further his act of cheating the fruits of our struggle and eradicate his leftist opponents in the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew joined forces with the British and the Tungku Abdul Rahman clique in the Federation of Malaya in 1961. In May that year, the “Greater Malaysia” Plan was hatched and floated by the Tungku. This was followed by a series of moves to surpress and clean out the leftist influence led by Lim Chin Siong in the PAP, as part of LKY’s push to wrest control of the PAP and to pave the way for his domination of Singapore.

This resulted in Lim Chin Siong and his leftist colleagues being forced out of the party which they had helped to form. In July 30 1961, they established the Barisan Sosialis to fight the PAP in a momentous irreconcilable stance. At the same time, they reached out aggressively to the left-wing political parties in Malaya, particularly the Socialist Front, which included the Labour Party and Party Rakyat, and the Sabah Kadazan Organization, as well as the Sarawak People’s United Party to forge a common stand against the Malaysia Plan.

We all know that after taking its turn to the right and having betrayed the righteous stand it espoused at the time of its original formation, the PAP had lost the support of and reviled by the people. Almost in an instant, the progressive forces of all races, including erstwhile cadres and members of the PAP turned up in droves to unite around Barisan Sosialis to form a fresh mighty force. That rocked the flimsy political base of Lee Kuan Yew and made him tremble in fright. He was literally on tenderhooks. Worse, the spectre of losing the Hong Lim and Anson bye elections (held respectively on 29/4/1961 and 15/7/1961) was to haunt him and strike him further like a double whammy. At once, his political future was shrouded in gloom. In order to save his political life, he threw himself at the feet of the British colonialist while bowing to the Tengku for help. Together, they conspired and hatched a plan to harm the anti-colonial forces. The “Twelve Broadcasts” was part of that loathsome plan — a pact of lies and fiction which he cooked up to demonize leaders of the Left.

Faced with this unworthy and despicable move of Lee Kuan Yew, we retorted by laying out all the facts and presented reasoned arguments within the framework of the constitution. This was done through numerous mass rallies and publications of all sorts in various languages despite multitudinal restrictions being imposed to restrict our freedom of action.

So as to realize his plan of moving Singapore into Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew proposed to conduct a referendum. Yet, this was another trick, ludicrous and laughable to the core. Thanks to the painstaking efforts of Lee, the voters were given three choices. No matter how you vote, the results would be taken as supporting the proposition of the PAP government. Even a blank vote was “by law” deemed as a vote for the government! The nonsensity of it was unprecedented. Even the Chairman of PAP and Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Toh Chin Chye was filled with disbelief, as he later commented on this in an interview with Melanie Chew quoted in “Leaders of Singapore”.

On the issue of merger between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, Barisan Socialis held the view that any merger must be genuine. This means that the status of Singapore state must be equal to that of any constituent state of the Federation of Malaya in the new set-up, and all Singapore citizens must automatically become Malaysian citizens. At the same time, the number of seats alloted to Singapore in the new central parliament must be proportionate to Singapore’s population.

But this was not to be. PAP did not fight for it because it feared that the Federation government, i.e. the Tengku and his clique would not concur. We know that the PAP did not even have the chips necessary to go to the bargaining table to fight for the equal rights we deserve! It was only concerned with its own political survival! And, precisely for that alone, it was willing to sell out the rights of all Singaporeans.

On much earlier occasions, Barisan Sosialis had pointed out in all seriousness that unequal merger conditions were apt to bring about grievous consequences, including social tensions and perilous after effects. True enough, Barisan’s foresight and prediction was “unfortunately” but unavoidably proven right. Horrendous racial riots between the Chinese and Malays broke out in July and September of 1964! Just one year after that, the PAP-dominated Singapore State was kicked out of Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew’s dream of a greater space to realize his ambition was greivously dashed. He had committed a glaring error. Singaporeans were treated to a YOYO journey of mistake after mistake. And did he ever confess to Singaporeans in all honesty how and why he went wrong?

Today, it is both shocking and shameful that the PAP has the cheek to relaunch the “Twelve Broadcasts” and the “Battle for Merger”— something that has been proven bankrupt beyond any doubt by ensuing events. God knows what diabolical dream are they harbouring again?

As it stood, what Barisan Sosialis embraced was a genuine merger between Singapore and the Federation of Malaya where true and long-lasting interests to the people of both territories would be ensured. It would be a merger that would foster the coming together of socialist forces to further bridge the wider political ideals, such as a common federated citizenship, common electoral registers, as well as centralized administrative and legislative systems. In addition to this, a meaningful common way of life and common destiny of the people would allow for struggles through peaceful and constitutional means to achieve political and social transformation. However, what the PAP’s merger plan meant was a sell-out of the fundamental rights and interests of all Singaporeans. Because it is clear to all that in the absence of proportional representation of all constituent states in the federated parliament, Singaporeans would be reduced to second class citizens.

Their power to exercise  political influence in the political arena in the greater Malaysian state therefore will be very much slimmer and ineffectual.

The series of events described above show that Lee Kuan Yew is an irresponsible politician and the PAP an erratic political party. Their policies have often gone against stern and solid walls.To say that they possess remarkable abilities and be ever victorious as their propagandists would like to make them appear can only be described as a sham.

We are of the opinion that PAP’s merger plan has the effect of turning back the wheel of history. It is harmful to the achievement of a truly harmonious relationship between peoples of the two territories which all of us aspire for. Indeed, it has poisoned the amicable feelings which had hitherto been existing between the two peoples. On this point, Singaporeans visiting Malaysia in the aftermath of separation in 1965, and indeed even till this day, would be able to attest to because the freezing irony and burning satire emanating from the other side and even unfriendly attitude, both latent and obvious make our hearts ache! People are questioning :

Can the PAP shirk this responsibility?

Declassified British archival records tell us that in order to set up Malaysia through merger, Lee Kuan Yew had submitted a long list of names of between 180 and 200 people from leftist political parties, trade unions, cultural and art societies, and student organizations to the British authorities for the tripartite Internal Security Council to take police action. This was the notorious Operation Coldstore mass arrests which took place on February 2, 1963.

Now, some 50 years later, a book entitled “The 1963 Operation Coldstore In Singapore” has been published. On the day of its launch, November 16, 2013 the hall with a seating capacity of 400 was full to the brim. Many attendees had to stand on the aisle or sit on the floor, just to be there to witness that rare occasion of great historical significance. Mrs. Jean Marshall, the widow of the first Chief Minister of Singapore the late David Marshall, was there with members of her family. So were the  widows of the late Dr. Lim Hock Siew’s and Tan Jing Quee’s.  The large number of people present and the highly spirited atmosphere combined to sketch a scene rarely found in Singapore for a long long while. It was like an atmosphere of great expectation at a mass rally of years past in which Lim Chin Siong was to be addressing the crowd. This shows that Coldstore is still fresh in people’s mind. It also indicates the deep concern of the people about what the historians in the book have learned from the newly declassified records in the British archives about Lee Kuan Yew, the nature of the man in the eyes of senior colonial officials such as Selkirk and Moore, and how he played his tricks on them, etc. Of course, people also wanted to know how the victims of Coldstore — the patriots of the nation — pass their time in prison and how they kept up their spirit against the onslaught of prolonged detention. From another angle, it also shows that people have by now shaken off their fear of this “white terror” which the PAP had deliberately culltivated as a shapeless tool to intimidate innocent people over a long period of time. People will not spare a glance at it now. Indeed, they are giving it a snort of contempt!

The new book exposes thoroughly the lies and myths fabricated by Lee Kuan Yew over the last 50 years or so. People now understand clearly that those myths were spawned by Lee Kuan Yew at the time for use on his political adversary and anti-colonialists so as to save his shaky regime from falling.

The historical facts of the 50s to 80s in the last century have eloquently proved that it was not the Left who repudiated the legal parliamentary struggles.

It was Lee Kuan Yew who resorted repeatedly to fascist brutal means by imprisoning leftist leaders and activists, and/or forcing them to go into exile, living a vagabond life so as to evade his devil’s clutches; it was precisely because Lee Kuan Yew had clamped down on all left-wing and legitimate organizations and societies, arresting their activists, including even duly elected representatives of the people, and depriving them of their freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, forcing those organizations into a state of impotence and inability of operating in an open and legitimate environment, that stripped them of their ability to make constructive contributions on matters concerning the state and assisting the people in overcoming their difficulties.

When this is set on the same plane as what happened in the United States in the mid-fifties when the whole of that country was caught in a state of hyper frenzy about communism, one cannot fail to find the absurdity, idiocy and abhorrence of the whole performance. One cannot but be sickened and aggrieved by the whole episode. During those times in the US, thousands of innocent people were smeared and accused of being pro-communist and stuck with “RED” labels, thereby having their livelihood destroyed for life. Joseph McCarthy, the senator who started it all, began by falsely accusing that several hundred “communists” were hiding in the State Department. He then turned his guns at numerous guiltless officials, framing up charges against them and continued to attack progressive elements and dissidents. Even top scientist such as the “Father of the Atomic Bomb”, Robert Oppenheimer, “China expert” John Paton Davies, and famous comedian Charlie Chaplin were targetted in that wild and mindless witch hunt. On October 3, 2014, when the secret files of the Atomic Energy Commission’s case hearing and archives were declassified after a period of 60 years, Oppenheimer was finally proved innocent from all those accusations — he was not a communist after all.

This episode lead us to wonder, closer to home, how long do we have to wait for the planners and executors of those “black box” operations in which we — and numerous other innocent patriots — who were falsely accused of and labelled “RED”, to be stoke by their conscience and move out of their dark cavern to give us back the justice we deserve. When will there be a hearing or a commission of inquiry be held so that we will be able to clear our name in a fair, just and open manner?

However, we remain perplexed after much thought as to what exactly are they after in re-launching the “Twelve Broadcasts” and “The Battle for Merger” recently? Some people say: In the face of all the dirty linen about Lee Kuan Yew exposed in the British archives ever since they were declassified, Lee Kuan Yew is caught speechless like a thief caught red-handed. He cannot come up with any explanation whatsoever to justify what he did. The whole nature of him being the crooked man is for the world to see and curse. Even his hired propagandists frequent visits to the Archival Chamber in Kew Gardens could not find a clue whatsoever to mount a defence. In the light of this emptiness and impotence, the only strategy left for them is to “fry the cold rice” as the Chinese say, which means that when a lie or a false claim is repeated enough times, there is hope that people will come to believe that it is true! But there are others who say: They are like the hard core Japanese right wing militarists who are out in force to stick to their stand of never admitting to the monstrous crime they committed against mankind during the Second World War. The Japanese right wing militarists will continue to refuse to face up to historical facts and have even gone to the extent of denying that the Nanjing Massacre ever took place. They will even destroy material evidence. This hideous shadow now flashes before our very eyes, making us shiver all over even though it is not cold!

Just where are they taking this country of ours to?


Related: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4haXXgYHv7M

(本文章发表于2015年 1月29日转载自:wangruirong@wordpress.ocm)











在这种情况下,以林清祥为首的左翼成员在1961年被迫退出他们曾积极参与成立的行动党,于该年7月30日正式组建新加坡社会主义阵线(简称“社阵”),代表广大人民与行动党分庭抗礼, 并与之展开势不两立的斗争。同时还积极与马来亚的左翼政党:主要是马来亚人民社会主义阵线党(由马来亚劳工党和人民党组成)、砂巴卡达山机构、砂劳越人民联合党和汶莱人民党,进行协调,组成声势浩大,反对《马来西亚》计划的一股巨大的进步力量。




即便是时任人民行动党主席和副总理的杜进才博士在与《新加坡的领袖》作者Melanie Chew访谈时也表示费解。



对此,社阵早已严正指出,不合理的合并条件必定会带来严重的社会紧张与后遗症。果然不出所料,就在合并后的一年左右时间内 — 1964年7月与9月,可怕的华巫种族暴力冲突爆发了。再过一年,李光耀的人民行动党主导下的新加坡被东姑一脚踢出了马来西亚。结束了他们想在更大的地域版图内实现其政治野心的美梦!他们犯了这么大的错误,误国误民,他有没有好好向人民做过交代?












可是,令我们百思不解的是最近的“十二讲“ 与”合并的斗争“的再次炒作所反映的到底是什么?有人说:面对英国档案中所揭露出来的肮脏东西,他们没法解释,也无从招架,连他们御用的所谓历史学者频频进出邱园档案馆(英国伦敦外的Kew Gardens)去查看回来都脑子空空,江郎才尽!绝望之中,只好拿冷饭来炒炒,可骗就骗,成就多少就多少。但也有人说:就像日本右翼顽固分子与军国主义分子一样老死不肯认错,不肯面对现实,甚至还狂妄自大到说”南京大屠杀“并没发生过。妄图修改铁证如山的历史事实,消灭证据。天啊!这个狰狞的影子,就在我们眼前闪进闪出,令人不寒而栗!





(中英文对照)Singapore’s ‘Battle for merger revisited’ 新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版第二部分

Related website:

1. DR Poh’S Part 2:


2.  Dr Poh’s Part I can be read here.    

3.The response to Part I from Mr Burhan Gafoor, Singapore’s High Commissioner to Australia, can be read here.    

4.Lim Chin Siong: Letter to The Straits  TImes Website:


新书:1963年冷藏箱的50周年        张素兰 2

林清祥 2-page-001          赛查理回忆录

The historical background

For the benefit of the younger generation, it is necessary to describe the historical background at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, i.e. the period prior to merger and Operation Coldstore.

Let us not forget that World War II was a ferocious battle between two imperialist camps for control of global wealth. In the Southeast Asia, it was fought out in the colonies with total disregard for the untold sufferings it brought upon the local population, including our forebears in Singapore and Malaya. Therefore, their desire for independence from colonial Britain in the aftermath of World War II was fervent and uncompromising.


With the end of the War in 1945, Britain sought to reimpose its exploitation of the colonies including Singapore even though as a member of the newly-established United Nations, it was obliged to grant them independence. Hence it began casting about for the person or party, most committed to protect British interests in Singapore, upon whom it could bestow independence. In brief, Singapore was still a colony in the period before merger and Operation Coldstore, with Britain having the final say in all matters affecting us. It had the right to suspend the constitution.


Unless history is to be revised, no one can deny that Britain abandoned Malaya and Singapore during World War II and that it was the colonised people and the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) that bore the brunt of resisting the Japanese invaders. However, with the Emergency unleashed in 1948, the CPM was a decimated force in Singapore by the 1950s. Historian TN Harper has quoted the 1959 Singapore Special Branch report by the police commissioner that the CPM strength was low: an estimated 40 full party members, 80 ABL cadres, 200 or so sympathisers and less than 100 released for ‘White Area work’.[I]

However, the mood of anti-colonialism was unabated. Even Lee Kuan Yew saw that the way ahead for him politically was to take on the appearance of an anti-colonial fighter though he recognised that his future rested firmly with the British.[ii] Chin Peng in My Side of History (2003) revealed that Lee had contacted the CPM for support when the PAP was being formed. At that time in 1954, Lee was fully aware that Samad Ismail was a communist, yet he appointed him the pro-tem chairman of the PAP at its inaugural meeting at Victoria Memorial Hall.

Because of the pressure for independence from the people, including the efforts of the Anti-British League (ABL), the British allowed an anti-colonial party – the PAP – to come into existence legally in 1954. Its founding constitution stated that it stood for independence, freedom of speech and assembly, human rights, abolition of detention without trial and even socialism. With the advent of the PAP, the clandestine ABL lost its relevance as anti-colonial activists could now join the PAP openly. In the sense of being at the forefront of the struggle against British colonialism for independence, the PAP in 1954 was the successor of the ABL.

The anti-colonial, democratic and socialist platform of the PAP ensured its landslide victory in 1959. But by 1961, it was becoming clear that the PAP leadership under Lee was not carrying out the goals listed in its 1959 electoral platform notably that of releasing political prisoners and trade unionists detained by the Lim Yew Hock regime. Lee’s PAP was also tightening the screws on the rights of trade unions to organise to protect its members’ welfare and hard-won benefits.

And so the test came in April 1961 during the Hong Lim by-election, when Ong Eng Guan cashed in on the failings of the PAP leadership. His election platform prioritised the release of all political prisoners, abolition of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (subsequently Internal Security Act) and easing of restrictions on trade union activities.

However Lee was assured of CPM support for the Hong Lim by-election. Citing Special Branch files, Lee Ting Hui referred to the letter that CPM leader in Singapore Fong Chong Pik (the Plen) wrote to Lee assuring him that the CPM was not interested in overthrowing Lee; on the contrary it was keen to continue the alliance with him.[iii] Lee Kuan Yew believed in his own propaganda that the communists were all powerful and that he would thus win Hong Lim easily; he forbade Lim Chin Siong and the trade unionists to speak on the PAP platform during the campaign. He wanted to demonstrate that he had no need for Lim and that he was capable of getting the votes by himself. Lee lost Hong Lim in a clean and fair election.

On the other hand, the British Acting High Commissioner PBC Moore recognised the depth of feeling that the electorate had for the key issue in the by-election: freeing of the political prisoners as the PAP had pledged in the 1959 election. In Moore’s view, ‘everybody in Singapore except the PAP seemed to know before the election that Ong Eng Guan was going to win’.[iv]

British strategic interests in the region at that time rested on its military base in Singapore from where it could effectively interfere in neighbouring countries as near as Sukarno’s Indonesia or as far as Mao’s China. But with the ground swell of anti-colonialism in Singapore, Britain was faced with the prospect of whether the base would be able to serve its purpose given Singapore’s largely hostile population. Therefore, to contain this threat to their interests, the British enticed the otherwise reluctant Tunku to accept merger with Singapore by expanding ‘Malaysia’ into the Grand Design, with the British Borneo states and Brunei thrown in. With the conservative Tunku in charge, the base would be safe.

In an interview with a German journalist in early 1961, the Tunku had said that merger was something in the distant future. He was clearly not keen on merging with the predominantly Chinese-populated Singapore. However within a month of the PAP loss of Hong Lim, the Tunku did a 180-degree turn. He was persuaded to agree to merger.

Even with communist support, Lee Kuan Yew’s political life was at stake with the loss of these two by-elections in 1961. It was not the communists that Lee feared, it was the larger anti-colonial movement that had lost faith in the PAP. Merger was a life-line thrown by Britain to save Lee in order to secure its strategic interests in the region.

So we now come to the issue: whether the motive for Operation Coldstore arrests was justified on security grounds as evidenced by existing acts of violence and riots; or a premeditated conspiracy with preparatory acts in furtherance of an uprising for which weapons had been procured and stocked, and secret arms training conducted, etc; or whether the arrests of Operation Coldstore were simply politically motivated to mow down legitimate opposition.

The Internal Security Council (ISC) did not have the luxury of blatantly arresting the political opposition, much as the British wished it could decimate the anti-colonial forces openly. Given the international climate of post World War II and the setting up of the United Nations, Britain would have to present any arrests for political domination under the guise of ‘security’. The assessment of the British officials in Singapore was that the ‘subversives forces were not plotting an insurrection as did the communist cadres in Malaya in 1948’, hence taking police action against them might well remove all hope of bringing about Malaysia peacefully, for it would raise the political temperature in Singapore and strengthen the support for the opposition.[vi]

On the part of Barisan Sosialis and the people’s movements in Singapore, there was no unconstitutional struggle, no plot or conspiracy for insurrection, no Occupy Raffles Place as we know the occupy movements today, to justify Operation Coldstore. Rather it was Selkirk who had to alert London that Lee would advocate a policy of provocation of Lim Chin Siong and his associates with a view of forcing them into unconstitutional action justifying their arrest. The UK high commissioner hoped that the colonial secretary would be able to impress on Lee when he visited London of the risk to merger of such a course and ‘our doubts whether we could give our support’.[vii] Specifically, Lee was in favour of a Special Branch proposal to create ‘just the right degree of provocation to force Lim Chin Siong into taking action’ by removing Federation-born leaders in the Barisan and trade unions to the Federation.[viii]

Lee had to give the impression that the arrests were not against his political opponents but a security exercise in conjunction with Malaya. So for the arrests to be seen as a Pan-Malayan security arrest, he insisted that the meeting of the Internal Security Council deciding on the arrests, be held in Kuala Lumpur and not in Singapore; he further insisted that the Tunku should arrest Lim Kean Siew, Ahmad Boestamam and other Malayan leaders. The Tunku refused to play ball.[ix] Thus Operation Coldstore, scheduled for 16 December 1962, was called off at the eleventh hour. This state of affairs goes to show that there were no pressing security issues to justify Operation Coldstore!

Azahari’s rebellion in Brunei had taken place a week earlier on 8 December. The Barisan Sosialis gave it moral support as it was wont to do in international solidarity with colonies rising up to overthrow colonial rule. The British were confident that the revolt would be squashed quickly. So before the Brunei uprising dissipated, the order came from London, giving Selkirk the green light to arrest us in Singapore to which the Internal Security Council concurred.[x] Lee grasped it as a ‘heaven sent’ opportunity.[xi] It allowed the ISC to claim there was concrete evidence of communist terrorism being plotted and spin a security scare while all that happened was that we expressed verbal expression of international solidarity. Till today, no evidence of any Barisan Sosialis involvement in the Brunei uprising has been presented. It would be the easiest way to settle the issue if indeed such evidence exists.


The security myth trotted out to justify Operation Coldstore is further and completely debunked by Lee’s insistence to arrest Ong Eng Guan[xii] and three members of his party, the United People’s Party (UPP).[xiii] Lee was afraid that Ong would capitalise on the arrests and pose a threat to him at the next general election.[xiv]

As stated earlier, merger was a life-line thrown to Lee after the PAP lost the Hong Lim and Anson by-elections in 1961 to a hostile Singapore electorate, which also threatened British strategic interests in the region, that were being safeguarded by the military base in Singapore. Therefore, it was no small wonder that Lee worked feverishly to get the Tunku to agree to merger to the extent of ‘fawning and bowing to the princeling’, as he put it.[xv]

Here I would say to Lee’s propagandists that they would do well to have a holistic reading of his works. Lee Kuan Yew had said, in no uncertain terms, that he agreed to Operation Coldstore to clinch merger – which is a political matter and NOT a security concern. In a letter dated 12 February 1963 to Lord Selkirk, Lee said:

It was because of your Government’s firm assurance given by your Deputy endorsing the view of your High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur that if the arrests were not agreed to, then merger and Malaysia would fail that made us agree….

It was because of this appraisal of the Federation position by your Government and the assurance that you would dissuade them from departing from the publicly agreed terms that we agreed to the decision of the I.S.C.[xvi] [The I.S.C. decision referenced is the mass arrests of Operation Coldstore.]

Therefore, Lee had to conceal his role and responsibility in Operation Coldstore as he was well aware that this move was against the people’s anti-colonial aspirations. Upon return to Singapore from Kuala Lumpur on 2 February 1963 – the day of Operation Coldstore – he denied responsibility for it, saying if he had had his way, Operation Coldstore would not be executed.[xvii] And the next day, pressured by fellow members of the Internal Security Council, the British and the Federation, he denied his denial!

Lim Chin Siong

The official PAP propaganda has it that Lim Chin Siong was a communist. Lim himself refuted this allegation in his letter to the Straits Times published on 31 July 1961. He said: (Linked to https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/12/26/lim-chin-siong-i-am-not-a-communist-%e6%9e%97%e6%b8%85%e7%a5%a5-%ef%bc%9a-%e6%88%91%e4%b8%8d%e6%98%af%e4%b8%80%e4%b8%aa%e5%85%b1%e4%ba%a7%e5%85%9a%e5%91%98/)

i m not communist-page-001

Your editorial comments and news reports in the last week have focused attack on me. By repeating the fiction that I am a Communist front-man I suppose my political antagonists hope that it would stick in the minds of some.

While Mr. Lee and his men keep crying Communism to cover up a multitude of sins, let me, for my part, try to set the record straight.

Let me make clear once and for all that I am not a Communist or a communist front-man or, for that matter, anybody’s front-men.

Lee Kuan Yew in his Radio Talks, subsequently published in Battle for Merger (1962), produced documents obtained in a raid on an ABL outfit in 1953/4 and claimed that the handwriting was that of Lim’s. Notwithstanding this opinion from the police handwriting expert, what these documents prove is simply that they are ABL and not CPM documents. A strong anti-colonialist, Lim had always admitted that he was in the Anti-British League.

The ABL was not a party with an ideology. Its membership was not limited to adherents of Marxism-Leninism or to the working class; the bourgeoisie was welcomed. Thus, members of the ABL hailed from all strata of society, embraced different worldviews and were only glued together by an anti-colonial commitment.

Clearly, the ABL was not the CPM and should not be confused as such even though in the climate of the early 1950s, it had to operate in the twilight zone since the British had declared Emergency and outlawed all anti-colonial activities, causing the demise of the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU).

If the PAP logic concludes that the ABL is communist, would not that conclusion logically apply to the PAP itself as well?

Meetings at Barisan Sosialis HQ

01 01-page-001  02 03-page-001 04 05-page-001 06 07-page-001 08 09-page-001 10 11-page-001 12 13-page-001 14 15-page-001 16 17-page-001 18 19-page-001 20 21-page-001 22 00-page-001-2 封面与封面-page-001

The Barisan Sosialis was a democratically constituted party that must listen to its cadres and grassroots.

In the atmosphere of that time after the phony merger referendum where the democratic process was obviously flawed: anti-colonial fighters for freedom locked up without trial; the Legislative Assembly prorogued indefinitely to avoid disclosing the terms of merger; and a phony merger referendum (whose choices were best characterised by David Marshall as choices to beat your mother, wife or daughter) had just been foisted on the electorate; it was no small wonder that Barisan cadres and rank-and-file were questioning the fairness or even the viability of the constitutional path. All avenues of lawful activities had been blocked in the name of the law or guise of it by the powers-that-be.

The Barisan Sosialis, as a legally constituted party that abided by the rules of parliamentary democracy and elections, was faced with the insurmountable obstacle of a grossly uneven playing field that was always tilted against it. An analogy to the current tenacious struggle of the BERSIH (CLEAN) movement across the causeway illustrates Barisan’s dilemma at that historical epoch.


Barisan Sosialis cadres in the branches were activists, not well paid civil servants. The threat of arbitrary arrest constantly hung over their heads. These young and brave activists struggled on at great sacrifices to themselves and their families for the lofty cause of social justice and freedom from colonial rule. We had to address their legitimate fears and disillusionment with the so-called constitutional path dished out to us by colonial Britain and the PAP. Hence these meetings and debates in Barisan Sosialis headquarters where all views and skepticism could be expressed and encouraged to be aired. These meetings were open with minutes recorded, and taken out of context by Mr Gafoor. These meetings concluded with the Barisan Sosialis cadres and members affirming the constitutional and parliamentary path.

It is not true as Mr Gafoor suggested that the Barisan did not recognise Singapore’s independence in 1965. Lim Chin Siong smuggled a letter out of Changi prison in which he asked Barisan cadres to accept this fait accompli and to move on despite the crippling blows. This letter was openly read out to Barisan assemblymen. Apparently, Mr Gafoor forgot to mention the Barisan ‘rump’ intentionally left behind by Lee Kuan Yew to his advantage when the entire moderate leadership of Barisan had been wiped out in Operation Coldstore.[1]

Poh Soo Kai


Mr Gafoor claimed that I was not an unwitting dupe of the communists. As evidence, he mentioned a Katong bomber incident in December 1974.


What proof can he proffer that this bomber was a member of the Communist Party of Malaya apart from bare assertion? Would the files be opened for scrutiny?

Just as Lai Tek was a known British agent infiltrated into the highest level of the CPM, so could bogus revolutionary groups be set up by the Special Branch or similar intelligence organisations like the CIA and MI6 in this devious game of spy and counterspy with unwitting and innocent youth duped into executing extreme violence. I have reasons to believe that the outfit to which the bomber belonged is a fake radical group called the Singapore Revolutionary Party.

I hereby state categorically that I have not treated any bomber, communist or non-communist that:

I, my wife Grace and G Raman went in the stealth of the night to Masai in Johore to treat an injured bomber. Lee even publicly told the people of Singapore that as a medical doctor, I would be charged and judged by my peers in the Singapore Medical Council and struck off the rolls. Up till today, I have not heard from the Singapore Medical Council on so serious a charge.

I have consistently asked for a public trial. Should evidence of the alleged crime that I had committed be presented in a court of law, I will accept its verdict.

It still pains me that on the basis of this serie noir (dark thriller), my wife Grace, was subject to arrest and tortured for a month.


Surprisingly, these new sensational charges of treating the injured bomber were never added to my charge sheets.

What if the Barisan Sosialis had won in a fair and clean election…

What if Operation Coldstore had not been carried out and the Barisan Sosialis had won in a fair and clean election?

This prospect has been and remains so terrifying to the PAP that its propaganda has repeatedly raised the spectre of a “communist millennium”. There would certainly be no such millennium should the Barisan accede to power in a fair and clean election. I reiterate that even as late as 18 July 1962, PBC Moore wrote that, though the British colonial office was of the view that Lim Chin Siong was a communist,

(T)here is no evidence that he is receiving direction from the C.P.M., Peking or Moscow. Our impression is that Lim is working very much on his own and that his primary objective is not the communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional Government of Singapore. It is far from certain that having obtained this objective Lim would necessary prove a compliant tool of Peking or Moscow.[2]

As a founder member of the PAP as well as of the Barisan, I can assure the people of Singapore that the Barisan was established to carry forward the founding constitution of the PAP, much of which was incorporated into the constitution of the Barisan.

There would be freedom of speech and assembly; the ISA would be abolished. There would be social justice and economic dignity for the sick and disabled, the old and retired and other vulnerable groups.

There would not have been the wave after wave of arbitrary arrests and imprisonment without trial that we have witnessed under the PAP to instill fear in the population and keep itself in power. The ridiculous arrests of Church and other social activists as alleged Marxists would not have happened.

There would certainly be no astronomical salary for ministers; no polarisation of wealth in society; ministers would have to declare their assets on taking office and be prohibited to have personal holding companies, exposed to the lure of investing in tandem with the Government Investment Corporations (GICs); and definitely, OCCUPY Raffles Square would not be deemed an illegal assembly!!

We would have promoted a robust 2-party system for checks and balances in the parliament which till today I would very much welcome.

Dr Poh Soo Kai was Assistant Secretary-General of Barisan Sosialis. He was imprisoned twice under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) – which allows for detention without trial – for a total of 17 years by Singapore’s PAP government.


[1] ‘Note of Meeting held with Mr Lee Kuan Yew’, attended by Minister of State Lord Lansdowne, Lord Selkirk and Mr West in Lee Kuan Yew’s office, 27 November 1962, CO 1030/ 1159:

“He (Lee Kuan Yew) considered that it was necessary to take in the leaders before Malaysia, leaving the lesser men to be proceeded against more quietly and gradually after Malaysia. At this point he said with surprising candour that it was to his advantage to preserve a pro-communist rump in opposition. He thought that this strengthened his position in Singapore.”

[2] No. 363, Moore to Secretary of State, 18 July 1962, CO 1030/1160.


[i] EJ Linsett, ‘The security threat to Singapore (Communism and nationalism)’, 24 July 1959, DO 35/9870, PR0, cited in TN Harper, “Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story’”, in Comet in our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, ed Tan Jing Quee and K S Jomo (2001), p. 31.

[ii] Colonial Office assessment, 1958. ‘Singapore – Political situation and outlook’, August 1958, CO 1030/451, Future of Singapore.

 “Lee Kuan Yew and moderate leaders of the PAP regard the continued presence of UK in Singapore as an assurance for themselves. They considered it unavoidable that in order to be consistent with the public image they have created, they must continue to be highly critical of U.K. Policies”.

[iii] Lee Ting Hui, The Open United Front: The Communist Struggle in Singapore 1954-1966 (1995), p. 197.

  [vii] Selkirk to R Maulding, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 April 1962, CO 1030/ 998.

[viii] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 April 1962, DO 169/247 Telegram 224 .

[ix] Secret 996, UK Commissioner, KL to Commonwealth Relations Office, 28 December 1962, CO 1030/1160.

“Tunku’s refusal to authorise arrest of Members of Parliament was genuine due to professional advice given to him that there was no security case which could justify it. Reason for his anger was realisation that Lee was taking advantage of atmosphere of urgency to include a number of political opponents in list of arrest on purely political grounds and by implicating the Tunku was hoping to shift the onus.’

[x] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Report on Internal Security Council meeting, 14 December 1962, CO 1030/1160.

[iv] PCB Moore to WIJ Wallace, Colonial Office, 22 May 1961, CO 1030/1149, Political situation, Singapore 1960-1962.

[v] Secret 263, Selkirk to Colonial Office, 17 July 1961, CO 1030/1149.

[vi] ‘Singapore Political and Security Situation’, United Kingdom Commission in Singapor, 10 April 1962, CO 1030/998.

[xi] Moore to Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 10 December 1962, CO 1030/1160.

[xii] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 January 1963, CO 1030/1576, p. 49, para. 2(b):

Lee has mentioned on several occasions that he fears Ong Eng Guan may attempt to make political capital out of the arrest. He wants to make it clear that if Ong Eng Guan were to cause serious trouble, action would have to be taken against him. I told Lee we could give no undertaking at this stage and that he was not a communist (he agreed) and there would have to be a strong case to take any action against him.

[xiii] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 January 1963, CO 1030/1576, telegram 53, p. 63:

Lee in effect admitted that the object of the U.P.P. arrests was to strengthen his own chances of political survival….The Director of Special Branch admitted however that he had been directed specifically by the Prime Minister to select several members of the U.P.P. for arrest and that it would never have occurred to Special Branch to propose these names for arrest. It is clear therefore that Lee’s purpose is to bring home to all who might entertain the idea of making political capital out of the arrests that they would not themselves be safe from arrest. In this way he hopes to ensure that the Chinese speaking electorate are not encouraged to transfer their political allegiance to Ong Eng Guan.

[xiv] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 January 1963, CO 1030/1577,

[xv] Record of Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew on July 25, 1961, CO 1030/1149, p. 93

[xvi] Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 February 1963, DO 169/248, Secret No. 108, appending text of letter dated 12 February received from Lee Kuan Yew.

[xvii] ‘Lee: Reds were ready for violent action’, The Straits Times, 4 February 1963.





二、傅树介医生本篇片文章第一部分网站:Dr Poh’s Part I can be read here.

三、新加坡驻澳大利亚最高专员回应傅树介医生本篇文章第一部分的网站:The response to Part I from Mr Burhan Gafoor, Singapore’s High Commissioner to Australia, can be read here.




在1945年二次世界大战结束后,英国寻求重新剥削它的殖民地包括新加坡,  尽管英国是新成立的联合国的员国有责任让殖民地独立.   因此,它开始制造了一个可以承诺为保护英国在新加坡的利益的政党或个人。简单的说,当新加坡在合并和冷藏行动之前还是一个殖民地时,英国人在所有的问题还是持有最后话语权以至于影响我们。他们有权终止宪法。

在1945年二次世界大战结束后,英国寻求重新剥削它的殖民地包括新加坡,  尽管英国是新成立的联合国的员国有责任让殖民地独立.   因此,它开始制造了一个可以承诺为保护英国在新加坡的利益的政党或个人。简单的说,当新加坡在合并和冷藏行动之前还是一个殖民地时,英国人在所有的问题还是持有最后话语权以至于影响我们。他们有权终止宪法。

无论如何,反对殖民主义的情绪并没有因此而低落。就是李光耀自己也看到,尽管他认识到自己的未来是必须紧紧依靠英国人,但是,为了政治前途,他必须是把自己扮演成反对殖民主义的战士。[ii]2003年出版的陈平:《我方的历史》揭露,在人民行动党成立初期,李光耀已经与马来亚共产党接触并寻求获得支持。在1954年,李光耀已经清楚知道沙末.伊斯迈尔(Samad Ismail)是一个共产党员,但是,李光耀还委任他作为在维多利亚纪念堂举行人民行动党成立大会的筹备委员会主席。

那是由于要求独立的压力来自人民和抗英同盟的努力  英国人只好批准人民行动党在1954年成为合法存在的政党。人民行动党成立的党章已经声明,它为争取独立、言论、集会和人权的自由,要求废除不经审讯的扣留法律和社会主义纲领。随着人民行动党的诞生,抗英同盟的秘密组织的存在已经不再需要了。抗英同盟的积极分子已经公开的加入人民行动党。从这个意义上而言,人民行动党已经替代了抗英同盟,成为了反对英国殖民主义争取独立的先锋力量……





在另一方面,英国驻新加坡副最高专员PBC Moore深深的意识到在这次补选的主要问题是:人民行动党在1959年大选时许下的释放政治犯是一个极其重要的问题。他的观点是。“在芳林区补选前,除了人民行动党外,全新加坡人民都知道王元必然会赢得这场补选”[iv]








李光耀必须给人制造一个印象,这个逮捕行动并不是要对付反对党,而是一项为了安全的理由而配合马来亚联合邦政府采取的行动。所以整个逮捕行动似乎是一项泛马来亚性的逮捕行动。李光耀一定要绝对逮捕行动的会议在吉隆坡举行;李光耀个人进一步要求东姑必须逮捕林建寿、阿末.波斯达曼和其他马来亚的领袖。东姑拒绝与他一起进行这场游戏【ix】.因此,原定在1962 年12月16日进行的冷藏行动计划在晚间11点被取消。这个事件将出示证明没有任何涉及威胁安全问题可以确认采取冷藏行动!




在这里,我要说的是,李光耀的宣传者他们会有一个全面阅读李光耀的作品。李光耀十分明确的说过, 他同意冷藏行动是与合并相关联的——这是一个政治问题,而不是一个涉及威胁安全的问题。在1963年2月12日,李光耀致给Lord Selkirk的信里说道:





行动党的官方已经宣传林清祥是一个共产党员。林清祥在1961731日致给海峡时报的信中已经驳斥了这些指控(见:林清祥致给海峡时报信件网址: https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/12/26/lim-chin-siong-i-am-not-a-communist-%e6%9e%97%e6%b8%85%e7%a5%a5-%ef%bc%9a-%e6%88%91%e4%b8%8d%e6%98%af%e4%b8%80%e4%b8%aa%e5%85%b1%e4%ba%a7%e5%85%9a%e5%91%98/

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社会主义阵线支部的干部是活跃分子,但不是有待遇良好的公务员。随意的逮捕威胁不断的挂在他们的颈项。这些勇敢的年轻人是为了社会正义事业和从殖民地统治中解放出来而战斗是建立在自我牺牲和他们的家庭基础上。我们必须重视他们对英殖民主义者和人民行动党的恐惧和对所谓宪制斗争的道路的绝望。因此,当时,在社阵总部进行的这些会议和辩论所产生的各种看法和怀疑可以公开的发表和鼓励。这些会议都是公开和有记录的。Mr Gafoor断章取义。这些会议记录了社阵的干部和成员确定了宪制斗争和议会斗争的道路。

Mr Gafoor说,社阵不承认新加坡在1965 的独立不确实的。林清祥在1965年让人从章宜监牢里偷偷带出来的一封信,呼吁社阵干部接受这个即成的事实,不要理会目前遭受到的打击并继续前进。这份信是公开在社阵的集会上宣读的。明显的,Mr Gafoor忘记提及有利于李光耀的全面逮捕了全部温和派的社阵领导人,为李光耀的统治创造一个有利的局面【I】



Mr Gafoor说,我不是一个无辜者。我是被共产党设立陷阱让我做了他们要做的事情。我知道自己在做一个共产党员该做的事情。他以有关1974年12月在加东发生的汽车爆炸案事件作为例子以支持他对我的指控。




我在此明确的表明, 我并没有为任何涉及爆炸案件的人,不论他是共产党员或者非共产党员进行任何的治疗。








对人民行动而言,这一直是一个令他们恐惧的预期情况。他们的宣传机构一直不断的进行宣传‘共产主义千禧年’的幽灵。对于社阵而言,在一个公平和干净的选举让它们取得政权的话,可以肯定的是绝对不会有共产主义千禧。我再一次强调,即便是在1962年7月18日,PBC Moore 写道,虽然英国殖民地办公室的认为林清祥是一个共产党员。

根本就没有证据证明,他接受来自马来亚共产党、或者是北京、或者说莫斯科的指示。我们的印象是林清祥依靠自己非常努力的工作和他的主要目标并不是共产主义社会,而是取得控制新加坡宪制的政府。假使林清祥达到这个目标的话  我不能肯定他会愿意一直做北京 或莫斯科的工具。【2】








    【1】档案编号:1962年11月27日CO 1030/ 1159: 国务大臣 Lord Lansdowne, Lord Selkirk and Mr West与李光耀先生在李光耀办公室会谈记录。    


  【2】1962年7月18日,第363号,编号CO 1030/1160,Moore致给国务大臣的信件    


     【i】EJ Linsett,《(共产主义和民族主义)对新加坡的安全威胁》。1959年7月24日,编号:DO 35/9870,PRO,引述自TN Harper,“林清祥和‘新加坡的故事’”,我们天空的彗星:林清祥的年代,编辑:陈仁贵和K. S. JOMO (2001),第31页。      【ii】1958年的殖民地评估报告。“新加坡——政治局势和展望”,编号: 1958年8月 CO 1030/451,未来的新加坡。     


     【iii】李廷辉:《公开同统一战线——1954年-1966年(1995年),第197页     【iv】1961年5月22日PCB Moore 致信WIJ Wallace,殖民地办公室:新加坡的政治局势》,编号:CO 1030/1149     【v】1961年7月17日Selkirk致信殖民地办公室,密件:263,编号:CO 1030/1149.     【vi】1962年4月10日,英国最高专员公署:《新加坡的政治与安全局势》,编号:CO 1030/998.     【vii】1962年4月28日,Selkirk 致信 R Maulding,殖民地国务秘书,编号:CO 1030/ 998.     【viii】1962年4月24日,Selkirk 致电文244号 殖民地国务秘书,编号:DO 169/247       【ix】1962年12月28日,最高专员公署致函吉隆坡共和联邦联络处,编号:CO 1030/1160.     


【x】1962年12月14日Selkirk致信殖民地国务秘书:内部安全理事会会议记录 .编号:, CO 1030/1160.     【xiv】1963年1月31日Selkirk致信殖民地国务秘书,‘1963-1965新加坡内部安全理事会’编号:CO 1030/1577     【15】1961年7月25日与李光耀进行会谈的记录,编号:CO 1030/1149, p. 93 第93页     【xvi】1963年2月13日Selkirk致信殖民地国务秘书,编号:DO 169/248.密件号码:108,附件:受到李光耀2月12日的来信。     【xvii】李:‘共产党已经准备进行暴力行动’,1963年2月4日海峡时报。     【xi】1962年12月10日Moore致信殖民地国务秘书,编号:CO 1030/1160.     【xii】1963年1月23日Selkirk致信殖民地国务秘书,编号:CO 1030/1576, 第 49页, 第 2段(b):    



    【xiii】1963年1月29日Selkirk致邮电53号殖民地国务秘书,第63页,编号:CO 1030/1576



(中英文对照)Weapon of the powerful? By Dr. Hong Lysa 人民的力量是创造历史强大的武器?——作者:孔莉莎博士

Wondering about The Response to Poh Soo Kai, “Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited: the poverty of its history” 


这是历史学家孔莉莎博士在2015年1月17日在其博客网站就新加坡驻澳大利亚专员发表回应有关前社阵助理秘书长傅树介医生在2014年12月10日发表的文章:《Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版》而撰写的。







 Battle royal



The Battle over Operation Coldstore—between the PAP establishment case that the fateful arrests of 2 February 1963 was rightly justified as a security measure that saved Singapore from subversion and imminent outbreak of violence, and the former political prisoners who maintain that it was to prevent the opposition forces from winning the 1963 general election has been going on in the last few years, following almost 50 years of virtual state monopoly on the subject.



In October 2014 the government took up the cudgels directly with the re-issue of The Battle for Merger (1962) by then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, which cast the 1950s and 1960s as the time of pitched battles between the communists and the non-communists in the PAP.


The challenge from those who have queried this version of history has caused the present PAP government to declare on that occasion that it is imperative that the ‘correct’ history be reaffirmed, in order to honour and emulate the spirit of our pioneers to rise above the ‘dire threat of communism’.  In other words, the battle is over; it has been won. History serves as an inspiration.



However, in the latest round of Battlefield Operation Coldstore, the importance of the communist vs non-communist trope and the legitimacy or otherwise of the Operation has been ratcheted right up.



High Commissioner of the Republic of Singapore, ‘Response to Poh Soo Kai’s Allegation’ [18 December 2014] vs Poh Soo Kai, “Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited” [ 3 Dec 2014]  both in New Mandala which is put out by academics based in the Australian National University is not just about fighting over narratives of the past.



Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong pointed in his Facebook posting of 20 December 2014 to ‘A few hard core ‘old Communist and pro-Communist activists [who] don’t want to admit that they had fought on the wrong side’, and ‘some revisionist historians’ who support their version of history share one motivation: cast doubt on the legitimacy of the PAP government, not just in the 1960s, but today.



And the PAP government has risen to the challenge.



The Response by the high commissioner is written on the letterhead of his office, and signed in his official capacity. It thus emanates from the government of Singapore and issued is by its representative to Australia, where New Mandala is published.



On his Facebook which is maintained by the Prime Minister’s Office, the prime minister wrote that ‘We have put together an account using evidence from the British archives as well as CPM sources, which confirm that Mr Lee Kuan Yew told the truth’ when he provided the url of ‘The Response’ for his readers.



What then would the government have to say should those British archival and CPM sources are shown in fact NOT to confirm in the least that ‘Mr Lee Kuan Yew told the truth’?





Given the high stakes that the government has put into Battlefield Operation Coldstore, including drawing Singapore’s high commissioner to Australia into the fray, one can expect that it would have poured in every resource at its disposal to present the most convincing, water-tight case possible, perhaps even using Singapore’s Internal Security Department confidential records to tear Dr Poh’s statements about the exercise to shreds for once and for all.



Yet the research and analysis in ‘The Response’ is plainly incompetent and quite embarrassing indeed. It is as if it is not meant to be read closely, not to say taken seriously; it is simply going through the motions to register that a Response has been made.



It actually reads like a spoof of itself. The Response claims that ‘revisionists’ conveniently omit mention of incriminating evidence in the documents against its own arguments, and merrily proceeds to do exactly that itself.


Dr Poh’s ‘Battle for Merger revisited’ quotes the following:


While we accept that Lim Chin Siong is a Communist, there is no evidence he is receiving orders from the CPM, Peking or Moscow. Our impression is that Lim is working very much on his own and that his primary objective is not the Communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional government of Singapore. It is far from certain that having obtained this objective Lim would necessarily prove a compliant tool of Peking or Moscow. (Philip Moore, deputy high commissioner to secretary of state, 18 July 1962, CO 1030/1160.) [Emphasis added]



This quotation has been oft-cited since it first appeared in T N Harper’s ‘Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story’ (in Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history ed. Tan Jing Quee and Jomo K S, 2001) by those who query the authority’s claim that it had evidence that Lim Chin Siong was a member of the Malayan Communist Party. In some instances, the first part of the first sentence is omitted. Moore’s passage has been simply ignored by the establishment and its stable of defenders.


However, The Response to Dr Poh no less has the temerity to write: “There is ample evidence in the British archives to show that Lim Chin Siong was a CPM member….[In a] dispatch in July 1962, Deputy UK High Commissioner Philip Moore wrote: ‘we accept that Lim Chin Siong is a communist.’”



Could The Response be playing a joke on itself?



History class: Text and historical context



If the colonial office records do contain any concrete evidence that Lim Chin Siong was a communist, that would have been brought to light from the start, and not fester as a thorn in the PAP’s flesh even fifty years later. Colonial officials, whether in the mother country or in Singapore all worked on the premise that Lim was a communist. Deputy commissioner Philip Moore and high commissioner Selkirk were certainly not exceptions in this respect.



To the colonialists, communists in Singapore fit a checklist: They were Chinese-speaking, particularly students and trade unionists; took part in group activities; were concerned with political and social issues; called for greater government recognition of Chinese-medium schools; demanded the departure of the colonial power; called for the abolition of the Emergency regulations, primarily detention without trial. Given the importance of its military bases to its defence of Southeast Asia, the British refused to grant self-government to Singapore if they did not have some control over internal security, fearing that Singapore’s left-wing forces could build up sufficient momentum to put the future of the bases in jeopardy.



Moore’s remark that Lim was not acting on orders was made when debates in the Internal Security Council over whether arrests should be carried out was at its fiercest. On 3 July 1962 a PAP assemblywoman resigned over the stipulation in the Referendum bill that all blank votes would be counted as a vote for the PAP’s Alternative A. The ruling party lost its one-seat majority in the legislature, which it held when it expelled the left wing of its party in July 1961. The liberal forces rallied to the Barisan, forming the Council for Joint Action. The police arbitrarily broke up anti-PAP merger moves, and coerced the press into not reporting the views of the opposition.



Analysing the developments, Philip Moore combed through Special Branch and M15 reports which ‘proved’ that Lim Chin Siong was a communist, and concluded that nevertheless Lim was working very much on his own. (S J Ball, ‘Selkirk in Singapore’, Twentieth Century British History, vol. 10 no.2, 1999 pp. 179-180)



Selkirk told London that the Federation and Singapore governments had plans to arrest 25 and 250 ‘effective political opposition’ respectively, and put the blame for the arrests on the British. (PREM11/1951, GM (62) 26 Selkirk to R Maulding, 17 July 1962, cited in S J Ball, ‘Selkirk in Singapore’, p. 180.)


Selkirk and Moore, both supporters of Lee Kuan Yew, were expressing their apprehensions of the impact of the proposed arrests on Lee and the British themselves.



Moore’s report continues:



I would like to take this opportunity to stress again that in Singapore today we have a political and not a security problem. We know who most of the potential subversives are and they could easily be gathered in at any time they seemed to threaten the security of the state. Our problem however is to prevent left wing parties from gaining control of the constitutional Government of Singapore by a chauvinist appeal to the Chinese educated. The Tunku’s threat in his ‘Close the Causeway’ speeches and Lee Kuan Yew’s Phase One have only had the effect of solidifying the political opposition to Merger and Malaysia. But I am not impressed by the opposition leaders who came to see me today. I believe moderate forces can prevail in Singapore provided either the Tunku nor we make stupid tactical mistakes. Nothing could provide a moderate effective rallying point for the chauvinistic and moderate elements against merger and Malaysia than to arrest leading members of the main Opposition party without adequate cause.



Moore was giving input to his superiors on the best strategy to ensure the defeat the left-wing Barisan Sosialis at the general election; he was not ‘soft’ on Lim Chin Siong. His professional judgment as Her Majesty’s servant was that the intelligence reports did not contain sufficient evidence to prove that Lim was acting on orders as a communist, which would create problems for the authorities if he were to be arrested on that ground.


However around that time, the colonial office was moving to a less open position on how to deal with the ‘communists’. Duncan Sandys became secretary of state for the colonies concurrent with his position as secretary of state for commonwealth relations on 13 July 1962. As minister of defence (1957-1959) he had made the plans to reduce the size of the armed forces by going for nuclear weapons, and a large air transport force to ensure mobility of troops. His key interest in Singapore was as a military base, and he regarded Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew as guarantors of British military interest in Southeast Asia. Sandys did not object to the Federation and Lee’s view that arrests should be made ‘to reduce the communist threat’, provided that the Internal Security Council approved individual cases for which reasonable grounds were presented, and that the arrests would not cause domestic unrest and difficulties for him in the British parliament.


The high commission in Singapore was thus no longer consulted for its view on the wisdom of launching arrests; its job was only to ensure that none of the detention cases would cause embarrassment. The outbreak of the Brunei uprising on 8 December 1962 made even that no longer necessary. Selkirk immediately asked the colonial office for an agreement in principle that he might ‘concur on behalf of the British government in the arrest and detention of the leading communists and communist sympathisers in Singapore.’



The colonial office internal minutes noted that that it was a ‘reasonable inference’ that as the Barisan had expressed its support for the revolt in Brunei, they would favour similar action in Singapore if the opportunity were present.   (CO 1030/1160 CS Roberts to Higham, colonial office memorandum, 11 December 1962)


It is thus facile to counter Moore’s much-cited statement by simply spouting others which show that Moore was actually convinced that Lim was a communist. Such statements are the stuff of police intelligence reports; equally numerous are UK high commission reports which freely note that Lee Kuan Yew was bent on arresting his political opponents which the British did not object to, so long as Lee took the responsibility for it publicly, and there would not be a popular backlash.



Moore’s observation about Lim Chin Siong being an independent actor inadvertently goes beyond the run-of-the-mill intelligence reports on Lim’s activities. In that paragraph, Lim Chin Siong is accorded a human dimension rather than being a stereotype whose every move is always predictable if not predestined. It was written when the colonial office was uncertain about the best strategy to adopt. Moore was performing his duty when he alerted the colonial office to the absence in the documents of what the authorities needed.



There is no contradiction at all when with the Brunei uprising the UK commission in Singapore was very gung-ho about drawing convenient lines to connect the Barisan, Brunei’s Azahari and communism.



Along with seeking permission from London to act against the left with the Brunei uprising,Selkirk sent the minutes of a Barisan meeting held 3 months earlier, on 23 September 1962. The Response quotes from this document central executive member Chok Koh Thong’s remark that ‘Experience elsewhere showed that ‘there was no country in the world which had attained a thorough success in revolution through constitutional processes.’


However, CS Roberts of the colonial office noted in internal minutes that the records of the Barisan meeting that Selkirk sent did not reveal ‘more than [the fact] that certain elements of the Barisan Sosialis would resort to violent acts if they thought it expedient.’ Nonetheless he went on to recommend ‘On the other hand we must take Mr Moore’s word that this evidence does show more conclusively than anything we have had previously that the Barisan Sosialis is communist controlled.’ (CO 1030/1160 CS Roberts to Higham, colonial office memorandum, 11 December 1962)



It is not a case of the devil citing scripture for its purpose.



Rather, the script in this instance has all along been written by the devil itself.



Perpetuating Lim Chin Siong as communist bogey



The Response sticks to the 50-year old format of treating Lim Chin Siong as the all-powerful leader whose every word is sacred to Barisan Sosialis and trade union members.



Dr Poh Soo Kai, Barisan assistant secretary general has given an account of his political involvements, which started with the postwar spirit of anti-colonialism. As a student of the University of Malaya he was the key defendant in the Fajar trial, prosecuted by the colonial government for sedition. The Fajar trial had nothing to do with Lim Chin Siong. Dr Poh has explained why he decided to join the Barisan Sosialis when he was approached, giving up two postgraduate medical scholarships to do that, and his relationship with Lim Chin Siong. Had the PAP expulsion of its left wing taken place just a couple of months later, Dr Poh would have already gone overseas, and his life would have taken a different course. His narrative can be found in his chapters in The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore (2009), and The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore: Commemorating 5o years (2013).



Despite this, The Response simply portrays Dr Poh and every Barisan member and trade unionist who was arrested on 2 February 1963 as an obedient follower of the diabolical Lim Chin Siong, more likely reflecting the type of leadership that PAP members and sympathisers are used to than anything else.



The memoirs of Chin Peng (2003), Fong Chong Pik (2008) and the publication of the Singapore Oral History Centre’s interview transcripts of Eu Chooi Yip (2006) have been around for some years, but the establishment narratives have not till now brought them into service at all.



Perhaps there is a reason for that. While readers are disappointed that Fong Chong Pik (‘The Plen’) revealed very little indeed of his secret meetings with Lee, his memoir is centred on the anti-colonial fervor of the time. It was the CPM that sustained the fight against the invading Japanese imperialists; in Singapore it was the Chinese-speaking youths like Fong who carried this over into the anti-colonial post-war movement. It is not a life-story that would have a place in the recommended reading lists of school textbooks.



The Response uncharacteristically treats the words of the MCP leaders in this instance as nothing but the truth. MCP secretary general Chin Peng, and leaders in charge of Singapore Eu Chooi Yip and Fong Chong Pik surely were fully cognizant of the significance that their comments on Lim Chin Siong would have on the PAP story, and given Lim’s stature, MCP history as well.


Chin Peng and Fong have chosen neither to deny nor confirm that Lim Chin Siong was a member, leaving a trace of the complexity of the politics of the time. What they have done is to remind Singaporeans that the communists were there, once a force which no serious anti-colonial group could simply ignore. Chin Peng reminds us that from the start, the PAP through various means, vitally kept its channels open to the spectrum of the left, including the CPM. One can surely assume that Lim Chin Siong would have his channels too. Being ‘influenced’ by the very knowledge that the CPM was in the background and keeping in touch with its reading of politics, even working surreptitiously with them in specific instances where it was deemed beneficial to one’s own interests did not make one a member of the communist party. This is only stating the obvious.



Unless one is talking about Lim Chin Siong, but of course.


Eu’s oral history transcripts which have been published (in Chinese, 2006) is particularly problematic. He renounced communism and on returning to Singapore in 1991, underwent debriefing by the internal security department and was taped by the Oral History Centre of the Singapore National Archives a year later. His 2002 transcripts are painful to read. He was concerned to distance himself Fong Chong Pik’s ‘mistakes’ in pledging total support to Lee Kuan Yew [which Fong accepted responsibility for in his memoir]. Eu claimed that as a graduate of Raffles College (the predecessor of the University of Malaya) he knew the likes of Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee well, while Fong was out of his depth. Chin Peng’s memoir takes a dig at Eu, who had apparently told the MCP leaders that Rajaratnam was not Lee’s man, and could be counted on to break with him.



So much for pedigree.



Or the notion that communists think alike.



The Response asserts this, despite the fact that while Chin Peng wrote that Coldstore shattered the CPM’s underground network throughout Singapore, Fong Chong Pik, the closest to Singapore of the three, (Chin Peng was based in China, and Eu Chooi Yip in Indonesia)  claimed that he had started withdrawing cadres who were likely to have been exposed in small groups from Singapore at around the end of 1961 to 1963-4. ‘As a result ‘practically the entire effective strength of the organization was withdrawn.’ The sum total of the cadres was more than 50 males and females. (Fong, page 172)



Communist leaders do have clashes of egos too. Just read their memoirs.



Weapon of the weak?



Fifty years after Coldstore, it is no longer so easy to hype up the PAP’s first two decades of history as a feat of basically destroying of one person, (and more than a hundred others, just in case) and one deserving of  eternal gratitude.



But it does not mean that the PAP has not kept trying.


Perhaps at this point,  it has no choice but to resort to the ways of its founders: Make is simple, make it loud and brazen. Bring out the government machinery. Capture the headlines– the actual text doesn’t matter.



To outsiders, it would seem irresponsible and even suicidal for the government to come up with an empty vessel like The Response and its echoes.  Why not simply continue to send out the well-trained troopers from the ranks of academia? Why do cabinet ministers, a minister of state and a high commissioner have to put their names to really ludicrous statements?



Just what is going on?



It has taken me almost a month before giving up trying to figure it out.



Only those directly involved at the highest levels will know what the battle is really about, and how it is faring.




——为(驻澳洲最高专员)的‘回应’有关傅树介医生的文章:《“新加坡合并斗争”的再版》感到惊讶 :这是对历史本身的贫瘠




1.这是历史学家孔莉莎博士在2015117日在其博客网站就新加坡驻澳大利亚专员发表回应有关前社阵助理秘书长傅树介医生在20141210澳大利亚国立大学的网站《新曼达拉》(New Mandala)邀约傅树介医生撰写一篇有关的文章:《Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版》而撰写的。









3.在傅树介医生发表了上述文章后,新加坡驻澳大利亚专员Mr Burhan Gafoor’s致函有关的的网站发表了一篇文章:《回应傅树介医生的指控》“Response to Poh Soo Kai’s allegations”。(见网址及有关函件扫描件:http://www.tremeritus.com/2014/12/28/rebutting-high-commissioner-burhan-gafoor-part-2/





一场有关‘冷藏行动’的激辩——行动党设置的案件——行动党把1963年2月2日一场致命性的(对付新加坡左翼运动)的逮捕行动(按指:‘冷藏行动’)定性为是一项安全措施,行动党视为是把新加坡从受到颠覆和即将把爆发的暴力危机中拯救出来;另一方是前政治拘留者则坚持:(‘冷藏行动’)是行动党防止左翼势力赢得在1963年(即将)举行的大选的阴谋。这个课题是随着过去在50年被虚拟的垄断而从 近年来就开始了这场激辩。









不过冷藏行动的战斗最新战役,被扣留者是否是共产党员 或者(冷藏行动)是否是正当合理的这些问题的重要性 都增加了好几倍



新加坡共和国(驻澳洲)的专员的文章于2015年12月18日发表了《回应傅树介的指控》,与傅树介于2014年12月3日的《新加坡的‘合并的斗争’的再版》同时在以澳洲国立大学为基地的New Mandala刊物上刊登,这不仅仅是在为狭窄的过去(历史)而辩论。



总理李显龙于2014年12月20日在自己的面书网站的帖文指出,‘一些死硬的共产党员和亲共分子拒绝承认他们是为错误的一方而战’,以及‘一些历史修正主义者’支持他们对历史的看法分享着共同的动机:制造有关行动党政府的合法性的怀疑,这不仅仅是1960年代而是今天 。






专员公署的文章是以自己官衔和官方的信笺发表的。因此这是出自新加坡政府和其驻澳洲专员代表新加坡政府在New Mandala发表 的。



李显龙的面书是由这里办公室负责管理的,当他提供了‘全球定位资源器’ ‘回应’(下同,此称呼。)了其读者时,他在自己的面书上这么写道,‘我们引用了英国档案管和来自马来亚共产党的资料,我们确认了李光耀说的是事实’。



那么. 如果那些在英国档案馆和马来亚共产党信息都根本没说明 ‘李光耀说了事实’的话 政府又怎样呢?









然而对‘回应’的研究与分析显然是真的没什么水准 甚至是丢脸。写得似乎是不想读者仔细地阅读,不想观众认真看待。它的‘回应’只是为了应付(傅树介医生的声明)而走过场应对吧了。



这篇(回应)确实就像自欺欺人。‘回应’指责‘(历史)修正主义’轻易的删略了对自己的立场不利的证据 后。接下来就沾沾自喜的自己犯这个罪.






尽管我们都认为林清祥是一个共产党员,但没有证据证明他在接受马共、北京或莫斯科的指令。我们的印象是,林清祥在很大的程度上是自主工作的,而他的主要目的并非要实现共产主义的黄金时代,而在于掌控新加坡的宪制政府。远远无法肯定,在实现这一目标后,林清祥必然会听命于北京或莫斯科,成为其工具。[v]  (1962年7月,Philip Moore, 副最高专员致给国务大臣函件。编号; CO 1030/1160.)【重点附加】



(傅树介医生)引述的这段话最早是出现在T N Harper的撰写的著作:《林清祥和新加坡的历史(我们天空中的一颗彗星:林清祥的故事)》(2001年由陈仁贵和Jomo K S编辑出版)。



那些对当局的声明说林清是马来亚共产党员有疑问的人,都常常引用这一段话在某种情况下,甚至把第一部分的第一句删掉 。当局和他们的走俎从来没提起Moore的 这一段文字。



无论如何,‘回应’对傅树介医生的文章仍然鲁莽的写道:“在英国档案馆的广泛资料证明;林清祥是一个马来亚共产党员……在1962年7月,英国副最高专员Philip Moore写道‘我们接受林清祥是一个共产党员’”









假设殖民地文献真 的记录拥有确凿的证据证明林清祥是一个共产党员的话,这 一定会一早就被暴露而这个问题不会50年后 还是一个 行动党体内糜烂的刺。殖民地的官员,不论是在自己的祖国或者新加坡的所有工作都是把林清祥视为是一个共产党员的前提。 英国副最高专员Philip Moore和最高专员Selkirk理所当然是不是超越这个前提的。



对于殖民主义者来说,共产党在新加坡已经列为一个清单,那就是:讲华语者,特别是学生和工会会员、集体活动参与者、关心政治和社会问题者、呼吁政府进一步扩大承认中学资质者、要求殖民主义者转移政权者、要求废除紧急法令者, 不经审讯被逮捕者。 考虑到它们的军事基地保护东南亚的利益,英国人拒绝给予新加坡获得自治权。假设他们无法在内部安全方面有所控制的话,他们将会感到担心新加坡的左翼势力可以建立有效的力量在车队军事基地的威胁。






 Philip Moore依据形势的发展,把政治部和英国M15情报部有关证明 ‘林清祥就是一个共产党员’的情报进行了梳理后,下的结论说,然而林清祥(当时)所做的工作是自己的决策的。(见:S J Ball。‘SELKIRK’在新加坡——20世界英国历史,第10卷第2部分,1999年,第179-18-页)



Selkirk告诉伦敦政府,马来亚联合邦和新加坡政府分别计划逮捕25名和250名‘有政治影响力的反对党’,并把这个责任推到英国政府头上。(见: 1962年7月17日Selkirk 致给 R Maulding的信件S J Ball,引述‘Selkirk in Singapore’,第180页。编号:PREM11/1951, GM (62) 26,。)  



Selkirk 和 Moore两人都是李光耀的支持者。他们表达了理解李光耀和英国人提议的逮捕计划。








东姑威胁‘关闭长堤’的讲话和李光耀的第一阶段只有有效的反对合并和马来西亚。但是,那些与我见面的反对党领袖并没有给予我 怎样的好印象。我相信温和派的势力可以在新加坡获得胜利,除非是东姑或者我们犯上愚蠢的策略上的错误。如果要令温和分子 和沙文主义分子聚集起来 温和的 有效的 反对合并和马来西亚的话 那就得 在没有足够理由的情况下 逮捕主要的反对党领导人。



Moore 是在给他的上级提议打败左翼的社会主义阵线在大选的战略;他对林清祥并没有采取‘宽容’的态度。作为英国陛下一个公务员的专业判断。 他的情报书里的判断是没有任何确凿的证据证明林清祥是在执行共产党的指示。所以,把他拘捕是会给政府带来麻烦。



总之,大约在那个时候,英国殖民地的官员对付共产主义的战略已经大概肯定了 。在1962年7月13日,Duncan Sandys成为国务大臣的同时,也担任共和联邦关系秘书。作为一位在1957-1959年担任国防部长的人,他制定计划通过生产核武器来裁军,以及通过大规模的空运军队的计划作为确保军队达到调动机制。他在新加坡最大的兴趣是军事基地,以及关心马来西亚和李光耀是英国在东南亚的利益保护者。Duncan Sandys并不反对联合邦和李光耀提出的通过逮捕行动‘降低共产主义的威胁’的观点。要获得内部安全理事会批准逮捕个别的人的案件,只要提出合理的证据证明。而且这些逮捕行动不会造成当地的暴乱和给予英国国会带来困难。






殖民地办公室的会议记录注释。这是‘合理的推论’社阵表达了支持汶莱的起义革命。假设类似情况出现的话,他们(指社阵)将会在新加坡采取同样的行动。( 1962年12月11日,CS Roberts 致给殖民地办公室Higham的备忘录。编号:(CO 1030/1160).



所以拿Moore 声明林清祥确定是共产党员的说法 来否定它他那句‘(历史)修正主义者’ 时常引用的话根本是个幼儿的做法。



这些声明都是警方的情报材料。相等于英国最高专员大量有关李光耀热衷于逮捕他的这种反对者的说明。就英国人而言,只要李光耀公开承担逮捕的责任,和不会引起大众的强烈反应, 英国人就不会反对。






Moore的观察,林清祥是一个独立的表演者。他无意超越情报的报告的活动。在这个段落里,林清祥的行为是符合人正常体态的人,而不是一个陈腔滥调的人。在一般的情报里 林清祥 的每一个行动都是可以预言的,也是注定的。Moore写 但没有证据证明林清祥在接受马共、北京或莫斯科的指令时 这是殖民地办公室无法确定接纳最好的策略 的段落。当Moore发现殖民地办公室缺乏当局所需要的文件见资料时,他是在履行自己的职责做出这样的报告。









可是殖民地办公室的CS Roberts注意到内部会议议程记录社阵的会议,Selkirk没有披露‘比(事实)更多的情况确定一小部分的社阵的成员将寻求武力行动,假设他们认为这是权宜之计’。尽管如此,他还是建议‘在另一方面我们必须接受Moore先生的说法,证据显示比我们所有的资料揭露非常清楚的是:社阵是被共产党所控制了。(1962年12月11日,CS Roberts致函给殖民地办公室的 Higham编号: CO 1030/1160)。












 ‘回应’坚持过去50 年来一直使用林清祥是一个全能的领袖社会主义阵线和工会的会员都把他的话当为圣话。 



傅树介医生,社会主义阵线的助理秘书长。他已经说明了自己参与政治活动的历史了。他说在战后开始就具有反对殖民主义的精神。作为一个马来亚大学的学生,他在‘华惹事件’(‘华惹’是当时马来亚大学社会主义俱乐部出版的机关刊物)是主要的被告。英国殖民主义者起诉进行煽动宣传。这个‘华惹事件’与林清祥无关。傅树介医生解释为什么他会加入社会主义阵线。当时他受邀加入社会主义阵线时,是他放弃了两个国外医药奖学金。他也曾经解释了他与林清祥的关系 。假使行动党迟了两个月才采取行动驱逐党内的左翼的话,那事情发生时傅树介医生肯定已经在国外了,同时,必将将会发生巨变。有关这方面的叙述可以阅读2009年出版的《华惹年代:社会主义俱乐部和它的马来亚与新加坡的战后政治》和《新加坡1963年的冷藏行动50周年纪念》的有关书籍。



‘回应’忽视这些事实,就简单的描述傅树介医生和那些在1963年2月2日被捕每个社阵的党员和工会会员是恶魔林清祥的盲目追随者。这是似乎反映了在行动党的党员和同情者对 他们的党领袖的态度吧。  






这也许有一个原因。虽然读者对于方壮壁(‘全权代表’)关于他与李光耀之间的秘密会面揭露的情况甚少感到失望。方壮壁的回忆录主要是集中在当时的反对殖民地的斗争热潮。这是当时马来亚共产党继续反对日本军国主义侵略。在新加坡,像方壮壁这样讲华语的青年,把反对日本军国主义的侵略的斗争延续到战后反对殖民主义运动。由此方壮壁的回忆录 绝对不会在受推荐为学校历史参考书之一吧。












余柱业在2006年的中文口述历史是特别有问题的。他谴责共产主义和在1991年回到新加坡后,向内部安全局提供了有关的情报。一年后他接受,国家档案馆的新加坡口述历史 的访问和录音。他在2002年的口述读起来是痛苦的。他对方壮壁犯上的‘错误’对李光耀保证马共的支持,采取了与方壮壁分割开来,(事实上,方壮壁在他的回忆录里接受承担这些错误)余柱业声言,作为自己是一个莱佛士学院的学生(马来亚大学的前身),认识李光耀与吴庆瑞和他们的阶级的人 而方壮壁并没无法了解他们 。陈平在的回忆录稍微嘲笑余柱业。他告诉马来亚共产党的领导人,拉惹勒南不是李光耀的人,可以指望他与李光耀决裂。








‘回应’自我辩护的这么说,但他忽视了事实。那就是:陈平(马来亚共产党总书记)在写道有关冷藏行动事件时,说道,在整个新加坡的地下组织网已经被削弱。方壮壁是他们三个人当中唯一一个最接近新加坡的。(当时陈平是长驻中国、余柱业是长驻印尼)。方壮壁说,在1961年到1963年之间,他已经开始把已经开始进行干部撤退的工作了。  那些属于已经暴露的干部分成小组从新加坡撤退。由于这样安排的结果,从“‘实践’而言的结果是,撤退影响了整个组织的力量”。被安排撤退的人数超过50个男女干部。(方壮壁:第172页。)









在冷藏行动50年后的今天,已经不再是那么容易像在当时的10年到20年历史里通过哄骗来摧毁一个人的功勋(以及近超过一百人) 而觉得应该受到人民永恒的尊重。






或者在此刻,它没有选择的余地,只好寻求它的缔造者:把事情简单化、让它大声嘶喊和厚颜无耻。开动所有的政府机器。让它成为头条新闻——实际的主题, 别管它。



对于局外人来说,政府这么做似乎是不负责任的 对他自己的名声也同样产生极其恶劣的影响以及像‘回应’和他们发出的回应声这样拿出近乎于空洞无凭据的说法。为什么不要继续派出经过良好训练的学术界兵团来应战?为什么内阁的部长们,一个国家部长和一个最高专员的名义发出这样滑稽的声明。









只有那些在高层直接涉及的人才会知道这场战役真正内情。就目前这场战役的战情而言,战役的发展态势,到底谁是这场战役的胜利者?谁是这场战役的战败者 ?



(中英文对照)Singapore’s ‘Battle for Merger’ revisited新加坡的《争取合并的斗争》的再版

By Poh Soo Kai, Guest Contributor

傅树介/文 中文译者:伍德南

3 December 2014 Posted in: Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore  http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/12/03/singapores-battle-for-merger-revisited/

按:澳大利亚国立大学的网站《新曼达拉》(New Mandala)邀约傅树介医生撰写一篇有关新加坡的文章,傅医生写了本文,于2014123日贴上该网站。


The merger issue

2015 is the fiftieth anniversary of Singapore’s separation after almost two years of being part of the Federation of Malaysia (16 September 1963 – 9 August 1965). The event is marked as the day when the island gained independence. The British colonial rulers formally relinquished its residual power over Singapore’s defence, foreign affairs and internal security to the newly-formed Federation of Malaysia when merger came into effect. Reunification was the aspiration of its people as the island was severed in 1946 by the British after being part of the Straits Settlements for 120 years, save for the Japanese Occupation (1942-45).

However the merger scheme which Lee Kuan Yew’s PAP government concluded with the Federation of Malaya government’s Tunku Abdul Rahman was an outright failure. It is thus curious that for the official celebration of SG 50, the PAP government should choose to highlight the 12 radio broadcasts that Lee Kuan Yew as prime minister made between 13 September and 9 October 1961 which was published as The Battle for Merger (1962). The book was reprinted in 2014, with much official hype but no new insights. The deputy prime minister and concurrently coordinating minister for national security and minister for home affairs who launched the reprint, stressed the importance of the PAP’s push for the 1963 merger thus:

It was a time when momentous decisions had to be made for Singapore. A wrong decision then would have been calamitous and Singapore might still be trying to shake off the dire effects today.

[Ministry of Home Affairs, Speech by Mr Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, at the launch of the reprint of “The Battle for Merger”.]

12讲再版封面 12讲

The 1963 merger was a wrong decision. The disastrous outcome was foreseen by the opposition Barisan Sosialis.  We wanted reunification with Malaya, but NOT on the terms that Lee obtained. Those simply could not work. They did not address the fundamental ethnic issue which was handled differently in Malaya and Singapore. The Alliance, the ruling party which dominated Malaysian politics, was an alliance of ethnic-based political parties. It had control of Singapore’s internal security through the internal Security Act (ISA) which provided for detention without trial. The PAP had accepted that Singapore would have fewer seats than its population size warranted, weakening its representation in the Federal government.

Lee insisted that we ‘opposed merger’ fearing that we would be arrested and detained without trial by the Tunku as Malaysia’s prime minister. We countered with the declaration that Barisan leaders were willing to be arrested and imprisoned before merger took place. Contrary to the PAP’s proposals, we insisted that the people of Singapore should have the same rights and responsibilities as any other Malaysian citizen. The ‘autonomy’ in labour and education for Singapore which the PAP obtained was meaningless if the ISA was not abolished.

After Malaysia was formed on these faulty terms, the PAP found itself in the margins of Federal politics when the Tunku rejected its attempts to replace the MCA as his Chinese coalition partner.  The PAP then, in a volte-face, resorted to so-called championing of equal political rights for the Chinese.  Ethnic tensions were stoked in response by UMNO extremists championing Malay rights. Riots broke out in Singapore in 1964, and Separation came to be seen as the only way to avoid further outbreaks of ethnic-based violence.

The merger of Singapore into the larger Federation of Malaya with an entrenched rightwing government was introduced by the British, and rushed through to save Lee Kuan Yew’s political skin. The British were not prepared to give Singapore independence outside of merger with the Federation, fearing that its military bases on the island would be jeopardised if our genuine leftwing party won the 1963 election. Lee was keen on such a merger, expecting that the Tunku would act against the leftwing of his party. There was no vision of democracy or equality for the new society that was enunciated.

Lee had made clear to the British that should there be no role for him, he would not go into Malaysia. As prime minister since 1959, he threw everything he had to push for merger and to discredit his opposition as communists. Based on this charge, the PAP expelled its leftwing members, who then formed the Barisan Sosialis party led by Lim Chin Siong. The Internal Security Council, comprising of the Singapore, British and Federation of Malay governments, duly carried out Operation Coldstore on 2 February 1963 and subsequent weeks, with a total of 133 arrested.

Building up a reading list

Among those imprisoned in 1963, were individuals who refused to sign statements ‘renouncing’ or condemning communism – the only way to gain release. Dr Lim Hock Siew, imprisoned for almost twenty years, refused to sign a statement renouncing violence in 1975. He retorted that it was like asking him to announce that he would stop beating his wife, giving the impression that he was imprisoned for wife-beating. He would never lift a finger to justify his detention.

For more than twenty years following the release in 1982 of the last of the political prisoners then (save for Chia Thye Poh) we maintained silence about our wrongful imprisonment.  The political climate was stifling; we were warned of re-arrest should we ‘cause trouble’, which included maintaining contact with one another. There was also the need to focus on making a living. Only gradually were attempts made among ex-political prisoners to meet up socially.

Following The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (1998) , Said Zahari, who certainly did not have any communist links but was imprisoned for 17 years, published his autobiographical account Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir, and Tan Jing Quee co-edited (with Jomo KS) Comet in our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History; both accounts came out in 2001. They were spurred on by Lee’s narrative of his heroic deeds and flawless judgment, and demonising of his leftwing opponents as subversive communists at every turn.

赛查理回忆录     林清祥 2-page-001

The momentum grew with Tan Jing Quee and Michael Fernandez speaking about their imprisonment at an arts forum on Detention-Healing- Writing in 2006. Tan then come up with The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore, (2010) and The May 13 Generation: The Chinese Middle Schools Student Movement and Singapore Politics in the 1950s. The two books, available in both English and Chinese, challenge the state bifurcation of English-speaking students as apolitical and Chinese-speaking as manipulated by the Malayan Communist Party. The book launches drew a capacity audience. The latter in particular was attended by about 300 elderly Chinese-speaking former political activists who for decades had hidden their past, even from their children and grandchildren, who accompanied them to the event.

华惹一代   513事件

The detainees of the 1950s and 1960s were not the only ones who began to find a voice.  A younger group of  lawyers, dramatists, political activists, and social and church workers arrested in Operation Spectrum in 1987 as ‘marxist conspirators’ had also started to stir. They connected with the 1963 and 1970s detainees to produce Our Thoughts Are Free: Poems and Prose on Imprisonment and Exile (2009). The next year, Teo Soh Lung (imprisoned without trial 21 May 1987-26 Sept 1987; 19 April 1988-1 June 1990) published Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner. At the book launch, Teo stated,

‘I call for the ISA to be abolished. The ISA and its predecessors have destroyed many lives from the time of the British to today.’

张素兰 1   张素兰 2

Since then, her comrades have put out collections of essays by Catholic church workers who were Operation Spectrum survivors,[i] and on Singapore’s political exiles from the 1970s[ii].

The growth of the social media, resulting in the proliferation of publishing outlets, made its impact during the campaign for the hotly-contested election of the president in August 2011. Citizen journalists,  invited to the debates, asked the candidates to state their position on the ISA. Former cabinet minister Tony Tan justified the legislation on grounds that terrorism is a real threat, which led Dr Lim Hock Siew to challenge him to repeat his statement so that they could meet in a court of law, and to call for an independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the allegations against all ISA prisoners. His challenge is still on YouTube.

Operation Coldstore documents: Demanding accountability

Except for the 1990s, the ISA has been used in every decade in postwar Singapore. Operation Coldstore remains the most controversial, as it paved the way for the PAP’s unbroken rule and constitutes its founding myth of ‘riding the communist tiger’. What it did, in effect, was to eliminate Lim Chin Siong and the Barisan Sosialis from the 1963 general election. Lim had won the confidence not only of the Chinese-speaking labour unionists, but also the English-speaking left, mostly coming out from the University Socialist Club. I was one of them.

Documentary evidence from the colonial archives, analysed by historians such as TN Harper, Geoff Wade[iii] and PJ Thum[iv],  has shown that

the British and the Federation governments were not going to accept a leftwing government in Singapore; they came to Lee’s rescue by abetting in Operation Coldstore. I too made a trip to the Kew Archives in the early 1990s.  There is insufficient evidence that Lim Chin Siong, the key target to be destroyed politically, was a member of the MCP—which did not stop the demonising of him as such in the 2014 Battle for Merger. Choice quotations from the Colonial Office include:

While we accept that Lim Chin Siong is a Communist, there is no evidence he is receiving orders from the CPM, Peking or Moscow. Our impression is that Lim is working very much on his own and that his primary objective is not the Communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional government of Singapore. It is far from certain that having obtained this objective Lim would necessarily prove a compliant tool of Peking or Moscow.[v]

Also, Lee was,

quite clearly attracted by the prospect of wiping out his main political opposition before the next Singapore elections…advocating a policy of provocation of Lim Chin Siong and his associates with a view to forcing them into unconstitutional action justifying their arrest. [vi]

The specific reason given for our arrests was that the Barisan was supplying arms and logistical support for the popular uprising led by Azahari in Brunei on 8 December 1962. The British had minuted how this charge was formulated:

Lee had in mind a statement calling for the crushing of the revolt pointing out that organisation, training and arms could not have been provided within the Borneo territories and drawing the conclusion that there must have been foreign intervention. As to arrests, Lee said that information about the recent contacts between Azahari and Lim Chin Siong coupled with Barisan Socialis’ statement giving open support for the revolutionaries provided a heaven-sent opportunity of justifying action against them.[vii]

Lim Chin Siong as Barisan leader had a meal in a restaurant with Azahari, leader of the socialist Partai Rakyat Brunei, who was stopping by Singapore, in full view of the head of Special Branch. Our statement of moral support for the Brunei popular uprising was no different from those that the Barisan had issued for other anti-colonial uprisings. Strangely for the danger we were alleged to pose in our fraternal relations with Azahari, our arrests were postponed for two months after the Brunei uprising as the Tunku and Lee could not agree on the list of detainees!

The authorities had indicated that they would produce evidence of our clandestine involvement in the Brunei uprising, but never did. I am still waiting.

Operation Coldstore was a set-up against Lee’s political opponents. On its fiftieth anniversary, I declared in the blurb of The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore: Commemorating 50 Years:

I maintain that I was imprisoned for being part of a slate of left-wing anti-colonialists who were going to pose a challenge to Lee Kuan Yew in the election of 1963. The charges of communism and subversion, used to frame people like me, have simply been chanted repeatedly to this day. Our rejection of the charge has been ignored outright, without any attempt to supply evidence or specific details which we could answer.


To date, we have received only a non-reply, in the form of the re-printing of the Battle for Merger, the Cold War diatribe of the day. The government has to content itself with targeting school children and blitzing the mainstream media, using the same language and materials from half a century ago, and resurrecting the failed ‘merger’, implicitly to justify Coldstore, though the event itself is not ever mentioned. The impression given is that with the radio talks the PAP won the hearts and minds of the people. If that had been the case, Coldstore would have been unnecessary.

Even more impossible to justify than our arrests is the length of the imprisonments. Detention orders were renewed every two years, without any limit at the minister’s pleasure. Lim Hock Siew would have received at least 8 extensions of such orders under section 8A of the ISA, 1960, a printed form with the name of the detainee and date typed in. How many such orders would Chia Thye Poh, – imprisoned on 29 October 1996, restricted to Sentosa island from 17 May 1989, then to Singapore from 28 November 1992 and freed of restrictions on 27 November 1998, – have received?

The present PAP leaders have chosen to identify themselves with the gross injustices using the ISA inflicted by their party elders, and to cling to a narrative of history that has been seriously questioned.

Dr Poh Soo Kai was Assistant Secretary-General of Barisan Sosialis. He was imprisoned twice under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) which allows for detention without trial for a total of 17 years by Singapore’s PAP government.

[i] Fong Hoe Fang, ed. That We May Dream Again (2009)

[ii] Teo Soh Lung and Low Yit Keng, eds. Escape from the lion’s paw : reflections of Singapore’s political exiles (2009)

[iii] Geoff Wade, ‘Operation Coldstore: A Key Event in the Creation of Modern Singapore’, in The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore: Commemorating Fifty years, eds. Poh Soo Kai, Tan Kok Fang, Hong Lysa (2013).

[iv] Thum Pingtjin, “‘The Fundamental Issue is Anti-colonialism, not Merger’: Singapore’s ‘Progressive Left’ , Operation Coldstore and the Creation of Malaysia”,  Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore Working Paper series no. 211, November 2013.

[v] High Commissioner, Singapore to Secretary of State, 8 September 1962, CO 1030/1159 in TN Harper, ‘ Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”’ in Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, eds. Tan Jing Quee and Jomo KS (2001), p. 41.

[vi]  High Commissioner Singapore to Secretary of State, CO 1030/998, 28 April 1962, cited in Tan Jing Quee, ‘Merger and the Decimation of the Left-Wing in Singapore,’ in Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore, eds. Poh Soo Kai, Tan Jing Quee and Koh Kay Yew (2010)  p. 283.

[vii] High Commissioner to Secretary of State CO 1030/1160, no 572, 10 December 1962.


作者:傅树介/文         中文译者:伍德南


按:澳大利亚国立大学的网站《新曼达拉》(New Mandala)邀约傅树介医生撰写一篇有关新加坡的文章,傅医生写了本文,于2014123日贴上该网站。







12讲再版封面     12讲

1963年的合并是个错误的决定,反对党社会主义阵线事前已预见其灾难性后果。我们要跟马来亚重归统一,但并非按李光耀所争取的条件,那样的条件根本行不通。他们没有针对根本的族群课题,马来亚和新加坡处理的方法不同。主宰马来西亚政坛的执政党“华巫印联盟”,是族群本位政党的联盟。联盟政府通过内部安全法令(内安法)来控制新加坡,该法赋予不经审讯可进行拘留的权力。 行动党又接受少过按人口比例应得的国会议席,因此削弱了新加坡在联邦政府的代表权。








在《新加坡的故事:李光耀回忆录》(The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew(1998年)出版后,跟共产党肯定没有任何关系却被拘禁17年的赛查哈里,也出版了自传体的叙事《人间正道》(Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir),再跟着是陈仁贵和K S 佐莫联合编著的《林清祥和他的时代》(“Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history”);后两本书是同于2001年出版,是受到李光耀叙述自己在每个转折点的英雄事迹、准确无误的判断以及把左派对手妖魔化成共产党颠覆份子等等叙事的激发而成书的。

赛查理回忆录      林清祥 2-page-001

随着陈仁贵和费南迪斯(Michael Fernandez)于2006年在的一个讲题为“监禁-伤愈-写作”人文座谈会上,叙述监禁遭遇,之后,潮流的势头逐浪高。接下来,陈仁贵又编辑出版了《华惹》时代风云 : 马大社会主义俱乐部对当代新马政治的影响The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore,) (2010))及情系五一三 : 一九五零年代新加坡华文中学学生运动与政治变革 (The May 13 Generation: The Chinese Middle Schools Student Movement and Singapore Politics in the 1950s


华惹一代   513事件

不仅仅是1950年代和1960年代的被捕者开始发声。在1987年的“光谱行动”中,被指涉及“马克思主义阴谋”而遭逮捕的比较年轻的一群律师、戏剧工作者、政治活动分子、社会工作者及教会工作者,也已开始涌动。他们跟1963年和1970年代的被拘留者联系,出版了《我们的思想是自由的:坐牢者和流亡者的诗歌与散文(2009)》(Our Thoughts Are Free: Poems and Prose on Imprisonment and Exile )(2009)。隔年,张素兰(两度不经审讯遭拘禁:1987年5约21日-1987年9月26日;1988年4月19日-1990年6月1日)出版了《跨越蓝色大门:一名政治被拘留者的回忆》(Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner)。在新书推介会上,张素兰郑重表示:


张素兰 1  张素兰 2


社交媒体的兴起,言路广开,冲击了竞争剧烈的2011年8月的总统选举活动。在总统候选人的辩论会上,受邀出席的公民社交媒体的新闻工作者(Citizen  journalists)要求各候选人陈述对内部安全法令的立场。前内阁部长陈庆炎认为内安法是正当的,因为真实存在恐怖主义威胁。对此,林福寿医生挑战他重复他的这一谈话,以便双方在法庭见面;林医生也要求成立一个独立的调查委员会,调查所有内安法的被拘留者所面对的指控是否属实。在YouTube视频网站仍可看到林福寿医生的挑战视频。(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zk-TH257ggI




根据英殖民地部门的档案文献,经哈珀(T N Harper)、韦杰夫(Geoff Wade)[iii] 和覃炳鑫 [iv] 等几位历史学者的探究分析,事实证明英国政府和联邦政府是不会接受在新加坡出现一个左翼政府的;他们出手拯救李光耀,配合采取“冷藏行动”。我也曾于1990年代初到过伦敦的克尤档案馆(Kew Archives)查阅档案资料。没有足够的证据可证明林清祥,一个被锁定要加以摧毁的政治对象,是马共党员。然而,2014年再版的《争取合并的斗争》仍旧不放弃对他的妖魔化。在此着重摘录英殖民地公署的一段档案资料:


同时,李光耀是,相当明显地专注于在新加坡下一届大选之前,一举扫清其政治对手 ….. 在采取一项策略,恣意挑衅林清祥及其伙伴,想迫使他们诉诸非宪制斗争手段,制造逮捕他们的理据。[vi]





 “冷藏行动”是李光耀对付政治对手的 蓄谋方案 。在纪念“冷藏行动”50周年出版的《新加坡1963年的冷藏行动-50周年纪念》,我在封底跋言说:








[i] 方可弘 编辑《让我们再筑梦吧!》(2009)

[ii] 张素兰和刘月玲合编:《狮爪逃生:新加坡政治逃亡者思辨集》(2009)

[iii] 韦杰夫著:《“冷藏行动”:现代新加坡在建国道路上经历的重大事件》,收录于由傅树介、陈国防和孔莉莎联合编著的《新加坡1963年的冷藏行动-50周年纪念》

 [iv] 覃炳鑫著:《根本课题是反对殖民主义,而非合并:新加坡的‘进步左翼’、“冷藏行动”及马来西亚的创建》,新加坡国立大学亚洲研究所的工作报告系列,编号211,2013年11月21日。

 [v] 英国驻新加坡最高专员致英国国务大臣的报告,1962年9月8日,CO 1030/1159;见哈珀著《林清祥和‘新加坡的故事’》(‘Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”)与见陈仁贵和K S 佐莫联合编著的《林清祥和他的时代》(“Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history”)一书第41页。

 [vi] 英最高专员致国务大臣信(编号CO 1030/1030/998, 1962年4月28日,见陈仁贵著,“合并与新加坡左翼的式微”,收录于傅树介、陈仁贵和许赓猷联合编著的《华惹世代:大学社会主义俱乐部和战后马来亚与新加坡的政治》第283页)

[vii] 英最高专员致国务大臣信(编号CO 1030/1160, 572号,1962年12月10日)



(中英文对照) The Battle for Merger re-staged: SG 50 and the killing of two birds with one red herring 再版《争取合并的斗争》:新加坡建国50周年 和一石二鸟

作者: Dr. Hong  Lysa  孔莉莎 (网址:http://minimyna.wordpress.com/) ——中文译者:伍德南   日期:November 25, 2014

Note: This is the original posting of ‘The Battle for Merger re-staged’. (minimyna essay number 11, posted on 7 November 2014)  When I learnt that the Film Appeal Board had just heard Tan Pin Pin’s presentation in her appeal against the ‘Not Allowed for All Ratings’ classification for To Singapore, With Love  and its decision would be released in a matter of days, I deleted references to the film, and retitled the essay ‘ The Battle for Merger re-staged: SG 50 and the art of shadow-boxing’.   The section, ‘Pesky Birds’  has been updated following the Appeal Board’s decision.

12讲     《当前宪制斗争的任务》

(Chinese text: Lim Chin Siong (editor), The Constitutional Struggle Ahead. The first in a series of compilation of speeches and essays  on merger published in 阵线报 the Chinese language paper of the Barisan Sosialis. Courtesy of Ong Sooi Eng 王瑞荣)

Pomp and Circumstance

A few weeks ago, those in Singapore who listen to ministerial speeches would have felt that the 1950s and early 1960s had descended on them.  The airwaves were blasting out rhetoric from the cold war era of stark political categories in all its unabashed crudity and oppressiveness. The most senior cabinet members, the prime minister brigadier-general (res) Lee Hsien Loong and rear-admiral (res) Teo Chee Hean, deputy prime minister, coordinating minister for national security and minister for home affairs dispensed a singular history lesson emanating from what is clearly a polemical political tract from the last half a century.

The full weight of the government was thrown behind re-sanctifying as gospel truth the 12 radio talks of then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew: how he rescued the country from being over-run by communists who were ascendant, subversive and violent, in a period of great upheaval and civil unrest manipulated from behind-the-scenes by communist hands. The Battle for Merger, delivered between 13 September and 9 October 1961, and published in 1962, was ‘pivotal in lifting the curtain on the communists and exposing their hidden manoeuvrings’ and won public support for the referendum on merger.

The fanfare orchestrated to greet the gravely-intoned regurgitation of the communist vs non-communist framework to understand Singapore’s past was accompanied by students making the requisite school excursion to visit to the allied exhibition, and the hint of public disciplining two academics for their works.

Despite the hype, the 1961 text was simply recited.  There is no new evidence or perspectives that would justify its reprinting.

Most significantly former prime minister/senior minister/minister mentor Lee Kuan Yew himself viewed the exhibition, and it was relayed by the deputy prime minister that the author had praised the team who had put up the exhibition for their ‘thorough research’.

Incredibly the government decided to put its credibility on the line to defend and propagate this document whose value fifty years since it was written surely lies in its historicity, not its veracity.

What thorough research?

The re-print includes an introductory chapter ‘The Battle for Merger—the Historical Context by Associate Professor Albert Lau, National University of Singapore.  It does not read like a work written in 2014 at all. It simply echoes the key lines of the Radio Talks, citing only like-minded publications without engaging at all with either documentary material or analyses which have emerged which question the premises of this PAP narrative.

This essay goes overboard in its zealousness, kicking an own goal in the process.

In one telling elaboration on just how brilliant and righteous it all was, we are told that at one point in the negotiations between the governments of Singapore and the Federation on the merger scheme, Singapore citizens were going to be accorded Malaysian nationality, not citizenship. The opposition Barisan Sosialis pointed out that Singapore citizens would become second-class citizens.  By his own account, and repeated in the 2014 essay, the Barisan’s challenge immediately instigated the prime minister Lee Kuan Yew to ‘implore’ both London and Kuala Lumpur to ‘use similar terms’ for the people of Singapore and of the Borneo territories, who were to be conferred Malaysian citizenship. If the Federation refused, merger would certainly be rejected by the people of Singapore in the promised referendum.

Clearly, the PAP government had not given due attention to the most basic of concerns for the largely immigrant population.   The vigilance of the Barisan and the pressure it asserted contributed to the outcome that Singapore citizens automatically became Malaysian citizens, even though the Barisan insisted that the change was only cosmetic as the representation that Singapore had in the Malaysian parliament was way below what its population figure warranted.

Yet then and now in the 2014 chapter, their intervention has been called ‘propaganda’, and another proof that they were against merger and therefore they were communists.

The 2014 chapter credits the radio talks with playing a vital part in defeating the ‘communists and pro-communists’ and winning the people over as seen in the referendum where 71 % voted for the PAP ‘option’.

The whole referendum exercise was nothing more than the government fixing the rules at every turn to obfuscate and confuse, playing on the people’s fear of what the Federation government might or might not do if merger fell through. Those responsible have continued to congratulate themselves for being very clever about it.  Then PAP chairman Toh Chin Chye said of the referendum in a 1996 interview,

‘The ballot paper was crafted by Lee Kuan Yew. Whichever way you voted, you voted for merger. …Few understood the ballot paper….How do choose? Which way do you vote? But we got away with it. We won… ‘ [Melanie Chew, Leaders of Singapore (1996), p. 92]

The National Museum of Singapore’s new interactive exhibition SINGAPURA 700 YEARS reportedly includes ‘hands-on experience’ such as casting a vote to decide Singapore’s merger with Malaya and taking a history quiz. One wonders if the museum visitors ‘reliving’ that ‘experience’ will understand the ballot paper more clearly than those casting their votes on 1 September 1962.

The PAP government had simply rammed through its terms of merger.  The Battle for Merger was one key propaganda exercise to this end. One blogger, a former political detainee has shown far greater understanding of the nature of the publication than academics seem to have. Ong Sooi Eng (王瑞荣) has juxtaposed the Radio Talks with booklets that the Barisan Sosialis published at the time explaining its position on merger.

They are ‘propaganda’ only as much as Battle for Merger is, and the publications should be read against one another.

Singapore’s merger with Malaysia proved to be a failure with consequences not necessarily for the better for the people and the societies in the long term.  The Barisan’s pointing out that if the fundamental difference in the politics of ethnicity adopted by the Federation and Singapore were not addressed, merger would only lead to conflict was but stating the obvious. And that was exactly what came to pass.

The well-worn ‘what if’ scenario, almost in verbatim refrain since the days of S Rajaratnam in the 1960s has it that if the

‘communists and their pro-communist CUF allies had won, and Singapore had fallen under communist rule in the 1960s…we would have gone a different path….Even if Singapore had survived, life would have been harsh and miserable.’

The re-printing of Battle for merger brings another ‘what if’ scenario to mind:

what if merger was intended to work, and the result of genuine consultation with the people of all the political units concerned, and not an immediate political expedience. What if the Federation, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah had negotiated a Malaysia that actually had a chance of working? We would all have gone on a different path….

What revisionist history?

The battle for merger has been re-staged ostensibly out of concern that ‘revisionist writers’ have emerged who ‘portray the fight as a merely a peaceful and democratic disagreement over the type of merger. They ignore the more fundamental agenda of the communists to seize power by subversion and armed revolution’. Historians Geoff Wade and Thum Ping Tjin have figured in the footnotes appended to deputy prime minister Teo’s speech as two such purveyors of this at best ignorant view.

The deputy prime minister actually appended ‘a sampling of the more credible books on the CPM and the communist struggles between the 1940s to the 1960s’ in the written copy of his speech. It comprises a number of authors who were given access to the documents of Singapore’s Internal Security Department.  One has to wonder why these individuals were deserving of such trust. Included in this list and cited in the 2014 essay is the poisonous and scandalous Dennis Bloodworth, Tiger and the Trojan Horse (1986). Bloodworth was also given interviews with the top PAP leadership, and even Mrs Lee Kuan Yew. Would all this make the book more credible or incredible?

Also making it to the minister’s recommended reading list is hagiographic accounts by MCP leaders and members.

However, the idea that ‘revisionist history’ is the work of historians in Singapore today who challenge the state narrative on the dangers of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, perhaps with an agenda in mind is quite misconceived. The seminal work of such ‘revisionism’ was in fact written more than a decade ago.

林清祥 2-page-001


As any undergraduate who has done modules on Singapore, or even  eighteen-year olds in junior college who have done a research project on that part of Singapore history would know, Cambridge University historian TN Harper’s ‘Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”’  [ in Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history, edited by Tan Jing Quee and Jomo KS, 2001] cited then commissioner of police Linsett’s 1959 report to the Internal Security Council to the effect that in his estimate, MCP strength was low: 40 full party members, 80 ABL (Anti-British League) cadres; 200 or so ‘sympathisers and less than 100 ‘released for ‘white area work’.

The report also spoke of ‘much uncoordinated ‘cell activity without either lateral or vertical contact’, [ EJ Linsett. ‘the security threat to Singapore (Communism and nationalism)’ 24 July 1959, DO 35/9870, PR0]

Harper’s ‘revisionist’ essay has long become the established paradigm for scholars. Credible research on post-war Singapore history has to be cognizant of it. Wade and Thum build on Harper’s study. A document featured in the study which has become de riguer to cite reveals that at the height of the bargaining among the ISC members on the list of people to be arrested, deputy high commissioner Philip Moore asserted:


While we accept that Lim Chin Siong is a Communist, there is no evidence he is receiving orders from the CPM, Peking or Moscow. Our impression is that Lim is working very much on his own and that his primary objective is not the Communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional government of Singapore. It is far from certain that having obtained this objective Lim would necessarily prove a compliant tool of Peking or Moscow. [Selkirk, British high commissioner, Singapore to Secretary of State D Sandys, 8 September 1962CO 1030/1159 in Harper p. 41]

The PAP Story denies that Lim Chin Siong was capable of thinking, discernment, and comprehending and adjusting to political developments in Singapore that he himself was in the forefront of. It freezes him in this caricature that is applied generally the Chinese-speaking students, trade union leaders and members. It alleges that the self is alive, and has human agency. The ‘other’ is one-dimensional and timeless in its perfidy.

Pesky Birds In his heyday, Lim Chin Siong was the PAP’s feared political nemesis; he has become the albatross around the party’s neck. Any hint that Lim was not a MCP member, was not a subversive and had no intention of supplying arms to the Brunei rebellion would raise questions about Operation Coldstore, and the morality of how the PAP came to rule Singapore. Yet Lim, who died in 1996, is not the main target in the 2014 exercise of re-staging the Battle for Merger.  Similarly the historians who write ‘revisionist history’ are but sideshows or collateral damage.

That honour goes to the former political detainees who have in the last decade step by accelerated step made their narrative public through interviews, speeches posted on youtube, and credible publications.  They have continued to insist that they have never been communists or subversives, and  refused to sign any ISD statements, the only way to obtain release. Said Zahari, Lee Tee Tong, the late Dr Lim Hock Siew, Dr Poh Soo Kai, and Chng Minoh endured imprisonment for as long as it took for them to earn the right to demand accountability.They have also reaffirmed that Lim Chin Siong was their legitimate and respected leader.


The former long-serving political prisoners and their counter-narratives have been studiously avoided by the authorities, leaving it for academics to sniff condescendingly that one has to be aware that they may have an ‘agenda’. They do indeed have an agenda, and have made that very clear: demand for evidence of the charges they were accused of, and the abolition of the Internal Security Act which as their cases show has been thoroughly abused.

The re-staged Battle has been carefully circumscribed to those couple of years; there is no mention at all of Operation Coldstore, which remains the elephant in the class/room.

Instead the MCP is served as red herring.

Tan Pin Pin’s To Singapore, with Love has been given the same treatment. The MCP members from Singapore who are not allowed to return to home unless they first report to the Internal Security Department featured in the documentary have been made fair game in the re-staging of the Battle for Merger, which apparently had been planned for SG 50 way before To Singapore, with Love made its appearance. The film was given a Not Allowed for All Ratings classification on 10 September 2014.

The interviews with the MCP members from Singapore have been condemned by the prime minister as ‘self-serving personal account, conveniently inaccurate in places, glossing over inconvenient facts and others, which will sully the honour and reputation of the security people, and the brave men and women who fought the communists, all those many years.  (Today, 3 October 2014)

Yet the MCP members who could produce evidence of citizenship within a specified time frame were allowed to return to Malaysia unconditionally as part of the Hadyai Peace Accord (1989)  by which the MCP agreed to disband their armed units and destroy all their weapons. The Malaysian security forces were engaged in jungle warfare against the MCP for fifty years. Since 1989, there have not been any official statements to the effect that the returnees have posed security risks to the country.

Tan Pin Pin’s appeal against the Media Development Authority’s classification was rejected by the Films Appeal Committee on 12 November  citing the Film Classification Guidelines which provided that “films deemed to undermine public order, national security and/or stability will be disallowed for all ratings”. The FAC agreed that the film condoned ‘the use of violence and subversion as a means to achieve political ends in Singapore’. This verdict was of course no surprise, despite mainstream commentators’ view that the film showed that the old men and women interviewed were once ‘militants who would have used violence to overthrow the legitimately elected, non-communist regimes in Singapore and Malaysia if they had a chance.’ (Chua Mui Hoong, ‘To JB, for a movie’ Straits Times 28 September 2014). One would have thought that read this way, there was every reason for the the film to be screened from the point of view of ‘national education’.

Yet while the segments of the To Singapore with Love which were given most public attention were the Chinese-speaking septuagenarian former MCP members resident in South Thailand and Bangkok, their narratives would not be the ones that the audience would find the most compelling.

The most forthright, reflective, poignant and inspirational interviewee who holds the film together has been carefully left out in official disparagement of the interviewees.

Just as the former political prisoners who continue to insist that they were political threats to the PAP, not security risks to their country, have not received any direct rebuttals from the authorities, there has not been any explanation given for Dr Ang Swee Chai having to remain in exile, standing by her husband Francis Khoo Kah Siang.


The late Francis Khoo (d 2011), lawyer, church and civil society activist  managed to escape in February 1977 while his friends were arrested under the Internal Security Act on charges of being Euro-communists. Most were released within three months, after signing statements and for some, television confessions. Khoo made his way to England. His return to Singapore entailed an Internal Security Department interrogation. Doubtlessly he would have to reveal the identity of those who helped him get across the causeway.

As Dr Ang tells the story in the film, Francis’s mother, a feisty peranakan matriarch who had been pressuring him to return, said to him ‘If you come back, I’ll take a gun and I’ll shoot you, then I will shoot the chief of ISD’ when she understood the situation.

By Dr Ang’s account, Francis Khoo did not simply pine for home, but continued his commitment to social justice in the new land and beyond. A refugee, she lent her surgical and organizational skills to the cause of the Palestinians—a nation of refugees, particularly the victims of war. She co-founded the British charity Medical Aid for Palestinians,  and co-authored War Surgery Field Manual (1996), based on her experience of  treating Palestinian victims of war atrocities.

Dr Ang sought special leave from the Ministry of Home Affairs to journey home with Francis’s ashes. She would not dream of doing that on a British passport as an expatriate widow.

In ordinary circumstances, Dr Ang Swee Chai could well be lauded as a model Singaporean.  As it is, she is reconciled to the fact that her siblings would bring her ashes home when she dies.

The elderly MCP members in To Singapore, with Love serve as red herring in being additional ammunition for the re-staging of the Battle for Merger, and as the reason for the NAR decision, which in effect shuts out Dr Ang’s narrative, the most difficult to re-write into a security risk story. Reality Check


It has been endlessly said that every society needs a narrative that knits it together. Such a narrative should articulate the fundamental and attractive values underlying it.

  The Battle for merger does the opposite.


Its idea of the ‘essential facts of our nationhood’ is that students should be able ‘to name one communist or one communalist.’


Sg 50 can indeed be an occasion for Singaporeans to reflect and take stock of their society’, to ask ‘how did we get here from there, in the span of 50 years’.

  An occasion for breaching the polarization that afflicts our history.


The occasion for the authorities to demonstrate that they possess wisdom, are ‘their own men’, even-handed, inclusive, humble, forward-looking.

And above all true to themselves and to the people of Singapore.

再版《争取合并的斗争》:新加坡建国50周年 和一石二鸟

注:本文原题是“再版《争取合并的斗争》”   (见《minimyna》博客2014年11月7日贴出的博文http://minimyna.wordpress.com/2014/11/07/the-battle-for-merger-re-staged-sg-50-and-the-art-of-shadow-boxing/)。当获悉影片上诉委员会刚聆听过陈彬彬针对媒体发展管理局将其纪录片《星国恋》列为“任何分级均不允许”(Not Allowed for All Ratings)评级决定的上诉,并将择日宣布决定,我便不提该纪录片,而把文章的题目改为“再版《争取合并的斗争》:新加坡建国50周年 和太极拳”。在上诉委员会作出决定后,‘恼人的鸟儿’一节也作了补充。

《当前宪制斗争的任务》                 12讲



好几个星期前,聆听部长演说的新加坡人好像是置身于1950年 代以及1960年代初期。弥漫空间的强烈声浪,散播着冷战时期的说辞、彻头彻尾的政治腔调,显现露骨的粗暴和咄咄逼人之势。内阁中的最高级成员,总理李显龙准将(战备)和副总理兼国家安全统筹部长及内政部长张志贤准将 (战备)祭出了一堂异常的历史课,追本穷源,明显是过去半个世纪的一场政治论战的事迹。

政府倾全力要把时任总理李光耀的电台12讲,重新供奉为 圣经 :在势力蒸蒸日上、从事颠覆活动、诉诸暴力的共产党人在幕后操控的大动荡、民事动乱的时期,他拯救了国家,不使国家落入共产党人之手。《争取合并的斗争》的电台演讲,是在1961年9月13日至10月9日之间播放的,册子是在1962年出版,它“对揭开共产党人的面纱、暴露他们的隐蔽操控活动,起了关键性作用”,并赢取公众支持合并的全民公投。 大吹大擂的活动,迎来了声调高亢的“共产党对非共产党”节目返潮上演,借以了解新加坡的过去;与此配合,安排学生以必要的课外活动方式,参观配合“再版”活动举行的展览会; 同时,似乎是在训斥两位学术界人士,非议他们的著作 尽管大肆宣传 ,1961年的说词照搬不误,根本没有任何新事证或视野足以说明 再版的必要性。 最具意义的是,前总理/内阁资政李光耀本人参观过展览会,据副总理转述,作者称赞工作团队经过‘透彻的调查研究’,举办了展览会。 令人不可思议,政府竟决定将自身的可信任度的防线置于捍卫和宣扬该文集;可以肯定地说,自发表以来的50年 间,该文集的价值是在于其历史性而非其真实性。  


再版本加插新加坡国立大学副教授刘坤华撰写的一篇题为“争取合并的斗争――历史事境”的绪言,读来根本不像是写于2014年。它简直就是附和电台演讲的主旋律,仅是引述同类看法的刊物的言论,根本没有触及已面世的、质疑行动党的叙事前提的文献资料或分析文章。 该篇绪言表现得过分热情,冲昏头脑,以致把球踢进自己的球门。


显然,行动党政府对以移民为主的新加坡人的最基本利益,漠不关心。社阵的警觉和施压结果,让新加坡公民得以自动成为马来西亚公民,尽管正如社阵所说,这只不过是装门面,因为新加坡在马来西亚国会的代表议席,大大少过按人口比例所应得的席位。 然而,按过去和当今这篇2014年绪言的说法,社阵的介入,反被指为“宣传”,是他们反对合并的又一证据,因此,他们是共产党人。 这篇2014年绪言赞许电台演讲,认为在击败“共产党人和亲共份子”、赢得民心方面,起了关键作用,有71%的人在全民公投中赞成行动党“选项”,就是证明。 整个全民公投的操作,只不过是政府在每一个转折点制定条规,混淆视听,玩弄人民的恐惧情绪,譬如,害怕联邦政府在实现合并后会做什么事,或又不会做什么事。负责其事者一直在自我庆贺,认为自己所做之事是非常聪明的。时任行动党主席的杜进才于1996年的一次访谈中说,

“公投选票是李光耀精心策划的。无论你怎么投,你都是投赞成合并 ….. 很少人明了公投选票 ….. 如何选择?你怎样投票?但我们借此过关了。我们赢了 …” [Melanie Chew著《新加坡的领导人》(1996)第92页)]



一位博客、前政治被拘留者王瑞荣对出版物作用的理解,似乎比学术人士来得更透彻。他把电台演讲跟社阵当时为解释其合并立场所出版的文集,并行阅读。 如果说社阵的册子是“宣传品”, 那么 《争取合并的斗争》不也一样是“宣传品” 吗? 这些出版物应当比照阅读。


老掉牙的‘倘若 … 将会怎样’的剧本,从1960年代拉惹勒南有影响力的时候开始,几乎是一字不差的台词是这样的,倘若“共产党人及其亲共的共产党统一战线的同盟军在1960年代获胜,而新加坡因此陷入共产党统治 … 我们就会走上了一条不同的道路 … 即使新加坡得以存在,生活将会是艰苦而悲惨的。”

再版《争取合并的斗争》,也把另一出‘倘若 … 将会怎样’的剧本呈现在人们眼前:倘若立意要实现能够运作的合并,达致由各有关的政治组织的人民开诚布公协商的结果,而非一蹴而就的政治权宜安排,将会怎样呢?倘若马来亚联邦、新加坡、砂劳越和沙巴协商成立一个能够实实在在运作的马来西亚,将会怎样呢?我们大家都会走上了一条不同的道路 ……  


《争取合并的斗争》 似乎是为了因应‘修正主义作者’ 而再版的,借以指这些作者“认为这场斗争仅仅是一场通过和平和民主方式,对合并形式进行的争论。他们不理会关于共产党人要通过颠覆活动和武装斗争夺取政权的更根本议程。” 

张志贤副总理 的文字版演说辞的脚注,指韦杰夫(Geoff Wade)和覃炳鑫两位历史学者都 犯了这个错误。 副总理的文字版演说辞的一条脚注的原文是: “有关1940年代至1960年代期间马共和共产党人斗争的比较可靠著作举例”。书目的作者中,有好几位曾获准参阅新加坡内安局文件。 人们不禁会感到困惑,为何这些人士可以如此获得信任。 列入书目并由2014年绪言引述的一部书是由极其恶毒、具诽谤能事的作者丹尼斯•布拉德沃斯(Dennis Bloodworth)所撰写的《老虎与特洛伊木马》(1986年出版)。行动党的高层领导包括李光耀夫人都曾接受过布拉德沃斯的访谈。综观这一切,这本书到底是可信还是不可信?

纳入部长推荐阅读的书目,也包括马共领导人和党员的回忆斗争经历的叙事著述。 不过,认为‘修正主义历史’是当今新加坡历史学者的杰作、挑战国家关于1950年 代和1960年代共产主义危险的叙事,也许思想上还存有某个议程, 这种看法是相当错误的。其实,早在十多年前就产生了‘修正主义’的萌芽之作。 林清祥 2-page-001 任何做过新加坡专项课题研究课业的大学生,或者甚至是对新加坡历史做过研究作业项目的十八岁上下的初级学院学生,他们都知道,英国剑桥大学历史学者哈珀(T N Harper)撰写的《林清祥和‘新加坡的故事’》(‘Lim Chin Siong and the “Singapore Story”)[见陈仁贵和K S 佐莫联合编著的《林清祥和他的时代》(“Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history”)一书];

哈珀在其书中引述前新加坡警察总监琳瑟特(E J Linsett)1959年向内安局所作的报告,大意是说,据他的判断,马共的势力是薄弱的:

正式党员40人,抗英同盟(抗盟)干部80人;另有约200名‘同情者’和不到100名‘白区工作者’。 该份报告也谈提到没有横向关系或纵向关系的‘不大相互配合的’细胞组织的活动[琳瑟特――‘新加坡的治安威胁(共产主义和民族主义)’ 1959年7月24日,编号DO 35/9870, PRO]。

哈珀的‘修正主义’文章被学者们 视为典范,为时甚久。要对新加坡战后历史进行实事求是的研究, 必须对此有所认知。韦杰夫和覃炳鑫两人是基于哈珀的研究成果,进行深入探索。该研究特载的一份文件,已成为必然要引述的珍贵资料,披露了内部安全理事会成员在就逮捕名单进行争议达到最激烈阶段时,副最高专员摩尔(Philip Moore)断言:

尽管我们都认为林清祥是个共产党,但没有证据证明他在接受马共、北京或莫斯科的指令。我们的印象是,林清祥在很大的程度上是自主工作的,而他的主要目的并非要实现共产主义的黄金时代,而在于掌控新加坡的宪制政府。远远无法肯定,在实现这一目标后,林清祥必然会听命于北京或莫斯科,成为其工具。[英国驻新加坡最高专员薛尔克致英国国务大臣森迪斯的报告,1962年9月8日,CO 1030/1159;见哈珀著作第41页]



当林清祥 的声望如日中天之时,他是行动党所畏惧的强大政治对手,成为该党的克星。任何倾向于表明林清祥 也许不是共产党,不是颠覆份子,没有意图要向文莱叛军提供武器 的蛛丝马迹,都会让人质疑‘冷藏行动’的正当性,质疑行动党得以统治新加坡的道德标准。

然而,于1996年逝世的林清祥,却不是2014年 再版《争取合并的斗争》活动针对的主要目标。同样地,撰写‘修正主义历史’的历史学者只被当成过场戏或附带的伤害。 荣誉归于那些坚韧不拔的前政治被拘留者,他们在过去十年来,加紧步伐,通过上载于youtube视频和刊登于诚信刊物的访谈、演说,将自己的叙事公诸于世。他们一再坚持自己从来不是共产党或颠覆份子,拒签内安局的任何声明来换取释放,这是获释的唯一途径。 赛查哈里、李思东、已故林福寿医生、傅树介医生和庄明湖等,经受长期监禁,不肯妥协, 只为了坚持要讨个公道的权利 他们也都重申林清祥是他们所尊敬的理所当然的领袖。 当局刻意回避这些遭长久关押的政治被拘留者以及他们反面叙事,留给学术人士带着优越感和自以为是的态度去嗅察,他们得要觉察出这些人可能有个‘议程’。  然而,经长久关押的前政治被拘留者的的确确有个议程,并且非常清楚地将之表露:要求提供证据来证明对他们的指控,要求废除曾遭彻底滥用来对付他们的内部安全法令。

再版《争取合并的斗争》的活动,谨慎地局限在那几个年头;根本没有提到‘冷藏行动’,它依然是教课室里的一头大象,有待剖析。 于是乎,马共被用来转移视线。

陈彬彬的纪录片《星国恋》遭受相同待遇。在纪录片中介绍了来自新加坡的马共党员,他们不获准回返新加坡,除非先向内安局报告;其实,在再版《争取合并的斗争》活动展开时,他们就已成为任由抨击的对象,是早在《星国恋》之前,显然是为了建国50周年活动而策划的。 该纪录片是在2014年9月10日被当局列为“任何分级均不允许”评级。 跟来自新加坡的马共党员的访谈,遭到总理的谴责,说是“为自己辩解的叙事,有多处根本与事实不符、掩饰难以启齿的真相及其他,会玷污保安人员以及多年来勇敢地跟共产党人斗争的男女们的尊严和声誉。”(见2014年10月3日的《今日报》) 然而,马共成员,只要能够在设定的时限内出示公民身份的证件,就可按1989年签署的、马共同意解散武装部队和完全销毁武器的《合艾和平协议》,无条件回返马来西亚生活。马来西亚保安部队曾跟马共在森林中进行过50年 的战斗。 自1989年以来,从未见过任何官方声明指归来者有危害该国的安全之事。 陈彬彬对媒体发展管理局的评级决定的上诉,于2014年11月12日遭影片上诉委员会驳回,援引影片分级准则条文说,“被视为危害公共秩序、国家安全及/或稳定的影片,属于不允许任何分级”。影片上诉委员会认为,该纪录片宽容 “以暴力和颠覆手段在新加坡实现政治目的”。 这一决定并不令人惊讶,尽管主流评论员认为,影片中受访的年老男女,一度是“斗士,如果有机会,他们就会使用暴力推翻合法当选的新加坡和马来西亚的非共政权”。(2014年9月28日,《海峡时报》:“到新山看一影片”,Chua Mui Hoong撰。) 人们将会认为,这样的解读,就更有充分的理由从‘国民教育’的角度,公开放映这部影片。 然而,尽管《星国恋》最引起公众关注的是那些居住在泰国南部和曼谷的、讲话语的七、八十岁的前马共党员,但他们并非最吸引观众注目的人物。 把纪录片紧扣在一起的最坦率的、具思想深度的、扣人心弦的和令人鼓舞的一位受访者,官方在诋毁各受访者的言论中,小心翼翼地没有提到。 正像那些一直坚持自己是行动党的政治强势对手而非国家安全威胁的前政治被拘留者, 却没有受到当局直接驳斥一样,洪瑞钗医生不得不流亡海外、陪伴丈夫邱甲祥的事迹,也从来没有获得官方的任何解释。 已故邱甲祥(2011年逝世)是个律师、教会和公民团体的活跃份子,在1977年2月份,他的朋友们因被指涉入欧洲共产党活动而在内部安全法令下遭逮捕时,他设法躲避逮捕得逞。大部分被捕者在3个月内发表声明后获释,有的还上电视悔过。过后,邱甲祥径直前往英国。他若回返新加坡,必将招致内安局问话。 毫无疑问,届时他必须交代那些帮助他偷渡新柔长堤的人的身份。 洪医生在纪录片中叙事说,邱甲祥的母亲,一位冲动的土生华人老妈妈,原本力促儿子回来,当她知道情况后,就告诫他不许回来,对他说:“如果你回来,我会找一把枪,我要杀死你,然后我要杀内安局的头子。 据洪医生叙述,邱甲祥并不只是渴望回来,而是要在新地方和以外的领域,继续他为社会正义奋斗的使命。洪医生身为难民,则以自己的外科手术技能和组织能力,献身于巴勒斯坦人的事业,为巴勒斯坦难民特别是战争受害者服务。她是‘英国援助巴勒斯坦人医疗公益组织’(British Charity Medical Aid for Palestinians)的共同发起人,也是《战地外科手术实用手册》(War Surgery Field Manual )(1996出版)一书的合著者;该书是她治疗在战争暴行中的巴勒斯坦受害者的经验总结。 洪医生是在内政部的特别许可下,专程护送丈夫邱甲祥的骨灰踏上归途的。身为死者遗孀,没想到竟然要以持英国护照的外国人身份来办理此事。   在正常境遇,可以赞誉洪瑞彩医生为模范新加坡人。既然不能作为‘生于斯,死于斯’的新加坡人,她只有期待在死后也让亲人护送自己的骨灰回故土。 在《星国恋》纪录片中介绍的年长马共党员,被利用来转移视线,借以增强 再版《争取合并的斗争》的火力,同时也作为决定把《星国恋》列为“任何分级均不允许”评级的理由。这样一来,等于是封杀洪医生的叙事,这部分事迹是最难再编入危害安全的故事之列的。 张志贤 老生常谈,每个社会都需要一个叙事来凝聚社会。这样的叙事应当明确地表述该社会潜在的基本的和吸引人的价值。 《争取合并的斗争》正好是与此背道而驰。 ‘我们国家的必知事实’的理念就是,学生们应当要能‘说出一名共产党人或一名种族本位主义者(communalist)’。

本来,可以借建国50周年 的机会,像部长们所说的, 让新加坡人来回顾和清点 他们社会的方方面面,问一问‘在这50年来,我们是如何从那里走到这里的’。 

借此机会寻求突破口,解决折腾我国历史的两极争论。 当局可借此机会来表现他们是富有智慧的、是 ‘有主见的’、公正不偏的、包容的、谦卑的和前瞻的。 总之,首先,他们自己要真心诚意,也要真心诚意对待新加坡人民。



  • 马来西亚计划——英国殖民主义者、东姑.阿杜拉曼和李光耀老饕餐桌上的佳肴!
  • 不要随着行动党的指挥棒把马来亚共产党和左翼公开组织画上等号!——马来亚共产党和新加坡左翼政党组织是为争取实现一个包括新加坡和马来亚联合邦在内的统一马来亚国家和独立、人民自由、民主与平等的真正爱国者!

康熙皇帝   李光耀的寿命够长了吧?够!确实够长!不但够长,而且他还够长气!乾隆皇帝也无法像他这样50年后说话的声音还是当年40岁出头的嗓子!   不信。那您就到北京的故宫或者台北的故宫走一趟。您能够听到的声音绝对是纯正的中国普通话话或者台湾人带着闽南口音的台湾国语。乾隆皇帝的嗓子您绝对听不到!   这是李光耀的孝子贤孙,第四代行动党人在庆祝2015年新加坡建国50周年的藉口下,拿纳税人的钱借用21世纪的资讯科技把他当年的《电台的12讲》重新刷新出版,所以,现在李光耀的声音和当年一样没有改变!   第四代行动党人确实是想尽办法、挖空心思拿老百姓的钱来干这事!   为什么?   第四代行动党人知道,80后的新加坡年轻人和中年人对重播李光耀当年的声音没有任何的兴趣,因为他们已经被日益沉重的生活压力折腾的喘不过气了顾不上这破事!。所以,第四代行动党人把重播李光耀当年的‘电台12讲’的观众对象锁定在建国一代和青少年。这就是咱们的老祖宗传说的:老的好欺骗、小的好下手。   咱们把话说穿!实际的情况是:  

张志贤                12讲

张志贤在开启李光耀那30多岁的嗓子盒时已经把行动党要干这事的目的给说得非常明确了!   他说:


张志贤关于重新出版的说明   为了证明李光耀当年论述的‘电台12讲’是具有划时代意义,第四代行动党人把国立大学的副教授刘坤华Albert Lau拉出来为重新出版撰写了‘合并斗争——历史性的来龙去脉’的文章。他的年纪比张志贤还要年轻,国大历史系比他年纪大、经历丰富、学术地位高的历史学者应该不乏其人吧!第四代行动党人挑选了他来撰写有关重新出版‘李光耀电台12讲’的文章到底是明智?还是愚蠢?不知道。请各位看看下面他说的这段话:(见第8频道网站:http://www.channel8news.sg/mobile8/singapore/20141009-sg-merger-syp/1406274.html

“这一系列的演讲激起了共产党领袖的激烈,反应这也代表当时演讲多么成功和有效。”、“有关合并,我必须说当时我的父母是存有质疑的,不过听了李先生针对合并的重要性发表的演讲,我父亲认为那是唯一的出路。”     因共产党员不断制造混乱和煽动反政府情绪,由李光耀领导的人民行动党,1961年输掉了两场补选。”

看来,他说吃皇粮的‘历史学家’。他对新加坡的历史认识水平是一般的水平。他并没有做好功课,就是胡乱抄袭‘李光耀电台12讲’里的一些能够刺激主人感官的文字就算球了。     作为一位历史学者,他对新加坡人民反对李光耀提出的新加坡加入马来西亚的合并条件的结论竟然是他家的老爷子和老奶奶的话:


他对人民行动党在1961年输掉芳林和安顺的两场的政治历史原因是什么?看来这位‘历史学者’根本懒得去找出真正的历史原因。就说是:“因共产党员不断制造混乱和煽动反政府情绪,由李光耀领导的人民行动党,1961年输掉了两场补选”!?   真正的历史背景是:

1.芳林补选:当时的候选人王永远。他是以16条提案为补选的口号击败行动党的候选人。那是因为上台后不久取消公务员的津贴导致公务员的不满的结果。林清祥等左翼成员鉴于行动党刚刚在1959 年上台执政,徐哟一个稳定的政治局面而号召人民支持行动党的候选人的。



他是一个历史系副教授。这就是他的对新加坡建国历史的专业学术见解和结论?!无语。   lau     《新加坡联合早报》为了配合行动党推出重新出版李光耀的‘电台12讲’,由御用媒体人韩永梅领军组团精心炮制了一套《解读李光耀12讲<争取合并的斗争>》的广播讲话视频。这丫鬟确实与党国保持一致的口径!     《早报》在为她的《早报制作电子书 《解读李光耀十二讲》简易阅读版附广播音频》是这么写道:(见: http://www.zaobao.com.sg/special/report/singapore/sg50/others/story20141011-398869#sthash.rbhk8XHP.dpuf”) (见:http://www.zaobao.com.sg/special/report/singapore/sg50/others/story20141011-398869)(《解读李光耀十二讲》简易阅读版附广播音频见如下网址:http://www.zaobao.com.sg/lkyradiotalk/


“疑团”、“谍影”还没揭开吗?   咱们就暂且别说韩永梅可以去请教她的老爸韩三元,一个自称是‘新加坡的文史工作者’或者是‘曾经参与新加坡的左翼政党、工会组织反对李光耀提出的新加坡加入马来西亚的条件斗争的过来人。’   就如张志贤所说的:



还是那句话:这些丫鬟们和那位副教授一样:他们都是属于吃皇粮的!他们必须睁眼睛说瞎话!   李光耀   2013年11月由历史学韦杰夫、谭炳鑫、孔莉莎和前政治拘留者共同撰写的一本极其重要、经受得起与行动党对质的书:《新加坡1963年的冷藏行动50周年》已经把当年在新加坡加入马来西亚前以及马来西亚后的所有历史文件档案公诸于世了!这本书的作者包括了历史学韦杰夫、谭炳鑫、孔莉莎从英国档案馆解密的档案。同时,除了林清祥、林福寿、陈仁贵等几位主要领导人往生外,当年参与领导这场斗争杰出的领导人其他重要领导人包括了傅树介、赛.查哈利和陈国防等。他们撰写了当年这场具有历史意义的反对新加坡加入马来西亚的斗争经过。


冷藏行动中文版                    新书:1963年冷藏箱的50周年

  李显龙于2014年10月4日在国大的一个讨论会上说,‘学术讨论历史问题不会受阻挠’。 李显龙讨论历史不会受阻挠     我们遵循李显龙的话。   为此,本网站从2104年10月30日到2104年11月24日上载了有关以新加坡社会主义阵线为首的左翼政党和组织有关反对由英国殖民主义者幕后推动、时任的马来亚联合邦总理东姑.阿杜拉曼和新加坡自治邦总理李光耀阴谋策划的“大马来西亚联邦计划”的历史文献的。同时,我们也把由韩永梅领军制作的李光耀的《解读李光耀十二讲简易阅读版广播视频》同时上载。


(一)在2104年10月30日上载了第一篇资料《当前宪制斗争的任务》。(见网址:   https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/10/30/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba/)   《当前宪制斗争的任务》   (二)2014年11月2日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《合并问题》。(见网址:     https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/02/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba-2/

(三)在2014年11月5日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《公民权问题》。(见网址:     https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/04/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba-3/

(四)在2014年11月6日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《国会代表权问题》。(见网址:     https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/06/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba-4/

(五)在2014年11月8日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《自主权问题》。(见网址:     https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/10/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba-6/

(六)在2014年11月11日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《财政经济问题》。(见网址:     https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/10/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba-6/

(七)在2014年11月13日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《大马来西亚问题》。(见网址:   https://www.dropbox.com/s/6wfom2e6xdpp8va/%E7%AC%AC%E5%85%AD%E9%83%A8%E5%88%86%EF%BC%9A%E3%80%8A%E5%A4%A7%E9%A9%AC%E6%9D%A5%E8%A5%BF%E4%BA%9A%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98%E3%80%8B-%E3%80%8A%E5%90%88%E5%B9%B6%E3%80%81%E5%81%87%E5%90%88%E5%B9%B6%E5%92%8C%E9%82%A6%E8%81%94%E3%80%8B.ppsx?dl=0   《合并、假合并和邦联》   (八)在2014年11月15日上载了《行动党重新祭出李光耀的灵位—‘电台12讲’改变不了走下神台的噩运!关于重新上载新加坡社会主义阵线反对李光耀提出的“合并”出版的历史资料的说明(三)》——社会主义阵线机关报《阵线报》(上)网址:   https://www.dropbox.com/s/kg4qz4mejx2zqei/%E7%A4%BE%E9%98%B5%E9%98%B5%E7%BA%BF%E6%8A%A5%EF%BC%88%E4%B8%8A%EF%BC%89.ppsx?dl=0

(九)在2014年11月19日上载了《行动党重新祭出李光耀的灵位—‘电台12讲’改变不了走下神台的噩运!关于重新上载新加坡社会主义阵线反对李光耀提出的“合并”出版的历史资料的说明(三)》——社会主义阵线机关报《阵线报》(中)网址:     https://www.dropbox.com/s/mvdr84lgbgwxo27/%E7%A4%BE%E9%98%B5%E9%98%B5%E7%BA%BF%E6%8A%A5%EF%BC%88%E4%B8%AD%EF%BC%89.ppsx?dl=0

(十)在2014年11月21日上载了《行动党重新祭出李光耀的灵位—‘电台12讲’改变不了走下神台的噩运!关于重新上载新加坡社会主义阵线反对李光耀提出的“合并”出版的历史资料的说明(三)——社会主义阵线机关报《阵线报》(下)(完结篇)》网址:   https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/21/%e8%a1%8c%e5%8a%a8%e5%85%9a%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e7%a5%ad%e5%87%ba%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e7%9a%84%e7%81%b5%e4%bd%8d-%e7%94%b5%e5%8f%b012%e8%ae%b2%e6%94%b9%e5%8f%98%e4%b8%8d-3/   社阵党徽   (十一)在2014年11月224日上载了《第四代行动党重新出版李光耀的《电台12讲》要给年轻一代灌输什么?——学习李光耀为了达到个人的政治野心:必须不惜使用造谣欺骗、奸诈阴险和忘恩负义的手段!》   (见网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/24/%e7%ac%ac%e5%9b%9b%e4%bb%a3%e8%a1%8c%e5%8a%a8%e5%85%9a%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e7%9a%84%e3%80%8a%e7%94%b5%e5%8f%b012%e8%ae%b2%e3%80%8b%e8%a6%81%e7%bb%99%e5%b9%b4/ 已故林清祥  已故陈仁贵 已故林福寿

赛查哈利           傅树介




第四代行动党人道现在还得依靠捏造新加坡的左翼组织为马来亚共产党的外围组织的关系的挫劣伎俩!那只是老祖宗所说的 :穷驴技穷!  







2.所谓‘帝国主义与当地政权双管齐下的措施凑效,加上左翼本身过左的意识 形态和行动,特别在中国文化大革命的严重影响下,导致自身的式微,新、马及砂拉越左翼终于全面走出历史。’





不论是‘历史御用历史学者 ’或者‘马共和左翼历史问题专家’在‘论述’‘李光耀电台12讲’的共同点是什么?










1.历史学者已经在《新加坡1963 的冷藏行动50周年》所揭露的李光耀当年是否列出一份几百名要在马来西亚成立前进行逮捕的名单的事实?    











李光耀的哭是:     马来西亚的东姑阿都拉曼在短短的609天把他给抛弃了!对于李光耀而言,这是他自1950年代以来第一次被人彻底的出卖!



























他们采取了采取合稀泥的变相的手法。他们在谈论50、60 和70年代的新加坡左翼运动始终保持一贯手法:不论左翼运动是蓬勃发展时期的历史还是遭受严重挫折的时期,他们都把这一切划入与马共操控的结果有关。    
























第四代行动党 从2011年5月全国大选以来,尽管他们使劲的进行所谓的‘调整’过去50年来李光耀一手制定的无限量和无限制的引进外来移民政策,但是,事实的发展还是无法让行动党摆脱一直处于被动挨打的处境!为了挽救自己日益走下神台的噩运!为此,第四代行动党被迫祭出李光耀的这具活动的尸体出来——50年前的‘电台12讲’。
























































































  • 第四代行动党重新出版李光耀的《电台12讲》要给年轻一代灌输什么?——学习李光耀为了达到个人的政治野心:必须不惜使用造谣欺骗、奸诈阴险和忘恩负义的手段! 


  • 50年前,新加坡左翼组织和领导人对李光耀提出的新加坡加入马来西亚的合并是虚假、是经不起历史的考验的!





  • 第四代行动党必须为李光耀当年以新加坡的左翼政党组织领导新加坡各族同胞进行反对新加坡加入马来西亚的斗争是马来亚共产党的统一战线的活动、是亲共分子为了要在新加坡建立一个共产主义的国主权,而与马来亚联合邦政府和英国殖民主义者在196322日引用‘公安法令(后改称为‘内部安全法法令’)进行了一场彻底消灭新加坡左翼政党和组织的‘冷藏行动’设调查庭,恢复和平反这件历史政治迫害的冤案!




























































李光耀    张志贤


  1. 2104年10月30日上载了第一篇资料《当前宪制斗争的任务》。(见网址:



















  1. 我们已经在2014年11月6日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《国会代表权问题》。(见网址:









  1. 我们已经在2014年11月8日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《自主权问题》。(见网址:







  1. 我们已经在2014年11月11日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《财政经济问题》。(见网址:








  1. 我们已经在2014年11月13日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《大马来西亚问题》。(见网址:










































行动党重新出版《电台12讲——争取合并斗争历史》——就是:     我们在《关于重新出版新加坡社会主义阵线反对李光耀提出的“合并”出版的历史资料的说明(一)—《当前宪制斗争的任务》和(二)—《合并、假合并与邦联》(见网址:     https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/13/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba-7/)已经说过:

“1.李光耀要否定和否认当年为了消灭新加坡的左翼力量而编织的谎言破产和制造冤案的罪孽历史罪行!     、、    2.为行动党目前处于民怨四起、无法摆脱在目前的困境,企图用重新出版李光耀的《12讲》变相对目前兴起的争取自由、民主化和等的斗争进行恐吓!     ……                           今天第四代行动党爷们不只是要面对李光耀在50年前干下的历史罪孽的问责!更重要的是无法面对日益高涨的民怨和经济问题!这些问题的根源是李光耀在50年前为了要消灭左翼在群众中的影响力和一党独裁的控制新加坡的政治局面,通过无限制和无限量的引进外来移民政策,进而改变新加坡的人口结构和产业工人队伍所造成的余孽!        新的一届国会大选即将上路!但是,第四代行动党爷们目前面的各种问题都束手无策!他们不承认自己的昏庸无能,反而想重施李光耀当年的故!          他们重新出版李光耀的《12讲》就是想通过这种‘曲折救命’的手段,向老百姓灌输和影射:       目前由韩慧慧小姐和鄞义林先生所推动的要求《归还我们的公积金》运动以及由此引伸出来涉及千家万户老百姓切身利益的各种民生课题都是有人在背后操纵和鼓动的!        这就是他们重新出版李光耀的《12讲》的谜底之二。” 社阵党徽-page-001 李光耀               张志贤     我们已经在:

  1. 2104年10月30日上载了第一篇资料《当前宪制斗争的任务》。

(见网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/10/30/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba/)         2.我们已经在2014年11月2日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《合并问题》。         (见网址:https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/02/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba-2/         3.我们已经在2014年11月5日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《公民权问题》。(见网址:         https://wangruirong.wordpress.com/2014/11/04/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e9%87%8d%e6%96%b0%e5%87%ba%e7%89%88%e6%96%b0%e5%8a%a0%e5%9d%a1%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e9%98%b5%e7%ba%bf%e5%8f%8d%e5%af%b9%e6%9d%8e%e5%85%89%e8%80%80%e6%8f%90%e5%87%ba-3/

  1. 我们已经在2014年11月6日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《国会代表权问题》。(见网址:


  1. 我们已经在2014年11月8日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《自主权问题》。(见网址:


  1. 我们已经在2014年11月11日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《财政经济问题》。(见网址:


  1. 我们已经在2014年11月13日上载了第二篇资料《合并、假合并和邦联》——《大马来西亚问题》。

(见网址: https://www.dropbox.com/s/6wfom2e6xdpp8va/%E7%AC%AC%E5%85%AD%E9%83%A8%E5%88%86%EF%BC%9A%E3%80%8A%E5%A4%A7%E9%A9%AC%E6%9D%A5%E8%A5%BF%E4%BA%9A%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98%E3%80%8B-%E3%80%8A%E5%90%88%E5%B9%B6%E3%80%81%E5%81%87%E5%90%88%E5%B9%B6%E5%92%8C%E9%82%A6%E8%81%94%E3%80%8B.ppsx?dl=0       8.我们已经在2014年11月15日上载了社会阵线报(上)网址:       https://www.dropbox.com/s/kg4qz4mejx2zqei/%E7%A4%BE%E9%98%B5%E9%98%B5%E7%BA%BF%E6%8A%A5%EF%BC%88%E4%B8%8A%EF%BC%89.ppsx?dl=0         当年在以林清祥为首的左翼杰出领导人的领导下,以新加坡社会主义阵线的干部为核心力量,领导了新加坡左翼政党、工会、文化艺术团体和学生团体进行反对李光耀提出的虚假合并的斗争。       社会主义阵线的党机关报《阵线报》以及各个组织都通过本身的宣传刊物报道有关群众参与这场斗争的情况,社阵的《阵线报》是其中的一份宣传及时、全面和具体报道有关这场斗争情况的刊物。       为了让建国一代重温50年前新加坡人民反对李光耀提出的虚假合并计划以及让年轻一代知道带上的历史真实的一面,我们将分上、中和下三辑上载《阵线报》的有关的历史资料。       社会阵线报(中)网址:     https://www.dropbox.com/s/mvdr84lgbgwxo27/%E7%A4%BE%E9%98%B5%E9%98%B5%E7%BA%BF%E6%8A%A5%EF%BC%88%E4%B8%AD%EF%BC%89.ppsx?dl=0